Plaintiff's objections to evidence offered post trial in Dandar's closing brief

13 September 2002


	IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
	IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA
	CIVIL DIVISION




CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG
SERVICE ORGANIZATION, INC.
				
			Plaintiff,			

	v.
CASE NO.: 00-002750-CI-20
                                                        		
DELL LIEBREICH, individually and as
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Lisa McPherson; ROBERT MINTON; 
THE LISA MCPHERSON TRUST;
DANDAR & DANDAR, P.A., and 
KENNAN G. DANDAR,

			Defendants.
__________________________________/


	PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE OFFERED POST 
	TRIAL IN DANDAR'S CLOSING BRIEF

	PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

	Over 80% of Dandar's post-hearing brief, and virtually the
entirety of his appendices, address evidence never put before this Court
during these hearings. Plaintiff objects to this evidence in toto on the
grounds that had it been presented during the hearings, plaintiff would
have had an opportunity to address it and, as necessary, call witnesses
to refute it. For example, if Dandar had timely disclosed that he
intended to offer portions of Jesse Prince's testimony before Judge
Schaeffer, plaintiff could have used those very portions to examine
Prince while on the witness stand before this court and could have
cross-examined him on the points contained therein.  Similarly, had
Dandar timely disclosed that he would offer Stacy Brooks' testimony
before Judge Schaeffer, plaintiff could at least have asked Brooks to
come to Florida to testify.  Instead, plaintiff was deprived of any
opportunity to meet or confront any of this evidence by Dandar's
sandbagging tactics of waiting until after the close of the hearing, to
debut the bulk of his evidence. 
	Although at the end of the hearing Dandar told plaintiff and the
court that he intended to offer testimony from certain identified
witnesses, he has filed exhibits and even deposition transcripts from
other cases, none of which Dandar ever presented to this court, and none
of which Dandar ever advised the Court or plaintiff he would be
offering.  
	Accordingly, plaintiff objects generally to Dandar's
post-hearing offer of any evidence not previously presented in this
case.  Beyond this general objection, plaintiff objects in particular
that the evidence offered is hearsay, for which no exception applies,
and much of it is inadmissible on the basis of other specific
evidentiary objections addressed in detail below.
I.	THE TESTIMONY OFFERED IS HEARSAY TO WHICH NO EXCEPTION APPLIES

	Plaintiff objects to virtually all of the evidence Dandar offers
from the hearing before Judge Schaeffer, as hearsay, and otherwise, on
specific grounds.  While the legal bases for most of these various
objections are obvious, plaintiff addresses the reasons that the
particular hearsay exceptions are inapplicable, as follows: 
	1.	Former Testimony
	Dandar may be expected to protest that some of his proffered
"evidence" comes in the form of former testimony, falling within the
former testimony exception of  90.804(2)(a) or as statements against
interest under  90.804(2)(c).   Either way, those hearsay exceptions do
not apply without Dandar showing the unavailability of the witness under
 90.804(1), something he has made no effort to do.
	The Florida standard for demonstrating witness unavailability is
stringent: "If the attendance of the witness cannot be secured by
subpoena, the proponent must attempt to secure the 'testimony' of the
declarant.  This provision [Fla. Stat. 90.804(1)(e)] means that the
proponent must attempt to take the deposition of the declarant and if
the proponent does so attempt and fails, the necessary 'unavailability'
is present."  Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence (2002), 
 804.1, at pp. 859-860.
	Regardless of the opinions of a proponent as to the likelihood,
or lack thereof, of a declarant's availability, the proponent absolutely
must make affirmative efforts to obtain their testimony before he can
avail himself of "witness unavailability."  See Spicer v. Metro. Dade
County, 458 So. 2d 792, 794-95 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984) (declining to find
unavailable a declarant who was "in the Federal Witness Protection
Program at an undisclosable location in the United States," because the
proponent did not "discharge its burden of establishing it had taken any
reasonable steps to procure the witness's attendance."); Rivera v.
Florida, 510 So.2d 340, 341 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987) (declining to find a
witness unavailable, despite threat from a co-defendant to kill the
declarant if he appeared in court).  
	Thus, to avail himself of the  90.804(2) exceptions, Dandar
would have had to demonstrate that the witness was unavailable and that
he had made the requisite efforts to procure that witness's attendance.
Dandar made no showing at the hearing that he tried to obtain the
appearance of any witness not at the hearing.  Thus, Florida law
forecloses him from admitting any hearsay evidence through this
exception.  
	2. 	Purported Prior Inconsistent Statements Offered to
Impeach Are Inadmissible

