Plaintiffs' Post-trial memorandum of law in support of its motion to disqualify counsel

30 August 2002



IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA
CIVIL DIVISION

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG
SERVICE ORGANIZATION, INC.

Plaintiff,

v.                              CASE NO.: 00-002750-CI-20

DELL LIEBREICH, individually and as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Lisa McPherson; ROBERT MINTON;
THE LISA MCPHERSON TRUST;
DANDAR & DANDAR, P.A., and
KENNAN G. DANDAR,

Defendants.
__________________________________/



PLAINTIFF CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SERVICE
ORGANIZATION'S POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL


PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This case has been marked by untoward liberties taken by Kennan Dandar ("Dandar"), 
his brother Thomas, and their law firm, Dandar & Dandar, P.A. ("D&D"), including, 
inter alia:
1.  D & D's submission to Judge Cope of Thomas' "$400 per hour" fee affidavit, for 
work allegedly charged to his partner, Kennan Dandar, as exacerbated by the 
disingenuous explanation of it offered by Thomas and Dandar to this Court;  
2.  Dandar's obstruction of the January, 2001, deposition of Liebreich by asserting 
specious "privilege" claims and instructions not to answer for over an hour and a half of 
questioning, conduct which was abated only after a stern warning to Dandar by this 
Court;  
3.  Dandar's later, additional discovery misconduct which impelled this Court to impose 
$11,824.26 in sanctions upon him;   and
4.  Dandar's machinations in not honoring hearing commitments before this
Court,   and in purposefully scheduling other cases to create a conflict he could then offer 
to this Court as an excuse for his inability to attend here.  
As bad as this conduct is,   it pales next to the recent revelations which precipitated the 
disqualification motion at bar.
Specifically, Dandar (and D & D) stands accused of conduct which is not merely among 
the most serious ethical violations an attorney can commit, but is, in part, criminal. That 
conduct by Dandar (and D &D) includes:
1) Misappropriating for his own personal use monies contributed by Robert Minton to 
and for the exclusive benefit of Dandar's client, the Estate;
2) Commingling his personal funds and the funds of D & D with client trust funds.
3) Violating the staff ruling by the Florida Bar in October, 1997, that Minton could not be 
allowed to interfer with counsel's independent professional judgment in the wrongful 
death case;
4) Directing Minton to withhold responsive documents duly requested in discovery, and 
to commit perjury respecting the money he entrusted to Dandar, Minton's involvement in 
strategy sessions pertaining to the conduct of the wrongful death case, and the agreement 
under which a Minton-selected anti-Scientology group was to receive the lion's share of 
any recovery in the wrongful death case; and
5) Repeatedly, in briefs, orally and in sworn statements, making misrepresentations to the 
courts, including, inter alia, receipt of the Minton money, theft of the Minton money and 
that the money was, indeed, to be used solely for the benefit of the Estate's costs in the 
wrongful death case.
In this post-trial brief plaintiff, Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization ("the 
Church"), shows that the evidence of Dandar's misconduct, as charged, is overwhelming, 
reaching well beyond the point of any possible, reasonable doubt.  Indeed, as to at least 
the theft of the Minton money and the commingling issues, these accusations are 
conclusively established by Dandar's own statements  both before this Court and other 
courts  with Minton's testimony merely corroborating them.  In fact, as discussed below, 
as to two of the hotly contested issues before this Court ("strings or no strings" on the use 
of Minton's money and the source of the two Swiss bank checks), Dandar has now 
admitted that the Church's allegations  and Minton's testimony  are true.
Respecting the accusations at bar that do involve, at least in part, a clash between 
Minton's and Dandar's testimony, as this brief shows, it was Dandar, not Minton, who 
had the knowledge, apprehension of the truth emerging about certain key events, and the 
legal skills to fabricate cover stories; it was Dandar, not Minton, who would suffer the 
consequences of truthful disclosure; and thus, it was Dandar, not Minton, who had the 
motive to, and would receive, the benefit of the fabrications.
Despite the seriousness of the charges of misconduct he faced when these hearings began 
before this Court, and despite his ethical obligations to fully cooperate, not to obstruct, 
this Court's search for the truth,   Dandar elected to exacerbate the situation by his 
conduct during these hearings, including:
1) Committing perjury before this Court;
2) Offering repeatedly shifting and inconsistent stories.  Indeed, what is most remarkable 
is Dandar's simultaneously arguing totally inconsistent factual positions, (e.g., respecting 
who owns the Minton money and, more importantly, whether it had "strings or no 
strings") to different courts as it suits his purposes;
3)   Resorting to evasiveness and dissembling in refusing to answer questions or to 
produce documents properly demanded;
4)   Enlisting his client, Liebreich, to provide sworn testimony (respecting the Minton 
money), that Dandar knew was false; and
5)   Attempting to obfuscate and deflect attention from the real issues at bar by making 
baseless accusations that the Church's counsel improperly coerced or threatened Minton 
to provide his damning testimony here against Dandar.
In sum, while the compelling evidence establishing the conduct Dandar stood accused of 
at the beginning of these hearings itself impels disqualification here, by his further 
misconduct during these hearings, Dandar has himself provided this Court with 
additional, compelling grounds to disqualify him and D & D.  
Finally, the disqualification the Church here seeks does not even begin to recompense it 
for the damage Dandar has caused by his perjury, subordination of perjury and 
instructions to Minton not to produce relevant documents.  The Church has been obliged 
to spend tens of thousands of dollars in discovery to overcome the Dandar-created 
obstacles.  Accordingly, the Church requests that in addition to disqualification, this 
Court award to the Church and against Dandar and D & D, the Church's legal fees and 
expenses incurred as a proximate result of Dandar's misconduct, in an amount to be fixed 
hereafter.
THE EVIDENCE
1.  Whose money is it anyway?  Strings or no strings?
Preliminarily, one of the few things everyone agrees upon is that the entirety of the 
$2,050,000 provided by Minton is all one transaction subject to only one agreement.  
According to Minton, it was all entrusted to Dandar as counsel for the Estate to be used 
exclusively to defray the Estate's out-of-pocket expenses in the wrongful death case, 
while according to Dandar's original story to this Court, the Minton money was all one 
transaction but it was all a personal loan to Dandar with no restrictions, "no strings," as to 
how he used it.  
This agreement that there was one transaction is important because it eliminates any 
possibility that part of the Minton money was for the Estate and part of it was for 
Dandar's personal use, i.e.  two transactions  a circumstance that would require this 
Court to determine how much of the Minton money was attributable to each transaction.  
Thus, this Court's determination as to the entire $2,050.000 is somewhat simplified as 
that there are only two choices  either it is all for the Estate's use and benefit or it is all a 
"no strings" loan to Dandar.
The evidence presented to this Court, including the unimpeachable documents, most of 
which were created by Dandar himself, demonstrates to a moral certainty that from his 
first check in October, 1997, through his last in March, 2002, every dime Minton gave to 
Dandar was entrusted to him as counsel for the Estate and was intended by Minton  and 
clearly understood by Dandar   to be solely for the Estate's out-of-pocket expenses in 
litigating the wrongful death case.
First, Minton's testimony before this Court is that:
Q.... Mr. Minton, I would like to go over with you. Last time you mentioned that the 
purpose of the funds you gave to Mr. Dandar, the Ken Dandar or 
Dandar & Dandar, whatever, that the agreement was that they were 
to be used to pay the expenses of the Estate in the wrongful death 
case.  Do you remember that testimony?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, are you clear on this that that was the only intention, the 
only allowed use of those funds, the expenses of the Estate in the 
wrongful death case?
A. Well, from the beginning that's always been the understanding.
Q. Okay. And that understanding was reached with Mr. Ken 
Dandar in October of 1997?
A. Yes.

(Ex. 6, Minton, April 19, 2002, pp. 81-82.)

Second, Minton's testimony is corroborated by his contemporaneous notes on his checks 
to Dandar, dated October 6, 1997, August 27, 1999, January 4, 2000, and May 25, 2001, 
each reciting that the funds were "for [the] McPherson" case.  (Plaintiffs' Hearing Exhibit 
1; Ex. 6, April 19, 2002, pp. 85-86.)
Third, Dandar's own contemporaneous letters to Minton dated October 9, 1997, May 12, 
1999, June 17, 1999, each recited his client's, the Estate's, thanks (not Dandar's) for 
Minton's donations/loans (Pl. Hrg. Exs. 9, 11 and 12).  Indeed, even Dandar's last letter 
to Minton pleading for money  his February 26, 2002, letter  expresses the Estate's 
thanks for his past contributions and requests more money, not for Dandar's personal 
use, not for him to use anyway he sees fit, not money with "no strings," but money to see 
the wrongful death case through trial. (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 73).
Fourth, Dandar's other contemporaneous statements  both oral and written  to various 
courts confirmed exactly what Minton has consistently said   i.e., that the monies were 
given for the Estate's exclusive use and benefit in defraying its costs and expenses in the 
wrongful death litigation:
...the family doesn't have to pay [Minton] back unless they think they got enough 
money and there's no restrictions on how the money is spent except for the Lisa 
McPherson case."

(Pl. Hrg. Ex. 21, October 1, 1999, Hearing before Judge Moody, p. 45.)

Robert S. Minton has provided funding to the Estate of Lisa McPherson through 
plaintiff's counsel to defray the costs of the wrongful death lawsuit against the 
Church of Scientology for the death of Lisa McPherson.

(Pl. Hrg. Ex. 24, January 3, 2001, Plaintiff's proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions 
of Law on Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Witnesses and Motion for Protective Order 
[regarding Minton].)
The plaintiff had testified in her deposition and the plaintiff filed an affidavit with 
this Court saying there is no agreement whatsoever with Mr. Minton except to try 
to reimburse him if sufficient recovery in this case.

(Pl. Hrg. Ex. 25, Hearing, January 4, 2001 before Judge Quesada, p. 76.)

...no agreements exist between the Estate or any other person or entity to do 
anything except repay loans used for the express purpose of funding the litigation.

(Pl. Hrg. Ex. 94, February 26, 2001, Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim with Prejudice, p. 
7.)
Fifth, as compelling is the contemporaneous sworn testimony of Liebreich herself (at 
least before Dandar induced her to change her story, see infra ) that her understanding 
from Dandar   respecting the Minton money, was precisely what Minton had said.  Thus:
Q.  Well, you do consider the money that Mr. Minton has given to be money for 
the benefit of the Estate of Lisa McPherson?
A.  Yes.
Q.  So that is not Mr. Dandar's money to go buy his wife an anniversary gift or 
himself some personal item; is that correct?
A.  Right.


(Pl. Hrg. Ex. 32, Liebreich, May 24, 1999 Deposition, p. 173.)

The testimony of Dandar's trial consultant, Dr. Michael Garko is equally emphatic.  Dr. 
Garko testified that he was on a retainer with Dandar, (Ex. 13, Garko, Tr. August 29, 
2002, pp. 102-103),   and agreed that he worked with him on daily basis as his "number-
one advisor" from a trial jury consultant's perspective. (Id., pp. 98-99.)  Dr. Garko 
testified that he never heard Minton refer to the funds given to Dandar as a "loan":
Q.  Did you ever hear Mr. Minton classify the money that he gave me over the 
years as a loan to me or a loan to the estate?
*   *   *
A.   I never heard him use the word loan.
Q.   Did he ever say who the money was going to?
*   *   *
THE WITNESS:  The money was going to the estate.

(Ex. 13, Garko, Tr. August 29, 2002, p. 32.)
Dr. Garko went one step further, testifying that the funds from Minton were specifically 
not to be used for Dandar's personal enjoyment:
Q.   When did you hear Mr. Minton [make] any statement concerning who the 
money is going to?
A.   Over the years over the two or three years, the three years that I was working 
as the trial consultant on the case, we had conversations with Mr. Minton, you and 
I, and I can't remember the exact times or places, but it was clear to me that when 
we did talk about the money that the money was going to the estate to fund the 
litigation, that is, the Lisa McPherson wrongful death case.  That was my 
understanding based on conversations that you and I had with Mr. Minton at 
various points in time over the three years.
***
Q.   Can you recall for us specifically where this conversation took place?
A.   It wasn't just one conversation, Mr. Dandar.  When we did speak with Mr. 
Minton about funding in the case, it was clear to me that he intended the money to 
be channeled or funneled or whatever, directed, to the estate to be put in trust, 
some trust account, and to be used to fund this case.  That was my understanding.  
I mean --.
Q.   But what were the words of Mr. Minton?
A.   I don't remember his exact words, but I can tell you what I didn't hear him 
say.  I didn't hear him say here's some money, go have a good time.  I mean, that's 
not what he said.  I inferred it was implied I concluded from our conversations 
with him, even as recently as 2002 when we went up to New Hampshire that the 
money was to be used to fund the litigation.  That was my understanding.  I mean, 
that's as simple as it is for me.  I mean, that's what it was and that's what it is in 
my [mind] as I sit here today testifying under oath.

(Ex. 13, Garko, Tr. August 29, 2002, pp. 33-35.)

At the outset of these proceedings, Dandar's sworn position was that every dime of the 
Minton money was a personal, nonrecourse, interest-free loan to him, not to his client, 
and that there were no strings on these loans, that Dandar was free to use the funds any 
way he saw fit, including for D & D's general overhead expenses, for Dandar's personal 
expenses and even for Dandar's personal investments and indulgences, such as buying 
luxury items.   As he later explained:
I could use that money any way I saw fit, period.  I could buy five estates and a 
warehouse and cars and yachts and planes and everything else that Mr. Rosen 
accused me of.  But -- I could do anything I wanted to with that money.

(Pl. Hrg. Ex. 97, Dandar, June 6, 2002, pp. 739-740.)