	Dandar might also claim that some of his new "evidence" consists
of prior inconsistent statements, admissible to impeach those witnesses
who did appear before this court, such as Minton. However, Dandar failed
to lay the proper foundation for availing himself of this exception.
When an otherwise-hearsay statement is offered for impeachment, the
witness on the stand must be confronted with the allegedly impeaching
testimony and be given an opportunity to explain it.  Kimble v. State,
537 So. 2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1989) ("[T]o lay the proper
predicate for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement, the witness
must be advised of the substance of the prior inconsistent statement,
the time and place the statement was made, and the person to whom the
statement was made."); Irons v. State, 498 So. 2d 958, 959-60 (Fla. 2nd
DCA 1986) (excluding testimony of multiple witnesses as to prior
inconsistent statement by another witness, where that witness was not
given an "opportunity to explain or deny").  As Professor Ehrhardt
explains:
Prior to counsel introducing any evidence of an inconsistent statement,
the witness must first be afforded an opportunity to admit, explain or
deny the prior statement.  The witness should be asked whether he made
the prior statement, with identification of the time, place, occasion
and the person to whom it was made.  When the statement is a written
statement or an oral statement which has been reduced to writing, the
court, upon motion of counsel, must order the statement be shown the
witness or its contents disclosed to him.    

Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence (2002),  608.4, at p. 478 (emphasis added).
	By waiting not merely until Minton, Rosen and Garko were off the
stand, but until after the end of the evidentiary hearing, Dandar has
necessarily denied these witnesses any opportunity to "admit, explain or
deny" statements attributed to him by others.  Dandar has thus failed to
lay the requisite foundation for the alleged prior inconsistent
statements of Minton and others that litter his brief, which must
therefore be excluded.
	3. 	Purported Prior Inconsistent Statements Offered to Prove
Truth of the Matter Asserted Are Inadmissible

	Had Dandar sought to rely on the provisions of  801(2)(a),
which permits prior sworn testimony to be admitted for the truth of the
matter asserted, he would have found it similarly unhelpful.  The very
terms of that rule preclude its use for any of the "evidence" that
Dandar now offers:
(2)	A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement and the statement is:

(a)	Inconsistent with the declarant's prior testimony and was given
under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or
other proceeding or in a deposition