It was only after Dandar was confronted with this mountain of evidence during these 
hearings that he attempted to change his story mid-stream.  That fabrication of this 
second story, is discussed, infra, as is Dandar's latest, damning admission  i.e., his third 
story, just debuted before Judge Schaeffer in July, that regardless of the recipient of the 
money  Dandar or the Estate  there was a "contractual relationship" between Dandar 
and Minton that the money was to be used for the Estate's expenses in the wrongful death 
case, i.e., that there were, indeed, "strings" to Minton's money.  (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 82, 
"counterclaim" at p. 4,  4.)
According to the tale he has told this Court, Dandar was free to use the Minton money 
any way he wanted, in his sole discretion, without accounting to his own client, the 
Estate, for any of it,  free to use as much or as little of it as he alone decided for the 
Estate's expenses in the wrongful death case, because "the money was all mine."     But 
even before his admission in the counterclaim this month before Judge Schaeffer (id.), 
Dandar's story was exposed for the fabrication it is by his own conduct:
First, if the Minton money was, from the outset, a personal loan to Dandar with "no 
strings" and Dandar was free to use it as he wanted, it was not necessary for Dandar to 
seek an advisory opinion from The Florida Bar before taking the first check in October, 
1997.  Surely, if Dandar obtained a personal loan from a bank, or other lender, of money 
he could use any way he wanted, he would not seek The Florida Bar's approval even if he 
intended to use some of those proceeds to front the expenses on a contingent fee case.  
Thus, the fact that he sought counsel of The Florida Bar shows that the money was 
entrusted to him for the benefit of his client and, critically, that it was earmarked solely 
for one particular case.
The second glaring flaw in Dandar's prevarications is his testimony that, before accepting 
the first Minton check, Dandar solicited and obtained his client's approval (Ex. 6, 
Dandar, April 19, 2002, pp. 177-178).  Here again, Dandar surely would not have 
solicited Liebreich's approval were he to have borrowed money from a bank or other 
lender that he was free to use any way he wanted.  Dandar did not solicit Liebreich's 
approval when, in 1999, he applied for a mortgage
on his new home.  Thus, the only reason Dandar sought his client's approval was that 
Minton's money came with "strings," including his involvement in the conduct of the 
wrongful
death case.   
Third, Dandar apparently never told his own client about the size of Minton's donations, 
individually or in the aggregate, or that the Minton money was not for the Estate's 
benefit, but a "no strings" loan to Dandar.
Fourth, while Dandar has shown himself to be a master of the self-serving letter, and 
while he employed that device to acknowledge Minton's "donations" (Pl. Hrg. Exs. 9, 11, 
12), at no time did he ever memorialize in a letter to Minton or even a memo to the file 
that his claimed arrangement was all a personal nonrecourse loan to him, and that he was 
free to use the funds any way he wanted.  Thus, Dandar would have this Court believe 
that he somehow neglected to reduce to writing the existence and the most significant 
interest-free nonrecourse terms of a $2 million loan, surely the largest amount of money 
Dandar had ever seen.   And Dandar would also have this Court believe that as a lawyer, 
and a sophisticated person who invests in real estate (Ex. 7, April 30, 2002, pp. 204-205) 
and stock market mutual funds (id., pp. 173-175; Pl. Hrg. Ex. 58A, 59), he was content to 
expose himself  and perhaps his own estate    to a later suit by Minton to recover $2 
million plus interest, all by neglecting to document the terms of the loan.
Dandar purposefully did not memorialize what he says now are the terms of the Minton 
loan for one reason:  had he sent Minton a letter memorializing what Dandar tells this 
Court were the loan terms, he could well expect an outraged response from Minton who 
obviously thought he was not only lending the money to the Estate, but more importantly, 
that he was lending it solely for use in the wrongful death case, not for Dandar to use to 
buy himself a yacht.  Thus, Dandar never memorialized what he says now were the loan's 
term  not in a letter to Minton; not in a letter to his own client; and not even in a file 
memo or a note to his own brother and law partner, Thomas.
Fifth, Dandar has offered this Court no explanation for his complete silence, for his 
failure to "correct" Minton as to the "strings" term of the loan in the face of Minton's 
notations on his personal checks to Dandar  from the first one in October, 1997, and on 
each of his subsequent checks including right through his last one in May 2001 (Pl. Hrg. 
Ex. 1)  that the funds were "Re Lisa McPherson Scientology case," or "for McPherson."  
And the reason Dandar never said a word about these notations is obvious  he was 
secretly converting the money and the last thing he would do is tell Minton, by writing 
him to "correct" these errors or otherwise.
Moreover, Dandar's "my money, no strings" story is wholly inconsistent with common 
sense.  Here, there is no dispute that:
1)   Minton and Dandar did not know each other  had never even met or  communicated 
 before September, 1997, as far as Dandar knew (Ex. 6, April 19, 2002, pp. 307-308.);   
and
2)   From the outset Minton expressed and Dandar acknowledged Minton's intention to 
continue his crusade against Scientology through the vehicle of the Estate's wrongful 
death case.  Yet Dandar would have this Court believe that Minton not only loaned the 
money to Dandar personally, not to the Estate, but that Minton did not even care whether 
his money was used to advance his anti-Scientology agenda or whether Dandar used it for 
his personal benefit.
Consistent with the familiar axiom that nobody ever told just one lie, Dandar was obliged 
to fabricate incredible explanations for his conduct that were hopelessly inconsistent with 
his "its my money, no strings" story.
First, Dandar repeatedly testified that the reason the Minton money was a loan to him 
personally, not to the Estate, was that it was he, not the Estate, who was obliged under his 
retainer agreement with the Estate to advance the costs of the wrongful death action (Ex. 
6, April 19, 2002, pp. 172, 231, 306-307).  This was the keystone to Dandar's attempt to 
explain why the loan was to him, although it does not explain, and indeed, contradicts, 
Dandar's "no strings" story.  More importantly, however, when Dandar was then 
confronted with his retainer agreement (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 52) which, in the second 
unnumbered paragraph, expressly provides that the client, not Dandar, is responsible for 
advancing costs, Dandar's falsehoods were exposed, leaving him with no ability to 
explain his perjured testimony save for some feeble attempt to reference some other 
agreement ("I'm just not understanding why its not in there. Maybe its somewhere else.") 
(Ex. 6, April 19, 2002, pp. 346-348), which to this day, Dandar has failed to produce.
Further, that Dandar fabricated specially for these hearings that he, not his client, was 
obliged to advance the costs of the wrongful death case, is conclusively established by 
Dandar's August 2, 2002, filing of an accounting with the probate court. That filing (Pl. 
Hrg. Ex. 95) discloses, for the first time, a 1998 settlement with one of the original 
defendants in the wrongful death case and the disposition of the settlement proceeds.  
Specifically, out of the $100,000 settlement proceeds, Dandar took a 40% contingency 
fee for himself, distributing $40,000 to the Estate's beneficiaries, and retained the 
remaining $20,000 as his client's advance deposit against future costs in the case.  (Id., 
Schedule B.)  And despite this, Dandar swore under oath that it was his, not his client's 
obligation to advance costs.
Second, respecting the letters Dandar wrote to Minton acknowledging his "donations" 
and expressing his client's (not his) thanks for the money (Pl. Hrg. Exs. 9, 10, 12), 
Dandar was unable to explain them, offering only evasive doubletalk:
Q. ...Why don't you give the Court any explanation you have for why, in 
writing back to Mr. Minton to acknowledge receipt of what you're telling 
us is a loan to you, you thank him for his, quote, donation?
A. Because that's the way I dictated it back in October of '97. There's no 
explanation for it.
Q. But we can agree, sir, that if I lent you money it would be a mistake to 
call that a, quote, donation, right? We would call it a loan, right?
A. It's a donation if the case is lost. It's a loan if the case is won. And that's 
exactly how Mr. Minton correctly identified it in his deposition.

(Ex. 6, Tr. April 19, 2002, pp. 209-211.) (See, also, id., pp. 229-230, 236.)

But what is remarkable here is that Dandar, who has a penchant for parsing sentences and 
who employs semantic word games to defend his conduct, could offer nothing coherent 
about his use of the word, "donations," in his letters to Minton:
Q...  [T]his letter says that you have advised, second paragraph, "Please be 
advised if the client does consent and is very appreciative of your 
donation." The client you are referring to in the second paragraph is Dell 
Liebreich, right?
A. No, it's the Estate.
Q. The Estate which is operated through Dell Liebreich as personal 
representative?
A. Correct.
Q. So when you said "the client" you were referring to Ms. Liebreich as 
the representative of the client?
A. Yes.
Q. She's the one who said, I consent and I'm appreciative, right?
A. Right.
Q. So, let's see if I understand this, does a client have to consent to 
somebody making a personal loan to you, Mr. Dandar?
A. That's what the Florida Bar said.

(Ex. 6, Tr., April 19, 2002, pp. 213-14.)

Similarly remarkable is Dandar's inability to explain why his client was thanking Minton, 
as Dandar stated in his letters to Minton.  (Id.)  According to Dandar, he, not his client, 
was responsible for advancing the costs of suit, thus, Minton's largesse was of no benefit 
to the Estate.  It was only a benefit to Dandar who was spared the most customary 
conditions   interest and recourse  for a loan he would otherwise have to obtain from a 
bank.  Moreover, why would Liebreich thank Minton for making a personal loan to 
Dandar that he was free to use solely for his personal expenditures?  What difference 
would it make to Liebreich if Minton gave her attorney money to buy himself realty, 
mutual fund shares, or a yacht?  Did Liebreich thank the bank that gave Dandar a home 
mortgage in 1999?
Next, Dandar's scheme to convert the money and his multiplying inconsistencies were 
further exposed by the issue of who repays Minton out of the recovery in the wrongful 
death case.  Dandar has repeatedly stated to the courts that at the end of the case, it is 
only the Estate that will repay Minton out of the proceeds of the case for all the monies 
he advanced.
Based upon this, were one to believe Dandar's current "no strings" story, one would be 
obliged to conclude that Dandar, after misappropriating the lion's share of the Minton 
$2,050,000, was maneuvering to have his own client repay his "personal loan" out of the
proceeds.   
Similarly, Dandar's statements to the courts have repeatedly claimed that this Estate   
not Dandar  will decide whether and how much to repay Minton. (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 21, Tr. 
Oct. 1, 1999, p. 45; Pl. Hrg. Ex. 98, Tr. December 4, 2000, p. 65.)  The Estate would not 
be the one to decide if Dandar were to repay a personal loan.   The Estate would not 
decide whether Dandar pays his home mortgage.   The reason that all of the pre-hearing 
testimony was that the Estate decides payment is because the agreement with Minton is 
that the Estate and only the Estate would get the benefit of the money  not Dandar.
As Dandar explained how the proceeds of the wrongful death case would be divided, two 
things became clear:
1) Dandar's order of distribution makes Dandar, not his client, the principal financial 
beneficiary of any recovery or settlement; and
2) Dandar's own financial interest may well lie in abandoning his duty to his client and 
losing the wrongful death case.
As Dandar explained, out of any gross recovery, he gets his 40% contingent fee off the 
top.  The Estate then decides how much to reimburse Minton for the costs and expenses, 
and then Dandar repays Minton for the portion of the $2,050,000 Dandar had used for 
non-Estate expenses. (Ex. 7, Tr., April 30, 2002, pp. 188-191.)  To appreciate this 
arrangement, assume a $1 million recovery in the wrongful death case.  Assume further, 
an allocation of Mr. Minton's monies to be $850,000 in litigation expenses and $1.2 
million in "personal loans" to Dandar. For the sake of this argument, ignore RTC's 
$600,000 judgment against the Estate plus any judgment for damages and contractually 
required attorneys' fees the Church gets in this case, all of which must be paid.
From the $1 million, Dandar takes his 40% off the top. That gives Dandar $400,000 
against which $1,200,000 is owed to Minton for his "personal loan," leaving Dandar a net 
loss of $800,000. The Estate grosses $600,000 from the recovery, with an obligation to 
repay $850,000 in litigation expenses, resulting in a net loss of $200,000. A $1 million 
recovery is a major financial setback for both Dandar and the Estate.
Now, assume the same facts except for a $3 million recovery. Dandar's 40% off the top 
gives him $1.2 million gross, less that same figure for the "personal loan," leaving 
Dandar at net $0 for all his time and effort as an attorney.
Upon these assumptions, the Estate would gross $1.8 million from the $3 million 
recovery and net $950,000, less than its counsel's contingent fee.  Obviously, if the 
personal component of the repayment obligation exceeds the assumed amount, even a $3 
million recovery results in a net loss for Dandar.
But it gets worse.
According to Dandar's description of his agreement with Minton, the loan to Dandar is 
non-recourse and need not be paid back if the Estate loses the wrongful death case. (Ex. 
6, Tr. April 19, 2002, pp. 210, 211).   Thus, by his own account, if Dandar loses the case, 
he gets to keep all of the estimated $1.2 million of Minton's money he has converted to 
his own use.  Indeed, the only way Dandar does as well personally as pocketing $1.2 
million by losing the case, is to get a verdict of more than $6 million  one that would not 
likely stand  out of which Dandar's 40% off the top would yield him $1.2 million net 
after repaying $1.2 million to Minton. 	Therefore, Dandar's "it's my money, no 
strings" tale places him in the unethical position of being at odds with his own client by 
creating a situation wherein his own personal gain lies in losing the wrongful death 
case.   In addition, when one adds the 40% contingent fee Dandar would get from a 
recovery to the "contingent" (i.e., nonrecourse) payment he says he received from 
Minton, Dandar would be paid twice for his legal services, raising additional ethical 
questions.
Dandar has been unable to offer any explanation for the countless times that he sat mute 
in depositions while witnesses (e.g. Minton, Liebreich) gave sworn testimony that the 
Minton money was loaned to the Estate, not to Dandar, and that it was to be used solely 
for the Estate's expenses in the wrongful death case  not to satisfy Dandar's personal 
avarice.  Dandar was present throughout all of the deposition testimony given on these 
subjects by Minton and Liebreich, discussed supra.  (Pl. Hrg. Exs. 70, 32, 99, 100.)   
While Dandar does not hesitate to create extensive errata sheets of "corrections" to 
deposition transcripts and file them with this Court, see, Dandar's errata to Liebreich's 
January, 2001, deposition transcript, (Ex. 9), Dandar filed no errata to this issue in any of 
these depositions, but now tells this Court that they were all incorrect.
The evidence even indicates when Dandar formed the intent to convert the Minton 
money: between October, 1997, and February, 1998.  Specifically, when Dandar received 
the first Minton check in October, 1997, he properly deposited it into the D & D client 
trust account.  (Pl. Hrg. Exs. 8 & 9.) That was the last check Dandar deposited into his 
trust account. When he received the second Minton check in February, 1998, he 
deposited it and every subsequent check into either the D & D operating account or one 
of Dandar's personal accounts (Pl. Hrg. Exs.10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 58A, 59.)
But no matter the overwhelming evidence against him, no matter that he has been unable 
to present a single witness or a single document to corroborate his testimony, Dandar was 
trapped into sticking to his "it's mine, no strings" story because he could not admit his 
plan to get as much money as he could from the golden goose, Minton, and then to take 
the lion's share of it to enrich himself.  If he conceded that the Minton money belonged to 
his client and came with strings, he would have to admit his conversion, or, at a 
minimum, improper commingling.  The only way to cover those acts of misconduct was 
for Dandar to fabricate the "it's mine, no strings," story and stick to it no matter how 
much evidence piled up showing it to be false. Thus, to this very day, Dandar has refused 
to provide any accounting of how Minton's $2,050,000 has been spent, not to his own 
client, not to this Court, not even in the accounting he was ordered to file with the probate 
court. (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 95).
To insure that the Church and no third party ever found out that he had converted the 
Minton money, Dandar resorted to the subterfuge that whenever he had to pay expenses 
in the wrongful death case or this case, instead of drawing the check on his personal 
account or the
D & D general account where the Minton money was, he first transferred it to the D & D 
client trust account and then issued the checks on that account so that it would appear to 
the recipient and anyone who saw the checks, that the Estate's expenses were being paid 
out of his client trust account.  (Pl. Hrg Ex. 15A.)  Dandar's explanation for this two-
transaction payment method  itself damning evidence of his guilt  is that this made the 
accounting easier.  (Ex. 6, Tr., April 19, 2000, pp. 199-200).  In truth, however, Dandar 
understood that if he issued checks to the Church's expert witnesses on his personal 
account or on a D & D account, it would raise a question why his client's money was in a 
non-trust account. Dandar's solution was the two- transaction payment method that he 
now claims he employed because it is simpler than a one-step payment method.
Although he had already received $1,800,000 from Minton as of June, 2001, and 
although he likely spent only a fraction of it for the Estate's expenses in the wrongful 
death case, when Minton announced that he would provide no more money (Def. Hrg. 
Ex. 1, e-mail, August 24, 2001), Dandar first made a public plea for funds (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 
93, Internet Posting), had Ms. Liebreich make a public plea for donations (Pl. Hrg Ex. 
58), and then wrote to Minton on February 26, 2002, (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 73) pleading 
desperately for more money to complete the case.  This evidence lays bare the whole of 
Dandar's scheme.  He was not just engaged in converting the lion's share of the Minton 
money and diverting it from its intended use, but was dealing dishonestly with his own 
client in telling her he was running out of the money needed to try her case.
Further evidence of Dandar's scheme to defraud Minton and his own client is apparent 
from the events of April and May, 2000.  Dandar, claiming to Minton a need for more 
money for the wrongful death case and asking that it be in untraceable funds so he could 
hide it (see, infra), prevailed upon Minton to give him the first Swiss bank check of 
$500,000 that Minton arranged to have issued on May 1, 2000, and then personally 
delivered to Dandar. (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 5).     But Dandar claimed it was not enough, and on 
May 4, 2000, the accommodating Minton gave Dandar another check, a personal one for 
another $50,000 (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 81).   And consistent with Dandar's criminal conduct, by 
his letter to Minton dated February 26, 2002, (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 73), Dandar, despite having 
already received $1.8 million from Minton and having spent, at most, a fraction of that in 
the course of the wrongful death case, pleaded poverty and begged Minton for more 
money to complete the case.
Next, is Dandar's disingenuous claim that the two Swiss bank checks totaling $750,000 
were not Minton's money, but came from some unknown benefactor.  Here, Minton's
testimony is:
Q. ... beyond the 1.3 million of personal checks that you signed made out to either 
Ken Dandar or Dandar & Dandar for purposes of defraying the cost, the expenses 
of the wrongful death case, did you, sir, provide any additional monies for that 
purpose to either Ken Dandar or the firm of Dandar & Dandar?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Will you tell us, please, what you did?
A. I caused two checks, one in the amount of five hundred thousand dollars to be 
issued to I believe it was Ken Dandar in around May of 2001 and an additional 
check for two hundred and fifty thousand dollars I caused to be issued to Mr. 
Dandar in February or early March, late February, early March time frame of this 
year.
Q. And were those checks of the same kind, mainly checks drawn on your 
personal account and signed by you?
A. No, sir.
Q. What kind of checks were these?
A. These were checks that were issued by Union Bank of Switzerland.
Q. The New York office of that bank?
A. No, the Zurich office. They were payable -- no, they were issued by the 
Geneva office of Union Bank of Switzerland. I think they were payable at Union 
Bank of Switzerland New York.
Q. So these are in the nature of bank checks that don't have a depositor's name on 
it like Robert Minton, but have the name of the bank?
A. Correct.
Q. And both of these checks, five hundred thousand and two hundred and fifty 
thousand, were made out to whom, sir?
A. I believe they were both made out to Ken Dandar.
Q. Can you tell me how it came about by way of discussion with Mr. Dandar, Ken 
Dandar as to how you came to issue these two checks for seven hundred and fifty 
thousand dollars total?
A. Well, sometime in Springish of 2001, Mr. Dandar said, you know, he needed 
money to continue with the case and basically bring the case to trial and, you 
know, he requested that I get him some money. And, you know, and he said that 
he wanted to do this in such a way that it didn't appear that the money came from 
me.
He mentioned several reasons why he didn't want it to appear to come from me. 
Number one, that the wrongful death case was getting to be extremely messy 
because of my financial contributions to the case.
Secondly, that he did not wish to run this money through his trust account. That 
he had another means of hiding this money from the Scientologists as well as 
some of his employees.
He mentioned specifically Michael Garko and Tom Haverty where I think Mr. 
Dandar was trying to, as he explained to me, trying to cut back on payments to 
them in order to conserve money to continue the case.
Q. Did Mr. Dandar say anything to you on the subject of whether you should or 
should not disclose these payments?
A. Yes. He said, you know, that these should not be known that they are from you 
and you shouldn't -- as recently as March he said, you know, I haven't revealed 
these payments to the Court and you shouldn't reveal them to the Court.

(Ex. 10, Tr., April 9, 2002, p. 6-9.)

Q. Okay. If I -- did there come a time in February of 2002 when you issued 
another or caused to be issued another bank check to Mr. Dandar?
A. That's correct.
Q. May I ask you, sir, to open what is in front of you the folder that is marked 
Exhibit 6.
A. Sorry. Just one second. Did you say February 2002?
Q. I'm sorry, March of 2000.
A. It was March, yes.
Q. March of 2002. And would you open the folder that is marked Exhibit 6, 
please, sir?
A. Just one second. Yes.
Q. Could you tell us -- tell the Court what that is.
A. That's a check for $250,000 payable to Ken Dandar issued by Union Bank of 
Switzerland dated March 7th, 2002.
Q. You --
A. Drawn on Chase Manhattan Bank in New York.
Q. And you caused that check to be drawn --
A. I did.
Q. -- by Union Bank of Switzerland?
A. I did.
Q. Okay. Now, prior to the delivery of this check to Mr. Dandar, were there any -- 
was there any conversation which led up to this between you and Mr. Dandar?
A. Ah, yes. There were numerous conversations. Mr. Dandar came to visit me in 
New Hampshire in early February along with Dr. Garko for the sole purpose of, 
you know, soliciting funds for the case.
And, you know, I had been somewhat reluctant in the past few months prior to 
that meeting to give money, give any further money. And so Mr. Dandar and Mr. 
Garko came up there to, you know, give me a sort of sales pitch on the state of the 
case.
Q. And was there any discussion at that time about how to issue what kind of 
check to provide by way of funds; whether it be a personal check or another Swiss 
Bank check?
A. Um, yes, it was discussed obliquely though. It was discussed in an oblique way 
because Dr. Garko was there. And going back to that May 2000 event, if I could 
just, because this is somewhat relevant to --
Q. Sure.
A. -- the issue of the March check. As I had stated before in this Court, one of the 
principal things that Mr. Dandar had said to me at the time was that he was going 
to not tell his trial team, basically, that he had money, and that he would basically 
be telling them that I wasn't giving money at that stage and he was financing out 
of his own personal retirement account this case.
So, going back to February of 2002 when Mr. Dandar and Mr. Garko came up 
there, because of Mr. Dandar's concerns about Mr. Garko not knowing about 
these funds that he was apparently, you know, putting in this place where nobody 
would find out about it, you know, the discussions at that time were basically 
referring to friends of mine in Europe who might be able to help.
You know, Mr. Dandar would still, if we were in private, he would see, you know 
-- he would say, you know, is Fred going to do anything or not?
Q. Fred meaning his pet name for you?
A. Well, his pet name for the source of funds that didn't necessarily run through 
his trust account.
Q. Meaning -- but that source was you?
A. That's correct.

(Ex. 6, Tr., April 19, 2002, pp. 52-55.)

Dandar's incredible response is that these bank checks were not Minton funds because 
they did not have Minton's name on them. (Id., pp. 267-268). This Court may take 
judicial notice of what the average person on the street knows  that when one purchases 
a bank check (a cashier's check), what one gets is the bank's check and not one drawn on 
the purchaser's account, and that many banks use an instrument that does not have a 
place to identify the bank's customer.  For Dandar to point to the absence of Minton's 
name on these bank checks is meaningless because these checks do not bear the name of 
anyone  not even Dandar's mythical, mysterious, benefactor.  
Dandar's "defense" that these two checks do not bear Minton's name  and therefore are 
not his  is exposed as a sham simply by looking at the checks themselves:  the two Swiss 
bank checks (Pl. Hrg. Exs. 5, 6) employ a form that does not have a place to type in the 
name of the purchaser.
Nor can Dandar explain the coincidence that the first of these checks was handed to him 
by Minton and the second mailed to him by Minton promptly upon Dandar telling Minton 
that he needed more money.  
Equally incredible is Dandar's testimony that while he understood that the Swiss bank 
checks were a loan, not a gift, when asked how he could ever repay this mystery man's 
loan if Dandar did not even know his identity, Dandar responded:
When the case is over and there was money to pay back I would call Mr. 
Minton and say, Who do I write the check to?