 801(2)(a) (emphasis added).  Three portions of this rule deny any use
of it to Dandar.  First, the requirement that the statement must have
been made "under oath" means that any out-of-court statements offered,
including those relayed through another declarant who was under oath,
are not admissible under this rule.  Second, the requirement that the
"declarant testif[y] at the trial or hearing" precludes this rule's use
to admit any testimony from anyone not a witness in this hearing.  
	Third, and most importantly, the rule requires that the
declarant be "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement."
Since Dandar did not present any of his new evidence at the hearing,
while some of the declarants might have been cross-examined but instead
waited until after the end of the hearing and the declarants are no
longer subject to cross-examination, this rule can be of no use to him.
None of Dandar's otherwise inadmissible evidence may be brought in under
this provision.
	4.	Admission of a Party
	Dandar may have tried to argue that at least Minton's prior
statements may come in as admissions of a party, as per  90.803(18).
Any such reliance on the party admission exception would be misplaced
for two related but distinct reasons.  
	First, Minton is not a "party" to the disqualification
proceeding, despite his involvement in the substantive, underlying case.
He has no legally-cognizable interest in whether Dandar remains as
counsel for the Estate; having "no dog in this fight," he is not a party
to it.  The principle that one may be a party to a case but not be a
party to a particular dispute within that case is one this court itself
recognized during the April 9, 2002, continuation of the contempt
hearing against Minton, when it ruled that Thomas Dandar could not
cross-examine Minton on his recantation testimony because Dandar and his
client, the estate, while defendants in this action, were not parties to
the contempt proceeding, a matter solely between Minton and plaintiff.
(Ex. 1, April 9, Tr., p. 26.) This same principle applies here where
Minton, while a party to the underlying case, is not a party to the
disqualification hearing; thus, his out-of-court statements are not
"admissions" of a party.  See Penabad v. A. G. Gladstone Assoc., Inc.,
2002 WL 1285340 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2002), reconsideration denied Aug. 21,
2002 (finding that named plaintiff in underlying matter was not a party
to subsidiary lis pendens proceeding).  
	Furthermore, the "party admission" exception to hearsay,
embodied in  90.803 has another limitation.  The rule requires that the
statement be "offered against a party."  Not only is Minton not a
"party" to this matter as explained above, but Dandar's newly submitted
"evidence" is not being offered "against" Minton.  Minton has no stake
in the outcome of this disqualification proceeding.  Nothing can be done
for, to, or "against" him within its confines.  In particular,
statements cannot be offered against him, because he has no legal
position in this hearing "against" which they might be set.
Accordingly,  803(18) is just as unavailing to Dandar as any of the
other hearsay exceptions.
II.	PARTICULAR WITNESSES
	For the reasons set forth above, and in the list of objections
below, Dandar cannot introduce any evidence that was not presented in
this court.  Despite the multiple valid objections to Dandar's new
"evidence," objections that should have been obvious to him, Dandar
tried to introduce hearsay statements from numerous witnesses.  While
the objections explained above and listed below stand on their own,
complete exclusion of the testimony of specific witnesses is
appropriate, as follows. 
	1.	Minton and Rosen
	While it is of no evidentiary significance, Dandar cannot claim
that the Minton testimony he now offers is new matter that he did not
have when Minton was on the stand here in April.  First, much of the
Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer that Dandar now offers is right
out of Minton's, pre-April, 2002, deposition testimony. Second, Dandar
certainly cannot claim that he was surprised by the Minton testimony
before Judge Schaeffer, because he could have, but chose not to,
question Minton on cross-examination before this Court so as to elicit
that very testimony.  Third, Dandar could certainly have called Minton
as an adverse witness and questioned him on any relevant issue.
	Dandar held back the Minton statements he now tries to introduce
for the obvious reason that he wished to deny Minton the right to
explain those statements.  Dandar also surely wished to prevent
plaintiff from cross-examining Minton on these issues.  In these
circumstances, however, neither Minton's pre-April 9, 2002, deposition
testimony nor his trial testimony before Judge Schaeffer may be used
now, after Minton has left the stand. See Kimble, 537 So.2d at 1096;
Irons, 498 So.2d at 954-60.  
	Moreover, certain of the testimony from Judge Schaeffer's
hearing (i.e., Minton, Leipold, Yingling) is offered by Dandar solely to