(Ex, 6, Tr. April 19, 2002 at p. 221)
The mystery man tale aside, the critical fact is that even according to Dandar, the 
$750,000 in Swiss bank checks were given him on the same basis as the rest of the 
Minton money, i.e., as a loan to be repaid by the Estate out of the proceeds of the 
wrongful death case. (Ex. 6, Tr., April 19, pp. 340-345.)  If this Court finds that the 
Minton money was loaned to the Estate, with strings, it would find, a priori, that the bank 
check funds were also for the exclusive use of the Estate regardless of the source. 
As with the whole of his testimony, Dandar has no witnesses and no documents to 
corroborate any part of his story that the Swiss bank checks were from some third party. 
But what Dandar has given this Court, and what is more enlightening is his remarkable, 
unexplained conduct respecting the two Swiss bank checks in contrast to his October, 
1997, conduct. Specifically, Dandar explained at great lengths that in October, 1997, 
when Minton first appeared and offered him money, Dandar was so suspicious, so 
cautious that he was reluctant to take it. (Ex. 6, Tr. April 19, 2002, p. 174-175.)  He 
testified he would not accept it until he first cleared it with The Florida Bar and informed 
Liebreich and obtained her consent.  (Id., 176-178.)  Yet, when it came to a $750,000 
Swiss bank check, Dandar exhibited no hesitation, no need to clear it with anyone, no 
need to call The Florida Bar, no need to tell his client, and instead, he just deposited the 
funds into his personal mutual fund account.  (Ex. 7, Tr. April 30, 2002, pp. 172-175; 
Exs. 58A, 59.)
Dandar was trapped into fabricating his story of the mysterious benefactor by his own 
avarice.  Unwilling to share the Minton spoils with others, Dandar told Dr. Garko, to 
whom he is indebted for fees for past services as a trial consultant (Ex. 13, Garko, Tr. 
August 29, 2002, p. 102-104), that the Minton money had run out, and he could not pay 
Dr. Garko.  (Ex. 6, Tr. April 19, 2002, pp. 53-54.)  Hence, Dandar's request to Minton 
that he not only provide those funds in untraceable form but that he not say anything 
about them to anyone else, e.g., Dr. Garko.
But this Court need no longer weigh Dandar's "it was not Minton's money" tale 
respecting the two Swiss bank checks because it is no longer a disputed issue.  After 
reviewing his April testimony before this Court, after appreciating how bizarre and 
unbelievable it was, when faced with piercing questions in the wrongful death hearing, 
including from Judge Schaeffer herself, Dandar finally admitted that the two Swiss bank 
checks were, indeed, Minton's money.  (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 96, Tr. June 4, 2002, pp. 334-341.)  
Thus, after wasting this Court's time with his tale about a mysterious benefactor, Dandar 
conceded the truth of Minton's testimony.  Dandar has acted in a manner completely 
consistent with his modus operandi as a witness: "if the record says that, that would be 
correct." (Ex. 7, Tr. April 30, 2002, p. 171.)
In sum, as against Dandar's uncorroborated and unsubstantiated claim that the Minton 
money was a personal, "no strings" loan to him, the overwhelming evidence, including 
out of Dandar's own mouth and word processor, shows that every dime of the Minton-
supplied $2,050,000 was both intended by Minton and understood by Dandar (and 
Liebreich herself), to be for the exclusive use and benefit of the Estate's expenses in the 
wrongful death case, and that Dandar, during the period October 1997  February 1998, 
concocted and has since been carrying out his criminal scheme to steal the lion's share of 
the funds.  And now that Dandar has conceded in his new counterclaim pleading before 
Judge Schaeffer, (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 82, at  4), that his "no strings" talk is false, the primary 
question remaining to be decided by this Court is the remedy for Dandar's fully proven, 
partially admitted misconduct.
2.   Commingling
As discussed infra, Argument, Point 2B, there is little more basic to an attorney's 
obligations than keeping separate his funds from those of his clients.  Because 
commingling creates an appearance, if not a presumption, of attorney theft of client 
funds, a breach of this duty is regarded by the bar as a serious offense.
Here, no matter which story respecting the Minton money that this Court decides to 
believe  Minton's story, Dandar's original "it's my money no strings" story, Dandar's 
mid-hearing shift to a different story,  or Dandar's latest, third story, conceding the 
"strings,"    Dandar has, by his own testimonial admissions, violated the "no 
commingling" commandment.
First, Dandar admits  and the documentary evidence confirms  that Minton's first 
check in October, 1997, was deposited into the D & D client trust account.  (Ex. 6, Tr., 
April 19, 2002, p. 199.) If, as Dandar originally claimed in these proceedings, the Minton 
money, from that first dime, was always a personal loan to him, then Dandar improperly 
commingled those personal funds with his clients' money in October, 1997.
Second, Dandar admits that after that October, 1997, deposit, he transferred the Minton 
money from the client trust account into the D & D general account to pay D & D's 
general overhead expenses such as rent and utilities. (Id., pp. 201-203.)   Thus, if this 
Court were to credit either 1) Minton's testimony or 2) Dandar's first story or 3) 
Dandar's second story or 4) Dandar's third story, it would necessarily find that Minton's 
October, 1997, funds belonged to the Estate and that in transferring the funds from the 
client trust account to the Dandar & Dandar general account, Dandar commingled client 
funds with his firm's general funds, at best.  
Third, it is undisputed that Minton's February 5, 1998, check was not deposited into the
D & D client trust account, but into the D & D general account.  (Pl. Hrg Ex. 10.)  Thus, 
were this Court to credit either 1) Minton's testimony or 2) Dandar's second story   or 
3) Dandar's third story, it would find that these funds belonged to the Estate, and Dandar 
is again guilty of at least commingling, if not worse.
Fourth, it is undisputed that every check from Minton, post-October, 1997, and right 
through February, 2002, (including the two Swiss bank checks), was deposited into either 
a Dandar personal account or the D & D general account.  (Pl. Hrg. Exs. 5, 6, 8-11, 13, 
14, 58A, 59).  Thus, if this Court were to credit either 1) Minton's testimony or 2)  
Dandar's most recent third story (see, Plf. Hrg. Ex. 82, at  4), it would necessarily find 
that Dandar is guilty of at least commingling, if not outright theft.
Evidence of Dandar's improper commingling, and of his further ethical violations is his 
lame explanation for depositing several of Minton's checks (including the two Swiss 
bank checks), into his personal accounts (i.e., his Putnam mutual fund account): "I put it 
into other accounts that made interest.  I was trying to make some money on this money 
so I wouldn't have to keep going back and telling Mr. Minton, Well, do you want to give 
us some more money?"  (Ex. 6, Tr. April 19, 2002, pp. 201-202.)  But Dandar could, 
possibly, have accomplished that by depositing the funds into an account in his client's 
name where it could earn the same interest.
3.   Violation of the Florida Bar Rules of Practice
Dandar's own testimony is that before accepting Minton's first check in October, 1997, 
he first sought an opinion from The Florida Bar.  The Bar purportedly stated that Dandar 
could accept the Minton money for use in the wrongful death case on condition that 
Minton not be permitted to have any say in the conduct of the wrongful death case. (Ex. 
6, April 19, 2002, pp. 174-177.)
The Florida Bar opinion would be consistent with the Florida Rules of Professional 
Conduct 4-1.8(f)(2), which provides that it is improper for an attorney to permit a third-
party who pays that attorney for representing a client "to interfer[e] with the lawyer's 
independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship."  It is not 
necessary that the third-party's conduct rise to that level of "control"; mere "interference" 
renders the attorney's action misconduct.  "Interfere" means "enter into, or to take part in, 
the concerns of others."  Black's Law Dictionary, p. 329 (6th Ed. 1990).
Minton's testimony before this Court (Ex. 10, April 9, 2002, pp. 16-19), was that in the 
fall of 1999, a meeting was convened in Dandar's office to discuss whether to move to 
amend the complaint in the wrongful death case to add Mr. Miscavige (the worldwide 
ecclesiastical leader of the Scientology religion) as a party defendant there.
Minton, Ms. Brooks (who worked for Minton and was paid with his money), and Dr. 
Garko (who worked for Dandar as a jury specialist but was paid with Minton money), all 
participated in this strategy session (apparently to the exclusion of Dandar's "client," Ms. 
Liebreich) regarding the conduct of the wrongful death case (Ex. 10, Tr., Minton, April 9, 
2002, pp. 16-19; Ex. 13, Garko, Tr. August 29, 2002, pp. 50-57) out of which emerged 
the decision to file the motion to amend on December 3, 1999.
Dandar's disregard of The Florida Bar ruling and the Florida Rules of Professional 
Conduct was knowing and intentional.  Indeed, it is precisely because Dandar knew that 
he was violating the Bar's directive that he then instructed Minton and Brooks to commit 
perjury in depositions and to deny and never disclose the strategy meeting with Dandar.  
See, infra.   Dandar has not denied this under oath before this Court.
4.   Improper Directions to Minton re Documents and Deposition Testimony
First, respecting Minton's involvement in the conduct of the wrongful death case in 
violation of The Florida Bar ruling and the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Minton's testimony is that as he and Ms. Brooks  were leaving the strategy meeting in 
Dandar's office, Dandar told them "we should never discuss that this meeting ever 
occurred in any way."  (Ex. 10, April 9, 2002, p. 19).  And later, as Minton was just about 
to be deposed, Dandar reiterated that instruction to Minton to commit perjury by denying 
that the meeting ever occurred:
Sometime prior to my deposition. I don't know exactly when.... Mr. 
Dandar said, do you remember the meeting that never happened, and I said 
no. And he said that's the correct answer.

(Id., pp. 19-20.)

Minton complied, committing the perjury Dandar directed.  (Id.)
Minton's testimony has a distinctive ring of truth.  First, Minton had no reason to lie 
about his involvement in the wrongful death case.   Second, since he is not a lawyer and
would have no reason to be concerned about The Florida Bar rules, Minton lacks any
motivation to lie about those events except to do so at Dandar's request to protect 
Dandar.
Respecting Dandar's obstruction of justice and subornation of perjury regarding the 
Swiss bank checks, Minton swore:
37.   I was later deposed about the amount of money I had provided to 
fund the wrongful death case.  Prior to my deposition Mr. Dandar told me 
to ignore this check for $500,000 and only concentrate "on the checks you 
have written."  When asked in deposition how much money I had 
provided, I testified falsely and omitted this $500,000 check.

38.  I was also served with a deposition subpoena in the wrongful death 
case to produce all documents relating to my payments to Mr. Dandar or 
his law firm.  Mr. Dandar told me not to produce this check for $500,000.  
He said that he had not disclosed this check to the Court and that I should 
not disclose it either.  He told me that I did not have to disclose the check 
because I did not write it.  He said the check came from "Fred." Fred was 
Mr. Dandar's nickname for me as the source of funds that would not be 
traced back to me.

(Ex. 11, Second Affidavit of Robert Minton,  37-38.) (Emphasis in original.)  (See also, 
Ex. 6,

Tr., April 19, 2002, pp. 112-113.)

Minton's testimony bears an unmistakable ring of truth and it is entirely consistent with 
the other evidence.  First, it is consistent with Dandar's scheme of converting the Minton 
money and hiding the two Swiss bank checks even from his confidants, Dr. Garko and 
Thomas Haverty, even as he was crying poverty to them as the reason he could not pay 
them. (Ex. 13, Garko, Tr. August 29, 2002, pp. 102-103.)
Second, Minton, who freely admitted the other monies he gave Dandar, had no reason to 
lie to conceal the Swiss bank check payments.  
Third, Dandar's instructions to Minton not to produce any documents relating to, and not 
to testify about, the Swiss bank checks and Dandar's statement that he had a way to hide 
those funds (Ex. 6, Tr., April 19, 2002, p. 48), is completely consistent with what Dandar 
did with those two bank checks  he deposited them into his personal account, Putnam 
Mutual Fund in Massachusetts (Pl. Hrg Exs. 5, 58A, 6, 59), and not into any of his 
personal accounts in Florida.  Were it not for Minton's recent admissions, there is no way 
the Church or anyone else would have found out about the two Swiss bank checks or 
where Dandar hid them.
But the single most important, most damning aspect of this Swiss bank check affair, is 
that it convincingly and conclusively establishes Dandar's conversion, commingling and 
perjury before this Court on the "whose money is it" issue.  Here, the smoking pistol is 
that the Dandar-concocted justification for Minton not to disclose the Swiss bank checks 
(because Minton had not signed them) is substantively identical to Dandar's explanation 
before this Court that those checks were not Minton's money because his name did not 
appear on them. (Ex. 6, Tr., April 19, 2002, pp. 267-269.)  The inescapable conclusion is 
that both like fables emanated from one single source  Dandar.
The third subject as to which Dandar importuned perjury by Minton  and caused his 
client, Liebreich,  to commit perjury, too  is the 1997 agreement made between Minton 
and the Estate, through Dandar, for the lion's share of any wrongful death case recovery 
to be contributed, through Minton, to an anti-Scientology group. There, despite Dandar's 
evasiveness and perjurious denials that such an agreement ever existed,   the 
overwhelming evidence from everyone else  Minton, Liebreich and Liebreich's siblings 
 all confirm that very agreement and that it was entered into with Minton by the Estate, 
acting through Dandar himself, and while Dandar was present, defending the deposition 
without comment or correction:
A. ... So I said [to Mr. Dandar], well, in order to get these Scientologists 
off of the case that everybody is in this for the money, she ought to just 
agree to donate the bulk of any money that she gets out of this case to a 
cult awareness type organization to keep other Lisa McPhersons from 
happening.  That's it.
*   *   *
Q    And [Mr. Dandar's] response was, what?
A    Well, he says, I've already had that idea but I haven't discussed it with 
Dell Liebreich yet.
Q    Has he since told you that he discussed it with Ms. Liebreich?
A    Yes.
Q    What did he say?
A    He said she agreed to do just that.
Q    When did he tell you this?
A    I think the 5th of December [1997]."

(Pl. Hrg. Ex. 70, Minton January 12, 1998 deposition, pp. 65-66.)

Q.  Is it an accurate description of your agreement that,  is it correct, that 
you, on behalf of the Estate of Lisa McPherson, have agreed to donate the 
bulk of any money that you get out of this case to a cult awareness group?  
Is that accurate?
A. Yes.
Q.  Has that been discussed with your other siblings?
A.  Yes.
Q.  And have they agreed to that?
A.  Yes.
* * *
Q.  What cult awareness group?
A.   Lisa McPherson
Q.  Lisa McPherson what?
A.  Memorial.  It's to help other people."

(Pl. Hrg. Ex. 53, Dell Liebreich May 24, 1999 deposition, pp. 198-199.)

Q. [h]ave you authorized Mr. Dandar, your sister, Dell, or anyone in behalf of 
you, to  to announce that the bulk of any funds that were received from 
this lawsuit against the Church of Scientology will be  donated to a cult 
awareness or an anti-Scientology group?
A.  Yes.  I agree that a substantial amount should be donated to the
Lisa McPherson Cult Memorial Fund.

(Pl. Hrg. Ex. 54, Lee Skelton (Dell Liebreich's sister) May 24, 1999 deposition, pp. 25-
26.)

A    ...  we discussed this recently, that when there was a settlement, that 
the majority of the money would go toward a foundation for Lisa 
McPherson, to prevent things like this happening to anyone else.

(Pl. Hrg. Ex. 55, Ann Carlson (Dell Liebreich's sister) May 24, 1999 deposition, p. 19.)

Q.  Now, do you recall testifying at your last deposition that you and your 
sisters had a discussion about how moneys that might be obtained either in 
settlement or from a judgment in this case would be contributed to a 
foundation for Lisa McPherson to prevent things like this happening to 
anyone else, do you remember testifying to that under oath?
A. Yes.
Q. Is this trust, the Lisa McPherson Trust, that foundation that you were 
referring to when you gave that testimony?
A. Yes.

(Pl. Hrg. Ex. 56, Ann Carlson July 27, 2000 Deposition, p. 225.)  

Q.  Okay. Directing your attention to the end of November -- excuse me, 
the end of 1999 and into the early part of 2000. Mr. Minton, did you go on 
a radio show and announce this agreement with the Estate to contribute the 
lion's share or a substantial amount of the proceeds in the wrongful death 
case to an anticult group?

A.  Yes. This was about the time the Lisa McPherson Trust was being 
formed. You say December of '99?
Q.  December of '99, beginning of 2000, that period of time.
A.  Yes. Yes.
Q.  And you made that statement public based upon Mr. Dandar having 
told you that the Estate had agreed to that?
A.  That's right. And I had previously testified in court about this -- not in 
court, in deposition that this agreement was basically in place.

(Ex. 6, Tr. April 19, 2002 Testimony, pp. 65-66.)