impeach Minton and Rosen, who appeared before this court, as to what
occurred at the March 29-30 settlement meetings in New York.   This is
improper for several reasons.  
	First, Dandar had every opportunity to examine and attempt to
impeach Minton and Rosen on the events at that meeting when they
testified here.  It is, therefore, particularly inappropriate for Dandar
to now offer allegedly impeaching evidence from Judge Schaeffer's
hearing that he never confronted Minton or Rosen with in this hearing.
It is black letter law that no witness may be impeached through the
testimony of other witnesses on a collateral matter. See, e.g., Faucher
v. R.C.F Developers, 569 So.2d 794, 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (overruled
on other grounds, Ullman v. City of Tampa Parks Dept., 625 So.2d 868
(Fla. 1st DCA 1993)) ("The law is well settled that it is improper to
litigate purely collateral matters solely for the purpose of impeaching
a party or witness. Once a question is put to the party or witness on a
purely collateral matter ..., the proponent of the question is bound by
the witnesses' answer; it is inappropriate to then try the truth or
falsity of the answer on the collateral matter by adducing independent
proof through other witnesses.")  
	Even assuming, arguendo, that Dandar's baseless claims of
threats, coercion and extortion practiced upon Minton are not
collateral, the question of whether plaintiff's representatives insisted
that Minton cause a termination of the wrongful death case (versus the
testimony, including of Rosen, that it was strongly desired but not put
forth as an absolute condition) is purely collateral.   Even assuming a
demand that Minton bring about an end to that case, that demand is not a
"threat," "coercion" or "extortion."   To be sure, one could expect and
there might well be subtle differences between the recollections of six
different people who attended the March 29-30 meetings, including
differences in emphasis that Dandar tries to exploit,    but at the end
of the day, every single witness -- Minton, Brooks, Yingling, and Rosen
-- testified unequivocally that there were no "threats", no "coercion,"
no "extortion" of Minton.   Regardless, the "evidence" of collateral
matters is entirely inadmissible for other reason, as listed below.
	2.	Brooks
	Stacy Brooks is not a party to this action, and therefore, there
is no basis for offering any of her testimony as an "admission."
Nothing in the portions of the Brooks testimony before Judge Schaeffer
that Dandar offers here constitutes any "declaration against interest"
by Brooks; she has made no statements offered by Dandar subjecting her
to any potential liability.    Brooks was in the courtroom throughout
the April 9 and 19 hearings before this court and Dandar could have
called her as a witness then or subpoenaed her to appear and testify at
a later date.  He did neither.    Thus, for Dandar to now claim that he
may offer Brooks' testimony before Judge Schaeffer on the grounds that
she is now unavailable, would not be well taken.  Her availability, as
well as Dandar's failure to demonstrate that he took any efforts to
secure her presence or deposition in this case, mean that none of her
testimony is admissible under 
 90.804(2)(a) or (c).
	3.	Alexander and Summers
	Peter Alexander and Teresa Summers are not parties hereto, and
their proffered testimony therefore offers no "admissions"; nor does it
offer any "declarations against interest."  They are or were in Pinellas
County and available to testify before this court.  Each of these
witnesses appeared and testified before Judge Schaeffer at Dandar's
request, and he could have made that same request to them for the
hearing before this court.  Indeed, both Summers and Alexander were
present in court during parts of the proceedings and communicating with
Dandar and Mr. Lirot.  It should also be noted that Mr. Lirot
independently represents Alexander in this county (Ex. 9, Tr. of
Proceedings, April 20, 2002, appearances page), and cannot claim
unavailability. 
	4.	Haney, Merrett, Oliver, Many, and Leipold
	Brian Haney, John Merrett, Frank Oliver, Nancy Many and Daniel
Leipold, while living outside of Pinellas County, all voluntarily
appeared and testified before Judge Schaeffer at Dandar's request.
Indeed, Dandar himself recognized his problem when he made his comment
to this court that Haney, Merrett, Leipold and Oliver are beyond this
court's subpoena power (Ex. 10, August 29 Tr., pp. 209-210, 285-286; Ex.
11, August 30 Tr., pp. 503-504), but against Dandar's unsworn
representations, the fact remains that each of these witnesses answered
the summons and traveled here to testify before Judge Schaeffer when
Dandar asked them to do so.
	Dandar presented no evidence, as required, that they would not
have done so had he asked them to travel here again, nor did he present
other evidence that he was unable to secure their attendance.  Both
Haney and Oliver have also been identified by Dandar as his consultants,
are obviously under his control, and Oliver was present during some of
the hearings.  There is no basis to conclude that these witnesses would
not have agreed to testify in person at these hearings and therefore, no
basis to invoke the unavailability rule.  Jones v. State, 678 So.2d 309,
313-314 (Fla. 1996) (requiring the party seeking to use "witness
unavailability" exceptions to the hearsay prohibition to demonstrate
that unavailability); Spicer v. Metro. Dade County, 458 So. 2d 792,
794-95 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984) (finding that proponent's failure to make
reasonable efforts to contact a witness in the Federal Witness
Protection Program vitiated any claim to "witness unavailability").
	5.	Pope and Yingling
	Although both attorneys Wally Pope and Monique Yingling were
available to testify here,  Dandar chose to not call them, but has
instead offered their testimony before Judge Schaeffer, which
constitutes inadmissible hearsay.  Mr. Pope was present during all of
the hearings.
	6.	Prince and Garko 
	The wrongful death case testimony of Jesse Prince and Michael
Garko that Dandar offers here is totally improper.  Neither is a party,
their testimony contains no "admissions" or "declarations against
interest," and, most importantly, both appeared and testified here for
Dandar at Dandar's request.  Instead of eliciting from them on the
witness stand whatever he wanted from their testimony before Judge
Schaeffer, Dandar made a conscious decision to conduct only limited
examinations of these two witnesses and now attempts to "supplement" the
record with their earlier testimony before Judge Schaeffer.  Not
surprisingly, Dandar's brief offers not a single precedent, no case or
rule of evidence, that allows him to offer the prior testimony of an
available and testifying witness.
III.	PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS
	For the court's convenience, plaintiff here presents its
objections in chart form, listing on the left hand side the disputed
evidence offered by Dandar, as identified in his post-trial brief, and
on the right hand side, identifying in shorthand the objections it has
to each part of Dandar's evidence.  As indicated above and in
plaintiff's brief, plaintiff objects to the introduction of testimony
imported from the wrongful death case, but as part of its "fairness"
(completeness) objections, in the event it is permitted, here
occasionally provides more complete testimony from that action.Brf Pg
Evidence	Objections
1	Pltf's Ex.  109-C, before Judge Schaeffer, Exhibit 8 herein, HCO
Policy Letter of 15 August 1960. 	o Irrelevant and immaterial.o
Not authenticated.o Not offered.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at
221-223).
6-7	Garko testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/11/02, Appendix 1,
116:2-10.Garko testified that Dandar did not tell Minton to lie in
Garko's presence.	o Hearsay.o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Improper
comment on Dandar credibility.
10	Pope testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/17/02, Appendix 2,
43:5-13. Q Well, you just told me that if Mr. Rosen apparently told you
to go ahead and file a motion to disqualify me, you didn't know what the
facts were but you trusted he knew what the facts were?A You know, I
suspect Mr. Rosen communicated to me the facts. But I honestly can't --
my -- my present recollection is that the full-blown facts came out at
the hearing of the 9th. That is when I learned the meat on the bones.
o Hearsay.o Irrelevant.Completeness Designation:Mr. Pope testified just
before this, giving a further explanation.  (Ex. 12, Pope testimony
before Judge Schaeffer, 7/17/02, pp. 39-40)
14-16	Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/28/02, Appendix 4,
1239:22-1240:8, 1240:17-1242:14. Minton testimony in the Schaeffer
hearings relating to the timing of the meeting regarding the addition of
David Miscavige.	o Hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment.
16-17	Garko testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/11/02, Appendix 1,
12:7-12.A Okay. I would not consider it a meeting. And this is a
different interaction than is outlined in Mr. Minton's affidavit.  But
present were myself, Mr. Dandar, Ms. Brooks and Mr. Minton. And Jesse
Prince was not there, as alleged in Mr. -- in Mr. Minton's affidavit.
o Hearsay.
20	Dandar testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/4/02, Appendix 5,
245:18-21.Q All right. Now, you testified earlier that you had zero
meetings, as you define meetings, with Mr. Minton to discuss the case.
Is that right?A That is right.	o Hearsay.Completeness
Designation:Dandar testified he had a very narrow definition of
"meeting."  (Ex. 13, Dandar testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/30/02,
pp. 9-10; Ex. 14, Dandar testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/4/02, pp.
291-292.)
20	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/9/02, Appendix 6,
566:3-567:5.Prince testimony in the Schaeffer hearings that Minton did
not attend any meetings relating to adding David Miscavige as a party.