Later on, however, Dandar became concerned that Minton's publication of the agreement 
with the Estate was becoming detrimental to his litigation strategy and he therefore 
enlisted Minton to commit perjury denying that the agreement ever existed.  
The occasion for debuting this perjury was Dandar's motion, dated December 7, 2000, to 
strike Minton from the witness list for the wrongful death trial.  In support of his motion, 
Dandar submitted both an affidavit from Minton falsely denying that the agreement ever 
existed (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 69)   and a like, perjurious affidavit that he prepared and had 
Liebreich sign (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 33).  Dandar submitted those knowing that they were 
perjurious.
Just as was the case with the "whose money is it" issue, Dandar, despite his proclivity for 
filing errata to deposition transcripts, sat through one deposition after another of Minton, 
Liebreich and her sisters, all testifying to the very agreement respecting the proceeds that 
Dandar now denies; and not once did he correct them, not once did he "cross-examine" 
them and not once did he prepare or file errata to "correct" their answers.  Yet in the face 
of over two years of Dandar's inaction during over half a dozen depositions, Dandar now 
tells this Court that all of that testimony was false, that there was never any agreement 
respecting the proceeds of the wrongful death case, and that he did not commit or suborn 
perjury when he denied such an agreement ever existed.
5.    Dandar's Misrepresentations to the Courts  Judicial Estoppel
Despite the Third Circuit's seminal, venerated admonition that attorneys not "play fast 
and loose with the Courts,"  Dandar has continued to do just that.  Indeed, Dandar has  
demonstrated that he will tell a court whatever will aid his argument on the matter there 
at bar, without regard to whether it is true and without regard to whether it is inconsistent 
with statements he has or will make to other courts.
As addressed above, Dandar's assertions to various courts confirmed the testimony of 
Minton that the monies were given for the Estate's exclusive use and benefit in defraying 
its costs and expenses in the wrongful death litigation.  See, (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 21, October 1, 
1999, Hearing, p. 45.)("no restrictions on how the money is spent except for the Lisa 
McPherson case."); (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 24, January 3, 2001, Plaintiff's proposed Findings of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law on Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Witnesses and Motion for 
Protective Order) ("Minton has provided funding to the Estate of Lisa McPherson 
through plaintiff's counsel to defray the costs of the wrongful death lawsuit"); (Pl. Hrg. 
Ex. 25, Hearing, January 4, 2001, p. 76.)("plaintiff filed an affidavit with this Court 
saying there is no agreement whatsoever with Mr. Minton except to try to reimburse him 
if sufficient recovery in the case."); (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 94, February 26, 2001, Motion to 
Dismiss Counterclaim, p. 7)("...no agreements exist between the Estate or any other 
person or entity to do anything except repay loans used for the express purpose of 
funding the litigation.")
These representations were entirely consistent with Liebreich's testimony, affirming her 
understanding respecting the Minton money, (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 32, Liebreich, May 24, 1999 
Deposition p. 173)("money that Mr. Minton has given to be money for the benefit of the 
Estate of Lisa McPherson") and the testimony of Dandar's trial consultant, Dr. Garko. 
("the money [was] to be ... put in trust, some trust account, and to be used to fund this 
case." (Ex. 13, Garko, Tr. August 29, 2002, pp. 33-35.)
Yet these representations were made despite Dandar's claim before this Court that from 
the beginning his agreement with Minton was that there were never any "strings" on the 
money (Dandar's first story), despite even Dandar's alternative claim (his second story) 
that the "no strings" deal was made in 1998.  The "no strings" story is crucial to Dandar's 
need to justify his conversion of client funds to his own use, addressed infra.
Yet, having argued in various discovery disputes the existence of "strings" on the Minton


money, Dandar then took the stand in these hearings and swore under oath that there were 
never any strings on the money, not since October, 1997, or at least since 1998, Dandar is 
now judicially estopped to assert "no strings" before this Court.
The principle of judicial estoppel, borne of the need to bar attorneys from disgracing the 
legal system by playing fast and loose with the courts,  clearly applies here.  See 
Bernard Berman, P.A. v. P. Gary Stern, M.D. , P.A., 731 So.2d 148, 149-150 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1999) (prevents a party from taking "a contrary position" to prevent parties "from 
playing 'fast and loose' with the courts, and to protect the essential integrity of the 
judicial process.") (citations omitted); Lambert v. Nationalwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 456 
So.2d 517, 518-520 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (plaintiff who won settlements based on what he 
alleged in earlier wrongful death case "precluded himself from later taking an 
inconsistent position in order to seek further recovery....").
In the circumstances at bar, it is not only legally appropriate but eminently just and 
equitable to invoke judicial estoppel to bar Dandar from asserting his "no strings" tale 
before this Court.  That is itself dispositive of the motion at bar.  Specifically, if Dandar is 
barred by judicial estoppel from denying that the Minton money was provided for the 
Estate's exclusive use and benefit in the expenses for the wrongful death case, it then 
follows:
1.Dandar is guilty of converting the lion's share of the $2,050,000 which he used
for his personal needs and indulgences; and
2.Dandar has commingled the Estate's funds with his own and with D & D's.
Either of these requires disqualification.   
6.   Dandar's Misconduct During these Hearings
A.  	Dandar's Perjury. 		
There is hardly a word of Dandar's testimony in these hearings that does not exude 
premeditated and calculated perjury. From his feigned inability to answer questions 
unless and until the Church's counsel showed him a document or deposition excerpt (so 
that he could then fabricate a response),  to his shifting stories, now totaling three in 
number, respecting the Minton money (see, supra), to his supposed inability to remember 
anything about what has to be the single most important financial day in his life (the day 
in 1998, that Minton allegedly agreed Dandar could use the money for his own 
indulgences), to his explanation for his letters to Minton thanking him for the donations 
to his client and the absence of any document memorializing the "it's mine, no strings" 
story, Dandar's testimony before this Court is an unbroken quilt of fabrications.
What makes Dandar's conduct unique is not only that he is an attorney, but that he has 
displayed no compunction about looking this Court in the eye and telling a story so 
obviously contrived that no one could possibly believe it. Thus, Dandar repeatedly 
testified that the explanation of why the Minton loan was to him, not to his client, is that 
under his retainer agreement, he, Dandar, was bound to advance the costs, and then held 
to that story even after he was shown his retainer agreement that says otherwise.  Dandar 
then demonstrated his utter contempt of the process of law by offering to this Court that 
he was referring to some other, unidentified  and unproduced-retainer agreement.
Similarly, when Dandar told this Court that the two Swiss bank checks were not Minton's 
funds because Minton's name does not appear on them  and despite that there is no 
place on this form of bank check to insert anybody's name  Dandar told this Court, loud 
and clear, that he would say anything he thought would help him without regard to 
whether it was even plausible, let alone truthful.
In the final analysis, however, it is for this Court to determine the extent of Dandar's 
perjury based not only upon the substance of his testimony and consideration of contrary 
evidence, but his demeanor as a witness.  The Church respectfully submits that this Court 
should find perjury by Dandar.
The Church is not unmindful of the fact that the stakes are high. When an attorney is 
found to have committed perjury, issues greater than disqualification are presented.  But 
it is precisely because Dandar is an attorney that his perjurious testimony is so 
problematic. That perjury not only violates the criminal law, just as perjury by a non-
attorney would, but perhaps even worse, violates Dandar's oath of office and his primary 
obligation as an officer of the court.  The courts are obliged to decide matters, including 
such mundane ones as scheduling conflicts, based largely on the unsworn representations 
of counsel; the alternative of holding evidentiary hearings to resolve any disputed 
representations made by an attorney would concern any court. But when an attorney 
demonstrates his willingness to lie under oath, a fortiori, his unsworn representations are 
worthless.  In sum, it is precisely because Dandar is an attorney that his conduct here, 
particularly on the witness stand, is so offensive.
B.   	Enlisting Liebreich to Commit Perjury
Whether we view it as an act of desperation, it is shocking that in the midst of these 
hearings, facing disqualification and perhaps even more serious consequences, Dandar 
would prevail upon his client to perjure herself.
Specifically, on April 20, 2002, after these hearings had begun, Ms. Liebreich appeared 
for deposition.  Despite her earlier, repeated testimony respecting the Minton money and 
the agreement,   despite that on direct examination by Church counsel, Ms. Liebreich 
was at times consistent with her earlier testimony , Dandar then, on cross-examination of 
his client, elicited contradictory and knowingly false testimony.
BY MR. DANDAR:
Q.  ...Is it your understanding that the money that Robert Minton gave to 
Dandar & Dandar, PA, or to Ken Dandar, your attorney, is a loan to Ken 
Dandar or the PA?
A.  Yes.
Q.  Did he give any money ever to the estate?
A.  No.

(Pl. Hrg. Ex. 61, Liebreich, April 20, 2002 Deposition p. 463.)

It is bad enough that a member of the bar would resort to perjury himself, but to 
importune his client to commit perjury to protect him and to thereby expose his own 
client to civil and criminal consequences, constitutes a complete abandonment of the 
attorney's duty to protect his client.  
C.  	Shifting and Inconsistent Stories
Fact finders, whether they be jurors or judges, are attuned to witnesses who cannot tell 
the same story twice.  Here, Dandar has told three different stories on a significant, 
$2,050,000 transaction.
First, these proceedings began with Dandar asserting that, from the beginning "its my 
money, no strings."   (Ex. 6, Tr., April 19, 2002, pp. 196-198.)
Then, only after two days of being confronted with the overwhelming evidence against 
him, Dandar shifted gears, to his second story that "it's my money no strings" was not the 
initial deal, but became so in a 1998 conversation with Minton.  (Ex. 7, Tr., April 30, 
2002, pp. 196-199.)
But Dandar is unable to remember a single thing about this financially significant event, 
not even approximately when in 1998 it occurred, not where, not anything. (Id., pp. 197-
199.)  And despite Dandar's prior self-serving letters and confirmations of his dealings 
with Minton, (Pl. Hrg. Exs. 9, 11, 12, 73 ; Pl. Hrg. Ex. 82, counter-counterclaim), there is 
no witness and no document corroborating this 1998 course change.  (Ex. 7, Tr., April 30, 
2002, pp. 196-199.)
Dandar's claimed inability to recall anything about this 1998 agreement with Minton is 
reminiscent of a well publicized lecture given decades ago by Chief Judge Edelstein of 
the Southern District of New York federal court as to when "I don't remember" can 
constitute perjury.  One example Judge Edelstein used is a witness who responds, "I don't 
recall" to a question of whether he had ever climbed Mount Everest.  Common sense 
teaches that a person would not forget such a momentous event so that the only 
explanation for an "I don't remember" response is deliberate perjury.
Here, we have a financial Mount Everest, an agreement, according to Dandar, that 
brought over $2 million his way, far more than he had ever seen in his life, and when 
asked about the details of his ascendancy to the top of this financial mountain, all he 
could offer was "I don't recall."  That is perjury  pure and simple.  But it gets worse.
On, July 26, 2002, Dandar filed a pleading in the wrongful death case, on behalf of Ms. 
Liebreich, entitled Answer and Defenses to Counterclaim and Counterclaim, alleging in 
the new counterclaim
In October 1997, counsel for the ESTATE entered into a contractual 
relationship with  Robert Minton, wherein Minton agreed to provide or 
obtain loan money to counsel for all funds necessary to complete litigation 
between the ESTATE and FLAG concerning the wrongful death of LISA 
MCPHERSON.  The ESTATE is a third party beneficiary of this 
agreement in that counsel agreed to fund all litigation, including attorney 
fees and costs, on behalf of the ESTATE, and the agreement with Minton 
and counsel was intended to achieve that purpose for the benefit of the 
ESTATE.

(Pl. Hrg Ex. 82, at p. 4,  4.)

While this pleading does not address to whom the loan was made by Minton  whether to 
Dandar or the Estate  that is unimportant in view of the clear assertion of "strings" i.e., 
that the "contractual relationship," with Robert Minton required that he provide "all funds 
necessary to complete litigation between" the Estate and the Church for the wrongful 
death case, not for Minton to provide funds for Dandar's personal expenses and 
indulgences.
With this new pleading, Dandar has therefore offered a third version of the arrangement 
with Minton, but has in the process come full circle to be simpatico with Minton's 
consistent, unwaivering testimony from the beginning as to the "strings" on the funds he 
provided. While that will surely be helpful to this Court in deciding that now non-issue, it 
is even more compelling on the subject of Dandar's dishonesty.  Having told three 
different, totally inconsistent stories about his ascent to the top of the financial mountain, 
there is no testimony Dandar could offer (save for admissions) that would be worthy of 
belief.
D.   	Evasions, Dissembling and Refusal to Produce
Relevant Documents

Here, as in our discussion of Dandar's perjury, supra, the Church could offer a tome 
respecting Dandar's evasiveness and dissembling that permeates the whole of Dandar's 
testimony.  However, as this Court has heard and seen, Dandar's demeanor and these 
antics, we offer only a brief discussion of the more memorable instances.
First, the Church served a Notice to Produce April 18, 2002, for Dandar and his firm to 
produce, "4. All bank records of Dandar & Dandar, P.A., Kennan Dandar and Thomas 
Dandar showing receipts and deposits of all payments any of them received from Robert 
Minton." (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 50.)
Dandar filed a response (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 51) which, after the usual boilerplate objections 
states:  "Defendant states there are none."  When asked to explain this on the witness 
stand, Dandar offered, under oath:
1)   His father had the records but he died, (Ex. 6, Tr., April 19, 2002, pp. 296-297);
2)   His sister now has the bank records (Id., p. 297.)
3)   Don't ask me, my brother prepared that response. (Id., p. 298, 299);
Dandar finally did admit that he did, in fact, have his personal bank account records and 
those of D & D.  (Id., pp. 298-299.)  Yet to this day, not a single one of these documents 
has been produced.
The Church also sought, via the same Notice to Produce, records of "payments" to 
Dandar and D & D by Minton.  Not a single document was produced and when asked 
about this on the witness stand, Dandar offered that "payments are for wages. Payments 
are not loans or donations."  And since he was not employed by Minton, no responsive 
documents exist.
(Ex. 6, Tr., April 19, 2002, pp. 299-300.)  
Similar semantic gyration was in evidence by Dandar's dissembling in trying to explain 
the word "donation" in his letters to Minton, (Pl. Hrg. Exs. 9, 11, 12), and his efforts to 
"explain" his definition of how a loan becomes a "donation."  (Ex. 6, Tr., April 19, 2002, 
pp. 298-300.)
Equally as dissembling is Dandar's explanation of how he decided which account (his 
personal account or the D & D, general account) he would use to deposit Minton's 
checks.  His explanation was that if Minton, by chance, made a check out to "Ken 
Dandar," as he did three times (Pl. Hrg. Exs. 5, 6, 15), Dandar deposited it into his 
personal account, but if Minton, serendipitously, made the check out to "Dandar and 
Dandar," Dandar deposited it into the D & D's general account. (Ex. 6, Tr., April 19, 
2002, pp. 198-199).  Dandar's repeated testimony, however, is that the Minton money 
was a personal loan to him, Kennan Dandar, and not to D & D.  (Id., p. 241.)  And since 
D & D is not a financial synonym for "Ken Dandar,"  it is little more that mere 
dissembling for Dandar to have testified that monies allegedly loaned to him personally 
were nevertheless deposited into the D & D account and, to boot that it was the 
serendepitous flick of Minton's pen that determined the depository.
Finally, when confronted with his unequivocal written statements that it was the Estate 
who was the only one who had any obligation of repayment to Minton  a particularly 
damning statement     all Dandar could offer was that "the letter's not written 
correctly." (Id., pp. 211-212.)
Dandar also made frivolous testimonial objections to stop damaging testimony from Dr. 
Garko during these hearings.  On direct, Dandar elicited that on April 9, 2002, 
immediately after Minton's testimony recanting his perjured testimony, Mr. Lirot met 
with Dr. Garko and Dandar to give them a debrief of Minton's testimony.  (Ex. 13, Tr. 
August 29, 2002, p. 43.)  On cross, when asked what Mr. Lirot had revealed, Dandar 
asserted a work product "privilege" claim. (Id., p. 105-06.)  However, it was then 
revealed that not only was an expert witness from a disrelated case present during the 
conversation, (id., at 106), but also Patricia Greenway was present  a friend of Dandar 
who is not a consultant, (id., at 111-12) and was therefore obviously not protected by any 
work product claim.
The reason for this frivolous objection became manifest, when Dr. Garko testified that 
Mr. Lirot's debrief included that (1) Dandar had asked Minton to lie under oath during 
Minton's depositions in this case, (id., at 106), (2) that Dandar had concealed from Dr. 
Garko the two UBS checks for $500,000and $250,000, (id., at 106-07), and (3) 
concerning misappropriation of funds. (Id., at 107.)  Yet Dandar denied none of these 
facts, (id., at 108-110), something an innocent person would certainly be expected to do.
Dandar has paraded before this Court his unyielding dedication to evasiveness, to 
stonewalling and to the extraordinary word games he chooses to offer as a defense to his 
indefensible conduct.  That display is unworthy of an attorney arguing a cause, unsworn.  
It is intolerable when offered by an attorney under oath and facing serious charges of 
misconduct.
E.  	Deflection in Baseless Accusations of Misconduct Made  
by Dandar

Perjury, suborning perjury, evasiveness, stonewalling document requests, and calculated 
dissembling do not exhaust Dandar's arsenal.  To those he has added deflection and 
distraction in the form of meritless accusations of misconduct against the Church and its 
counsel.
Following his usual practice of "you just say it" even if you have no proof, Dandar has 
offered as his "defense" here that in meetings held in March and April of this year, the 
Church and its counsel, particularly Messrs. Pope and Rosen, threatened, coerced and 
extorted Minton into bearing false testimony against Dandar.
Those allegations are not merely irrelevant,  but are unprofessional, offensive, 
irresponsible and obviously a desperate effort of one caught dead to rights to distract this 
Court's attention from the real issues.
We will not dignify Dandar's conduct save to note that at the settlement meetings held in 
New York at the end of March (the meetings that Dandar asserts were marked by 
untoward conduct directed at Minton), there were six participants: Minton, Brooks, their 
attorney, a Church representative and two attorneys for the Church, Ms. Yingling and Mr. 
Rosen. Before Judge Schaeffer in the parallel disqualification hearing, Dandar advanced 
his same baseless accusations of misconduct.  Having nothing to hide, all three attorneys 
there in attendance voluntarily waived their work product privilege and produced their 
notes of those meetings, but that was not enough to satisfy Dandar's ulterior motive.
Thus, of the six people in attendance at those meetings, three testified before Judge 
Schaeffer  Minton, Brooks, and Ms. Yingling. All emphatically denied that there were 
any
threats of coercion, any extortion. And given that Dandar had no witnesses to call who 
were at those meetings to refute those denials, one would have thought that any 
marginally responsible attorney would have desisted from this trumped up defense. But 
not Dandar, who apparently sees distraction as his last line of defense.
Thus, at the August 13 scheduling conference with this Court, Dandar announced his 
intention to pursue the "defense," despite his lack of evidence, when he announced that 
Mr. Rosen would be Dandar's first witness when these hearings resumed.  When Mr. 
Rosen testified on August 29, which testimony proved to be irrelevant to these 
proceedings.  Even accepting arguendo, Dandar's baseless accusations that Minton was 
threatened in March and April of this year to bear false witness against Dandar, that 
would not explain the mountain of pre-March, 2000, evidence offered against Dandar, 
including:
1.Minton's checks with their notations;
2.Dandar's misappropriation of them;
3.Dandar's improper commingling;
4.Liebreich's and Dandar's own status and testimony discussed supra requesting the 
Minton money, the "strings" on it, the 1997 agreement respecting the 
disposition of the proceeds of the wrongful death case, etc., etc.
As to these, Dandar will have to come up with better deflection than his accusations 
against the Church and its counsel.
ARGUMENT
Point 1.   The Standards for Disqualification
It is the most fundamental precept of American jurisprudence that conduct that is 
unethical or undermines the integrity of  judicial proceedings strikes at the very heart of 
our legal system.   Thus, while it is certainly not the province of the courts to discipline 
attorneys for breaches of the Rules of Professional Conduct, when presented with 
evidence of an attorney's unethical conduct in a pending case, it is the court's province 
and responsibility to protect the integrity of the legal system by disqualifying the 
offender.  Simply put, the court decides whether an attorney ought be barred from further 
participation in the case before it, while the Bar decides whether that attorney ought be 
barred from participating in other cases.
This distinction was clearly recognized by the Florida Supreme Court in Burns v. 
Huffstetler, 433 So.2d 964 (Fla. 1983).  In Burns, on a consent decree, the trial court 
disqualified the attorney from further representation in the case and had the attorney 
surrender his Bar card to the court.  The Supreme Court ruled that:
... the contempt power may be used as an alternative to formal disciplinary 
proceedings in "cases of lesser infractions."   When the offense is serious enough 
to warrant a suspension or disbarment, however, either The Florida Bar grievance 
process or the judicial disciplinary process must be utilized in order to provide 
appropriate direct review in this Court and to comply with the procedure 
established for reinstatement.

We conclude that the order of contempt requiring petitioner to surrender his 
license as an alternative to incarceration amounts to a suspension from the 
practice of law and that such a punishment may not be imposed as a sanction for 
contempt.   Suspension and disbarment may, however, be sought for the identical 
conduct in the appropriate disciplinary proceedings authorized by this Court . . . . 
We find no basis in this record to vacate the order removing petitioner as counsel 
for the criminal defendant . . . .

Id. at 965 (emphasis supplied.)
While the Rules of Professional Conduct no longer contain a specific admonition "to 
avoid the appearance of impropriety,"  the standard in a disqualification motion still 
remains "the appearance of impropriety." State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company v. K.A.W., 575 So.2d 630, 633-634 (Fla. 1991).  In the present motion, 
plaintiff alleges not merely the appearance of impropriety, but actual impropriety.  The 
Florida Supreme Court adopted from Rotante v. Lawrence Hospital, 46 A.D. 2d 199, 200, 
361 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (1974), the proposition that disqualification is warranted in any 
situation that is "rife with the possibility of discredit to the bar and the administration of 
justice."  State Farm v. K.A.W., supra, at 638.  
In Henriquez v. Temple, 668 So.2d 638 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1996), the appellate court refused 
to disturb a trial court order disqualifying a law firm which surreptitiously obtained 
documents that the trial court, after an in camera inspection, previously ordered were not 
to be produced.  The Third District, citing  Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental 
Finance Corp., 811 F.Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla. 1992)Norton v. Tallahassee Memorial 
Hospital, 689 F.2d 938 (11th Cir. 1982)







A.  	Theft of client's monies.

The Florida Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that misuse of client funds held in trust 
is one of the most serious offenses a lawyer can commit and that disbarment is presumed 
to be the appropriate punishment."  The Florida Bar v. Travis, 765 So.2d 689, 691 (Fla. 
2000)(ordering disbarment where referee recommended 90-day suspension, even though 
attorney cooperated with the Bar, had no prior disciplinary record, presented substantial 
evidence of community contributions, and had an "otherwise exemplary record"); The 
Florida Bar v. Korones, 752 So.2d 586, 590, 591-592 (Fla. 2000)(ordering disbarment of 
attorney who, as personal representative of uncle's estate, misappropriated funds and 
filed a false accounting to cover up what he had done, even though referee recommended 
90-day suspension and attorney had "remorse, financial and familial difficulties, health 
problems, good reputation," and made "restitution to the beneficiaries");  The Florida 
Bar v. Dancu, 490 So.2d 40, 41, 43 (Fla. 1986)(attorney disciplined when he placed 
insurance proceeds in money market account in own name and also kept the interest on 
that account).
Theft of money is, of course, a crime under Florida law.  If the amount stolen is over 
$100,000 or more, it is a felony of the first degree.  Fla. Stat.  812.014.
If misappropriation of client funds results in virtually automatic disbarment and 
constitutes a felony under Florida law, a fortiori, an act of misappropriation creates an 
appearance or reasonable possibility of impropriety and certainly creates public suspicion 
that outweighs any possible countervailing reason why counsel would be kept on a case.  
See The Florida Bar v. Mason, 2002 WL 390009, *3 (Fla.) (The misuse of client funds is 
among those acts that do the greatest damage to the public trust.); The Florida Bar v. 
Graham, 605 So.2d 53, 55 (Fla. 1993)(referring to theft of client funds as "one of the 
most serious offenses a lawyer can commit.").
Here, Dandar has taken funds that were given to him for the benefit of his client and has 
used them for his own purposes.  When his actions were discovered, he gave 
contradictory and false testimony as to the nature of the funds and their intended purpose.  
His acts are improper, and subject to great public suspicion.  No reason exists why he 
should be permitted to remain as counsel.
B.   	Commingling of Funds
Rule 4-1.15, Fla. R.Prof. Conduct requires that:
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer's own property, funds an 
property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection 
with a representation.  All funds, including advances for costs and expenses, shall 
be kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is 
situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person . . . 

As the Third District Court has held:
. . . few breaches of ethics are as serious as the commingling of a client's funds 
and the use thereof for a lawyer's private purposes.  The funds of a client in the 
custody of his lawyer should be guarded and protected as securely as if the same 
were in the custody of the community's strongest financial institution.  The 
relationship between a lawyer and a client is of the highest degree of integrity and 
fidelity.  In handling his client's money the lawyer should guard it with much 
greater diligence and caution than he does his own.

Afrazeh v. Miami Elevator Co. of America, 769 So.2d 399, 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), rev. 
denied sub nom., Smyler v. Afrezeh, 786 So.2d 580 (Fla. 2001), citing State ex rel. The 
Florida Bar v. Ruskin, 126 So.2d 142, 143 (Fla. 1961).
There can be no doubt that an infraction of Bar rules as serious as an attorney's 
commingling of his client's funds with his own also creates extreme public suspicion, as 
well as an appearance or reasonable possibility of impropriety and therefore warrants 
disqualification.  Here, Dandar has taken funds given to him by Minton in trust for 
Dandar's client and placed them in his firm's operating account, as well as his own 
personal accounts, and he has also taken money from his firm's operating accounts and 
transferred it into his client trust account to pay bills from that account so he could 
conceal that they were not in the trust account in the first place.   Not only do his actions 
appear improper or have a reasonable possibility of impropriety, they are improper, and 
there is no countervailing reason to permit him to remain as counsel that outweighs the 
public suspicion created by his actions.
C.  	Violations of Restrictions Imposed by The Florida Bar 
When Minton offered to provide Dandar with funding, Dandar contacted The Florida Bar 
for guidance as to the propriety of accepting funds from Minton. The Bar told Dandar 
that he must comply with the requirements of Rule 4-1.8(f)(2), providing, inter alia, that 
it is improper for an attorney to permit a third party who pays that attorney for 
representing a client to "interfer[e] with the lawyer's independence of professional 
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship."  See Aetna Ca. & Sur. Co. v. Protective 
Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 631 So.2d 305, 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)(even though insurance 
company pays for representation of its insured, it is "precluded from interference with 
counsel's independent professional judgments in the conduct of the litigation on behalf of 
its client").
As shown above, Dandar permitted Minton to interfere significantly in this litigation by 
participating in meetings about decisions to add parties, by having Minton's paid 
retainers on Dandar's trial team oversee his actions and participate in shaping the 
direction of the wrongful death case and by agreeing to take particular actions desired by 
Minton to receive additional funding from Minton.  Thus, Dandar's conduct here, is 
unethical, improper and warrants disqualification.
D.   	Directing Minton Not to Produce Documents 
The Florida Rules of Professional Conduct specifically prohibit a lawyer from 
obstructing "another party's access to evidence or otherwise unlawfully" concealing "a 
document that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is relevant to a pending or 
reasonably foreseeable proceeding."  (Rule 4.3-4(a).)  The rules also prohibit a lawyer 
from  engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (Rule 4-8.4(d)) or 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.  (Rule 4-8.4(c)).  In 
addition, they require an attorney to "make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation" 
(Rule 4-3.2) and to be candid with a tribunal, whether through his own representations to 
the tribunal or through testimony or evidence by witnesses.  (Rule 4-3.3.)
In spite of these obligations, Dandar instructed Minton not to produce documents  the 
two Swiss bank checks showing payments to Dandar  even though they were requested 
of Minton in deposition subpoenas and even though Minton was ordered to produce 
responsive documents.  (See, Orders dated June 5, 2001, and June 14, 2001.)  Minton 
testified that the only reason he withheld these documents was that Dandar told him not 
to produce them or even reveal their existence.  (Ex. 10, Minton, April 9, 2002, pp. 21-
22, and Ex. 6, April 19, pp. 112-113.)
Not only do Dandar's instructions to Minton violate his obligations under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, they also violate his discovery obligations under Rules 1.280, 
1.350 and 1.380 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rule 1.380 provides for 
sanctions against "counsel advising the conduct" that necessitates a motion to compel.
In addition, withholding of evidence constitutes obstruction of justice.  See Vega v. CSCS 
Int'l, N.V., 795 So.2d 164, 167 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); State ex rel. Meyerson v. Askew, 
269 So.2d 671, 674-675 (Fla. 1972).  The Supreme Court views a conviction for 
obstruction of justice as a serious offense against Bar rules.  The Florida Bar v. Wolis, 
783 So.2d 1057, 1060 (Fla. 2001).
By instructing Minton not to produce documents, he has obstructed justice in this case 
and the wrongful death case.  Because Dandar has committed such opprobrious acts, his 
disqualification is required.  See Point I supra.
E.  	Soliciting Minton to Commit Perjury
Equally contrary to Florida law are Dandar's instructions to Minton not to testify 
concerning the Swiss bank checks paid to Dandar when he was asked about how much he 
had given to Dandar, to "backtrack" from his truthful testimony about an agreement 
concerning the proceeds of the litigation, and to deny that he had ever had meetings with 
Dandar concerning the conduct of the litigation and specifically the decision to add David 
Miscavige as a defendant, as well as his solicitation of Minton's signature on a false 
affidavit.  He also had his client "backtrack" on her own prior testimony to protect 
Dandar's own falsehoods, misappropriations, commingling, and ethical violations from 
exposure. 
Minton admitted giving false testimony in this case and in the wrongful death case and 
doing so at the behest of Dandar.  His false statements went to matters material to the 
particular proceedings in which they were made, such as discovery hearings or 
depositions, and also contradicted statements he made previously.   Such falsehoods and 
false contradictions constitute perjury under Florida law.  See Fla. Stat.  837.011 
(definitions), 837.02 (perjury in an official proceeding), 837.021 (perjury by 
contradictory statements).
There is no question that Dandar solicited Minton's perjuries.  Minton testified that the 
only reason he provided the false testimony on these various subjects was that Dandar 
told him to do so.  (Ex. 10 (re Swiss check), Minton, April 9, pp. 21-22; Ex. 6, Tr. April 
19, pp.112-113; Ex. 6, Minton, April 19, pp. 66-68, 72-76 (re secret agreement); Ex. 10, 
Minton, April 9, pp. 16-20 (re meeting to add David Miscavige as party to case.).  
Soliciting someone to commit perjury is a crime under Section 777.04(2) Florida 
Statutes.  Jones v. State, 466 So.2d 293, 294-295 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied 478 So.2d 
53 (Fla. 1985).  It would be a crime even if Minton and Liebreich had not actually 
committed the perjuries.  The "crime of solicitation is completed when the actor with 
intent that another person commit a crime, has enticed, advised, incited, ordered or 
otherwise encouraged that person to commit a crime . . . ."  Id., (citing State v. Gaines, 
431 So.2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); see Fla. Jury Instr., Criminal Solicitation (defendant 
solicited a person to commit a criminal act, and commanded, encouraged, hired, or 
requested the person to do so).
Dandar, an attorney, obviously knew that telling someone to provide false testimony is a 
crime and, therefore, he clearly had the intent that Minton and Liebreich commit crimes 
when he advised, encouraged, and incited them to provide false testimony.  His actions 
violated Section 777.04.
F.       Dandar's Misrepresentations to the Courts.
Throughout the course of this case, the wrongful death case, the probate case, and the 
Texas breach case, Dandar has made repeated misrepresentations to the courts, not to 
mention personally providing false testimony in the form of oral testimony and an 
affidavit.  There can be no dispute that his misrepresentations and false testimony were 
knowingly and willfully made in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including Rules 4-3.3(4), 4-8.4(a)-(d), and other rules as set forth in Point 1.  This is not 
minor, unintentional conduct; rather, it is deliberate flouting of the laws of this state and 
the rules under which an attorney is privileged to practice his profession.  This conduct, 
therefore, warrants disqualification from this case.
Point 3.  	Dandar's Misconduct During the Hearings Before this Court 
also Warrant Disqualification 

During the course of these hearings, Dandar has: (1) personally committed perjury; (2) 
suborned his client to commit perjury; (3) given shifting and utterly inconsistent stories 
about the facts at issue both as counsel and as witness; (4) been evasive concerning 
documents and refused to produce relevant documents; and (5) made baseless accusations 
directed at plaintiff and its attorneys to deflect attention from his own wrongdoing.  This 
conduct is in derogation of the rules cited in Point 1 governing attorney conduct, all of 
which emphasize the requirement of honesty and underscore an attorney's duties as an 
officer of the court to assist in the search for truth and advance the judicial process.  Such 
conduct before the Court cannot be tolerated, and Florida's courts do not tolerate it.
For example, in The Florida Bar v. Agar, 394 So.2d 405 (Fla. 1980), an uncontested 
divorce proceeding, the attorney for the husband arranged for the wife to testify to the 
husband's residency.  Just before the hearing, the attorney informed the wife that the 
practice of the presiding judge prohibited the wife from giving such testimony, and he 
suggested to her that she conceal her identity, testify under a false name, and state that 
she knew the husband because she had done bookkeeping for him, which she did, while 
testifying truthfully on the material fact of residency.  The Supreme Court disbarred the 
attorney for this conduct because he "allowed his client to perpetrate a fraud upon the 
court and, according to the testimony of his client and the false witness, was the one who 
suggested the fraud in the first instance."  Id. at 406; see The Florida Bar v. Lathe, 774 
So.2d 675 (Fla. 2000) (Florida Supreme Court suspended an attorney who made false 
statements of fact concerning his alleged inability to attend a deposition); The Florida 
Bar v. Hmielewski, 702 So.2d 218, 220-21 (Fla. 1997) (suspending attorney for 
"deliberate misrepresentations of material fact" regarding existence of documents).
Point 4. 	Dandar and D & D Must be Disqualified as Counsel for Liebreich here 
Because They are Now Party Defendants in this Action.		

Rule 4-3.7, Fla. R. Prof. Conduct provides that
A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
necessary witness on behalf of the client except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;

(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no reason 
to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the testimony;

(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the 
case; or

(4) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.

None of the exceptions apply here.  Any testimony by Dandar will be hotly contested and 
substantial evidence will most certainly be offered in opposition.  His testimony will go 
far beyond the subject of legal fees.  And the disqualification of Dandar and D&D will 
not cause substantial hardship, as defendant now has another attorney, Luke Lirot, who 
can take over the representation.  Dandar and his firm, therefore, should be disqualified 
now that they are parties in this matter and Dandar's testimony will be necessary.

Point 5.    	The Church Should be Awarded its Costs and Counsel Fees 
Incurred in Discovery Here as a Result of Dandar's Misconduct.

Dandar's conduct has geometrically multiplied plaintiff's discovery expenses and legal 
fees.  For example, instead of deposing him for a single day, plaintiff had to depose 
Minton for multiple days because Dandar instructed him to lie.  It is thus appropriate that 
plaintiff be awarded its incremental costs and counsel fees directly caused by Dandar's 
misconduct.
The Florida Supreme Court recently resolved a conflict among the circuit courts and held 
that a trial court possesses the inherent authority to impose attorneys' fees against an 
attorney for bad faith misconduct.  Moakley v. Smallwood, 2002 WL 276466, 27 Fla.L. 
Weekly S175 (Fla. Feb. 28, 2002); see also Bitterman v. Bitterman, 714 So.2d 356, 365 
(Fla. 1998) (recognizing inherent authority of a trial court to award attorneys' fees and 
costs for bad faith conduct against a party).  Under Moakley, a court may assess 
attorneys' fees under its inherent powers, as long as it makes "an express finding of bad 
faith conduct . . . supported by detailed factual findings describing the specific acts of bad 
faith conduct that resulted in the unnecessary incurrence of attorneys' fees." Moakley, 
2002 WL 276466 at *4; see Lathe v. Florida Select Citrus, Inc., 721 So.2d 1247 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 1998)( upholding imposition of attorneys' fees against an attorney who lied to the 
trial court after he failed to appear for a deposition); Patsy v. Patsy, 666 So.2d 1045, 
1046-47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (affirming trial court's inherent authority to award 
attorneys' fees and costs against attorney for a bad faith motion to disqualify counsel, 
filed without a factual basis and solely to delay the proceedings); David S. Nunes, P.A. v. 
Ferguson Enterprises, Inc., 703 So.2d 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (assessing attorneys' 
fees against counsel who did not attend a mediation and advised his clients that they also 
did not have to attend).
The award of fees should include the costs and expenses incurred as a result of the 
misconduct, including those occurred during the hearing at which the serious misconduct 
is established, and is in addition to the remedy of disqualification.  See Knox, 933 F.Supp. 
at 1586 (disqualifying counsel and awarding attorneys' fees as a result of counsel's 
discovery abuses, including fees incurred with respect to court's hearing on counsel's 
misconduct); see also Kleiner v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1192, 1210 (11th 
Cir. 1985), 751 F.2d at 1210 (ordering disqualification and award of attorneys' fees).
A court also "shall" award attorneys' fees, in specified circumstances, under Rule  
1.380(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, for disobeying a discovery order.  Unlike the 
imposition of attorneys' fees under the court's inherent powers, fees award under Rule 
1.380(d) do not require a finding of bad faith.  Rather, the court "shall require the party . . 
. to pay the reasonable expenses caused . . . , which may include attorneys' fees" unless 
the party can show that the failure to obey the order was substantially "justified."  As 
with an attorneys' fees award for bad faith conduct, the amount of the attorneys' fees 
award is determined by the expenses incurred as a result of the party's disobedience.  See, 
e.g., Tutor Time Merger Corp. v. MeCabe, 763 So.2d 505 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); 
Interamerican Car Rental, Inc. v. Icaro, 559 So.2d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Florida 
Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Ortega, 508 So.2d 493 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
The explicit actions for which fees are sought and the appropriate amount of fees to be 
awarded can be calculated after the Court determines an entitlement.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Dandar and D & D must be disqualified and sanctioned for 
their misconduct.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy hereof has been furnished by HAND DELIVERY 
to Thomas John Dandar, Esq. and Kennan G. Dandar, Esq., Dandar & Dandar, P.A., P.O. 
Box 24597, Tampa, FL 33623-4597; and by REGULAR U.S. MAIL to Bruce G. Howie, 
Esq., Piper, Ludin, Howie & Werner, P.A., 5720 Central Avenue, St. Petersburg, FL 
33707; Thomas H. McGowan, Esq., McGowan & Suarez, L.L.P., 150 Second Avenue 
North, Suite 1500, St. Petersburg, FL 33701; and Luke Lirot, Esq., 112 East Street, Suite 
B, Tampa, FL 3360, this 30th day of August, 2002.
JOHNSON, BLAKELY, POPE,
BOKOR, RUPPEL & BURNS, P.A.




By: ___________________________
F. Wallace Pope, Jr.
Post Office Box 1368
Clearwater, Florida 33757
Tel:  (727) 461-1818
Fax:  (727) 441-8617
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SPN #00002797




	     (Ex. 1, Affidavit; Ex. 2, Hearing April 25, 2001, pp. 147-151.)  Exhibits introduced 
and marked at the disqualification hearings are denominated Plaintiff's Hearing Exhibit or "Pl. 
Hrg. Ex. ___."  Exhibits referenced to this memorandum which are not hearing exhibits, but are 
part of the record of this case, are merely denominated, "Ex." 
	    Ex. 3, Deposition and Hearing Transcript, January 10, 2001, p. 49.
	    Ex. 4, Order dated January 10, 2002.
	    E.g., Dandar's departure from the State for a legal education conference, leaving 
Thomas to cover Dandar's jury trial in St. Petersburg, with the result that neither Dandar nor 
Thomas appeared for the previously scheduled March 14, 2002 hearing before this Court. (Ex. 
5, pp. 3-6.)
	    E.g., Dandar's July 9, 2002, request to Judge Barton of the Hillsborough County 
Circuit Court to schedule the Nelson Trial to begin August 19, 2002 without disclosing that 
seven days earlier, hearings dates were fixed in this case for August 22, 29 and 30 and Dandar's 
subsequent Objections to Set Hearing Dates, citing his manufactured Nelson case conflict. (See, 
Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Kennan Dandar's and Thomas Dandar's Contumacious 
Conduct, filed August 27, 2002.) 
	    It is axiomatic that a lawyer's paramount obligation is, as an Officer of the Court, to 
uphold and advance the judicial process, to assist in the search for truth, a process in which the 
lawyer owes the highest duty of candor to the courts. See, Argument, Point 3, infra. 
	    See, Argument, Point 3, infra. 
	   In addition, this Court's August 14, 2002 Order granting plaintiff leave to amend to 
plead against Dandar and D &D, requires their disqualification from the representation of 
Liebreich here.  See, Argument, Point 4, infra.
	   As discussed, infra, Dandar did modify that original story mid-hearing with a new 
version  that originally the transaction was as Minton has said, but in 1998, the agreement 
changed to Dandar's "it's my money, no strings" version. 
	10  Liebreich had no communications  oral or written - with Minton at all until 
December, 1998, (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 17, Liebreich Depo., May 24, 1999, pp. 162-164), so that her 
understanding of whose money it was and the strings on it was derived from what her own 
counsel told her.
	      The transcript from the hearing of August 29, 2002 is available only in rough form, 
which is what is included as an exhibit hereto.  A final version will be provided to this Court and 
may have different page numbers. 
    12   Ex. 7, Dandar, Tr. April 30, 2002, p. 177.
	   Whether Dandar ever, in fact, sought Liebreich's approval is problematic given that 
apart from Liebreich's story, debuted in these hearings, there is no evidence to support Dandar's 
position.  Indeed, even Dandar's thank you letters to Minton of 1997, 1999 and February 26, 
2002 (Pl. Hrg. Exs. 9, 11 and 12) do not show copies to Liebreich. 
	    Dandar testified in deposition that the largest gross jury verdict he has ever won for 
any client is less than half of this amount.  (Ex. 8, Dandar Depo., January 25, 2001, p. 50.).
	    For example, if Dandar died, his wife, a lawyer herself, would have no way of 
defending an action by Minton to recover his loan, plus interest, and no way of proving what 
Dandar told this court were the terms of the loan. 
	     Dandar testified that he was told he actually met Minton in March of 1997, but he 
could not recall the incident.   (Id.) 
	     It was only when this point was driven home to Dandar during his testimony before 
this Court that he created a different and wholly inconsistent story  i.e., that the Estate would 
only repay the portion of the Minton money that was actually used for expenses of the wrongful 
death case and that he, Dandar, would repay the remainder out of his contingent fee.  (Ex. 7, Tr., 
April 30, 2002, pp. 187-192.)
	    Rule 4-1.7 , Fla. Rules of Professional Conduct generally prohibits conflicts of 
interest, and  4-1.8(a) prohibits lawyers from entering into business transactions that are adverse 
to the interests of their clients. 
	  Minton's testimony that Dandar would hide the untraceable Swiss bank check proceeds 
is borne out by Dandar's own conduct.  Thus, of the three Minton checks that Dandar deposited 
into his personal accounts, the one personal traceable Minton check (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 15) was 
deposited into Dandar's personal bank account in Florida, but the untraceable Swiss bank check 
(Pl. Hrg Exs. 5, 6, 58A, 59) was hidden in Dandar's Massachusetts personal mutual fund.
        20   The court will note here Dandar's inherently inconsistent testimony that while the 
absence of Minton's name from the checks told Dandar that they were not from Minton, the 
congruent absence of the mysterious, benefactor's name from them was of no moment to 
Dandar. 
       21   Dandar told Minton he needed more money at Minton's New Hampshire home in
February 2002 (Ex. 6, Tr. April 19, 2002 at p. 53) and then in his February 26, 2002, letter to 
Minton. The $250,000 bank check was issued on March 7, 2002, (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 6), barely a week 
after Minton received Dandar's letter.  
          22  Dandar's dissembling aside, Minton clearly and unequivocally testified that the two 
Swiss bank checks were his funds (Ex.10, Tr., April 9, 2002, pp. 6-7.)  That testimony is entitled 
to the greatest weight because it is an admission by Minton that he maintained funds in a Swiss 
bank and brought them into the U.S., an admission which could expose him to certain potential 
liabilities under United States tax law. 
	   While Dandar's original story was that the Minton money was his, no strings, from the 
first dime of it in October, 1997, mid-hearing before this Court and right after being confronted 
with the deposition testimony Minton gave in January 1998 with Dandar present (Ex. 7, Tr., 
April 30, 2002, pp. 193-199), Dandar changed to a story that the Minton money was originally a 
loan to the Estate for its exclusive use and benefit but that sometime in 1998, his agreement with 
Minton changed to the "it's a personal loan to me, no strings" story.  See discussion infra.
	   See, Pl. Hrg. Ex. 82, at  4.
	   At worst, and as the Church here charges, that transfer was not merely an improper 
commingling but was an act of theft.
	   Respecting Dandar's second, mid-hearing story that his arrangement with Minton 
changed in 1998, Dandar was not able to provide a clue as to when this change supposedly 
occurred in that year.  (Ex. 7, Tr., April 30, 2002, pp. 196-199.)  And since it is Dandar's burden 
to prove that change, to prove that the February, 1998, funds were not (like the October, 1997, 
funds), the property of the Estate, Dandar's failure of proof as to the date of the supposed change 
requires this Court to find that the February, 1998, funds were, in fact, the property of the Estate 
and that Dandar nevertheless deposited them into a non-client-trust account.
	    While Minton might have had a concern under the tax laws to not disclose that these 
payments came from his Swiss bank account, he certainly could have disclosed the amounts of 
the payments without identifying the depository, or, if necessary, invoking his Fifth Amendment 
privilege were that very question added, just as he had repeatedly done before Judge Schaeffer 
and this Court and as he quite properly could do if the disclosure bears on his potential tax 
liability.  But for Dandar's instruction to commit perjury for Dandar's gain, when he was asked 
at deposition on May 24, 2001, how much money he had given Dandar, Minton could have 
included the $500,000 May, 2000, Swiss bank check when he instead omitted it and responded, 
The total amounted to $1,050,000. (Ex. 12,  10.)
	 
     Q. Okay. Now, sir, you said a moment ago, and I want to make sure I got this 
right, there was never any agreement to contribute the monies  to be recovered in 
the wrongful death case to a cult awareness group, right?
     A. Well, you show me where I said that, Mr. Rosen, because you know that's 
not true.
     Q. Well, sir, was there such an agreement?
     A. Among the family members there was.
     Q. Was there ever an agreement between Dell Liebreich on the one hand and 
her family and Mr. Minton on the other that a substantial, if not that  that all, if 
not a substantial amount, of the recovery from the wrongful death case was  going 
to be contributed to an anticult group?
	     A. No.
	     Q. There was no such agreement?
     A. Let me tell you again, apparently you didn't hear me. There's been no 
agreement with Mr. Minton on disposition of funds outside of trying to pay him 
back.

(Ex. 6, Tr., April 19, 2002, pp. 275-276.)


	   At the hearings before this Court, Mr. Dandar was 
ultimately forced to agree that this 
was "truthful testimony." 	
Q. Now, you sat in this courtroom today and heard as we went over the May 1999 
deposition testimony of Dell, of Ann, her sister, and of Lee testifying to the fact 
that there was an agreement to donate the bulk of the proceeds.  You heard that 
testimony, right?
	A.  That's true testimony.
	* * *
Q.  At any time, did you correct any of those depositions and say, no, it's not 
true?
	A.  No, because that was truthful testimony."  

(Ex. 7, Dandar, April 30, 2002 Testimony, pp. 143-144.)
	   	     Q.  Okay. Mr. Minton, after executing your affidavit, Exhibit 
42, did there then come a time when you were deposed and 
specifically in October of the year 2001 by me in this case, in this 
breach case?
		     A.  Yes, sir.
     Q.  And during the course of that deposition, were you asked a 
series of questions on this very subject, about whether there was or 
was not an agreement?
	     A.  Yes, I was.
     Q.  And did you give answers to the effect that you have been 
mistaken in your radio statement and your Internet announcement? 
Did you backtrack and say there was no agreement?
	     A.  Yes. I backtracked. I misunderstood what Mr. Dandar had told 
		me and ...			
     Q.  You gave a lot of excuses in terms of trying -- a lot of 
reasons and excuses to get away from the agreement that you had 
already made public, right?
	     A.  It was a pretty uncomfortable deposition, yes.
     Q.  Okay. And you did that because of Mr. Dandar's request 
that you had to backtrack because it was hurting the case?
     A.  That's correct and because I had signed this affidavit that he 
wanted me to sign and I had to backtrack at that point."

(Ex. 6, Tr., April 19, 2002 Minton Testimony, pp. 80-81.)
	    Dandar denied that he drafted the Minton affidavit but that is hardly significant.  Far 
more important is the undisputed fact that it came into Dandar's hands and that he submitted it to 
the court knowing it was false. 
	    Scarano v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 203 F.2d 510 (3rd Cir.  1953).
	  See, Scarano, supra.
	    In addition, as discussed, supra, if the Minton money belongs to the Estate, Dandar 
also took the earnings/interest and may have violated a Florida Bar rule by keeping it.  Fla. R. 
Prof. Cond. 5-1.1(e).   Dandar's inconsistent representations also independently violates the rule 
regarding attorney candor toward the Court.  Rule 4-3.3 .
	   	A.  I deny it unless you can show me something to the contrary.  I 
can't sit here and say, oh, yeah, I remember this.  I can't do it.
Q.  Mr. Dandar, your answer is, if I can prove to you that you're not 
telling the truth, then you'll admit it?

(Ex. 7, Tr., April 30, 2002, p. 140.)
	    (Pl. Hrg. Ex. 17, Liebreich Depo., May 24, 1999, pp. 162-63; Pl. Hrg. Ex. 32, p. 173;  
Pl. Hrg Ex. 61, Liebreich Depo., April 20, 2002, pp. 311, 343-44, 345, 347-48, 469-70.)
	  
Q.  I've marked as Exhibit 12 a letter from Mr. Dandar that you produced in 
discovery.  Do you see in the second paragraph that Mr. Dandar says you've 
consented to Mr. Minton providing money for the estate?
A.  I did.  I said I thought it was great.
Q.  So Mr. Dandar asked you if you consent to the money coming to the estate?
A.  That's right.  Yes.
Q.  And you said that was great?
A.  Right.  I said I can't believe somebody is doing that but I think it's wonderful.
Q.  All right.  How many times did you consent to Mr. Minton providing money 
for the estate?
A.  Any time he wanted to.  I don't know how many times, any time he wanted 
to."

(Pl. Hrg. Ex. 61, Liebreich, April 20, 2002 Deposition pp. 343-344.)
	    An attorney who elicits testimony from a witness known to be false violates Rule 4-
3.3(4), Fla.R. Prof. Conduct as surely as when he himself offers false testimony.  And this itself 
is grounds for disqualification.  See Knox v. Hayes, 933 F.Supp. 1573, 1585-86 (S.D.Ga. 1995), 
aff'd, 108 F.3d 343 (11th Cir. 1997)(disqualifying attorney for submitting false affidavit and 
obstructing discovery); see also Burns v. Huffstetler, 433 So.2d 964, 964-965, 966 (Fla. 
1983)("We find no basis in this record to vacate the order removing petitioner as counsel for the 
criminal defendant," in part for attempting "to impede trial by requesting continuances upon 
false grounds....")


	      In fact, Webster's New College  Dictionary, 1999, offers as the definition of "payment" as 
"1. The act of paying or state of being paid. 2. The amount paid.  3. One's due, award, or 
punishment: requital."	
	    Thomas is a partner in the D & D firm (Ex. 6, Tr. April 19, p. 241.).
	      The Church believes that this statement is absolutely accurate in that Minton's 
money was intended to be used exclusively for the Estate's expenses in the wrongful death case. 
Thus, it follows that only the Estate would have any obligation of repayment.  However, were we 
to believe Dandar's "it's my money, no strings" tale, then this statement takes on a far more 
sinister character, for despite what Dandar may testify to here, it certainly appears that 
particularly given Liebreich's total ignorance respecting the whereabouts and use of the Minton 
funds, if there ever were a recovery in the wrongful death case, Dandar's intention is to stick the 
Estate with repaying the Minton money he had misappropriated.
	     See the Church's Bench Memorandum handed up on August 29.
	     Although the Rules of Professional Conduct no longer contain a rule as to the 
appearance of impropriety, aspirational goal 1.1 of the "Ideals and Goals of Professionalism" 
adopted by The Florida Bar Board of Governors admonishes that "[a] lawyer should at all times 
avoid the appearance of impropriety."
	     See also, Matter of Beiny, 522 N.Y.S.2d 511, 523 (N.Y. 1987):

In framing the disqualification issue as they have, as one turning exclusively upon 
the relative prejudice which would be visited on the parties were we to rule one 
way or the other, petitioner's counsel overlook what should have been obvious 
from our decision--that it is not only the interests of the parties which are 
implicated in this case, but the considerable interest of the courts and the public in 
maintaining the integrity of the judicial process and the attorney-client relation.   
Intentional misconduct of the sort committed by petitioner's counsel vitiates and 
demeans the process and, as this motion demonstrates so vividly, results in 
substantial additional burdens being placed on both the courts and litigants.


	 	This principle has been codified in the section on Disbarment in the Rules of 
Discipline: 
Disbarment is the presumed sanction for lawyers found guilty of theft from a 
lawyer's trust account or special trust funds received or disbursed by a lawyer as 
guardian, personal representative, receiver, or in a similar capacity such as trustee 
under a specific trust document.  

Rule of Discipline 3-5.1(g); The Florida Bar v. Mason, .  Theft is the only act for which such a 
presumption was written into the disbarment rule.  
	 	In any situation where ownership of trust funds is disputed, those funds must 
remain in trust until the dispute is resolved.  Rule 4-1.15(c), Fla. R. Prof. Conduct.  
	 	This conduct also violates various Rules of Professional Conduct as addressed 
above in Point 1 and Point D.  See The Florida Bar v. Forrester, 818 So.2d 477, 481-482 (Fla. 
2002)(attorney suspended who had hidden a document during the course of a deposition in 
violation of Bar rule prohibiting concealing of relevant evidence).
	 	Materiality for purposes of perjury has historically been defined as "material to 
the point in question" or "the issue" to which it goes.  Miller v. State, 15 Fla. 577, 1876 WL 
2509, *3 (Fla. 1876).


To Life and Death of Lisa McPherson