o Hearsay.Completeness Designation:Prince slipped and said Minton was
there.  (Ex. 15, Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/9/02, pp.
575-576)  Prince is also being paid by Dandar to testify as Dandar has
requested.  (Ex. 16, Prince testimony before Judge Baird, 8/30/02, pp.
370-373)
21	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/9/02, Appendix 6,
567:6-25, 568:1-11.Prince testified in the proceeding before Judge
Schaeffer that "Scientology" told Minton and Minton told Prince that
Scientology wanted Minton to take certain actions to get the case
dismissed. 	o Triple hearsay.  o No foundation for impeachment.
21	Prince before Judge Schaeffer, 7/9/02, Appendix 6,
568:12-23.Prince speculated that:  Mr. Minton was in "anguish over the
-- the prospect of -- of lying on behalf of Scientology" and Ms. Brooks
was in a panic and desperate frame of mind to do whatever it took to
extricate Mr. Minton from the assault that Scientology was enacting upon
Mr. Minton.	o Hearsay.o Speculation (as to another frame of mind).o
Improper lay opinion.
21-23	Haney, 6/19/02 before Judge Schaeffer, Appendix 7, 83:2-9,
83:17-84:25, 94:1-9, 95:12-96:5, 96:13-16.Mr. Haney testified that he
did not observe that Mr. Minton had any control over the wrongful death
case.Mr. Haney testified that he attended meetings to talk about adding
on parties to the wrongful death case and Minton did not attend those
particular meetings.	o Hearsay.o No personal knowledge.o
Immaterial.Completeness Designation:Haney testified he hadn't spoken to
Minton since January-May 2000, that he disassociated himself from the
LMT (whose activities Minton directed), and that he was hardly ever in
Clearwater. Haney stated in his testimony that Robert Minton did attend
such a meeting. (Ex. 17, Haney testimony before Judge Schaeffer,
6/19/02, 78, 140, 146-147, 186-187; id., 95-96.)
25	Peter Alexander testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/7/02,
Appendix 8, 137:14-138:11.Peter Alexander testified in the Schaeffer
hearings that he overheard a conversation between Robert Minton and
Patricia Greenway in which Minton allegedly acknowledged he could not
control the wrongful death case.	o Double hearsay.o No foundation
for impeachment.
25-26	Garko testimony before Judge Schaeffer, Appendix 1, 6/11/02,
96:15-25, 97:1-7.Dr. Garko testimony that Minton did not control the
case.	o Hearsay.Completeness Designation:Garko testified that Minton
said many times he wanted Prince and Brooks used more so as to make the
wrongful death case more of a Scientology case, and that Minton was
"involved" and "concerned" with the case.  (Ex. 18, Garko testimony,
8/29/02, pp. 63-65)
26	Oliver testimony before Judge Schaeffer, Appendix 9, 7/15/02,
316:22-317:5.Frank Oliver testimony that he did not know Mr. Minton to
direct the wrongful death litigation.	o Hearsay.o No personal
knowledge.Completeness Designation:Immediately after this testimony,
Judge Schaeffer said,  "Truth of the matter is, this witness wouldn't
know that.  I mean, I guess he'd know if he heard something, but he
wouldn't know what went on between Mr. Minton and Mr. Dandar."  The
question was then limited to Oliver's minimal knowledge. (Ex. 19, Tr.,
7/15/02 317)
27	John Merrett testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/23/02, Appendix
10, 73:22-74:10.Merrett testified that it was his understanding that the
agreement to donate the bulk of the proceeds of the wrongful death case
did not exist.	o Hearsay.o No personal knowledge.Completeness
Designation:Merrett testified that he did not know which was true,
Minton's testimony in his May 2000 depo, or what is in his recantation
affidavit. (Ex. 20, Merrett testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/23/02,
p. 26)  He also specifically stated that he did not know whether there
was an agreement or not. (Id., p. 248)
27-29	Haney testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/19/02, Appendix 7,
89:6-91:12.Haney testified in the Schaeffer hearing that there was no
agreement that Minton would get a bulk of the proceeds for LMT.  Haney
also "predicted" Minton "would take over a situation and commandeer it".
o Hearsay.o Speculation.Completeness Designation:Objection that Haney
was "parroting self-serving statements that Mr. Dandar made" on this
issue, was sustained.  (Ex. 17, Tr., 6/19/02, p. 90)Haney testified that
he had spoken to Liebreich and they would give money to groups that
would help people who had been victimized by cults.  Liebreich also told
Minton this.  (Ex. 17, Haney testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/19/02,
pp. 88-89)
27-29	Haney testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/19/02, Appendix 7,
91:13-92:18.Haney also claims to have talked to Bob Minton about his
internet postings; about which Mr. Minton laughed and claimed to have
gotten "carried away".		o Hearsay.o No foundation for
impeachment.
30	Summers testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/10/02, Appendix 11,
99:4-18.Teresa Summers, a former executive of the LMT testified that
Minton and Brooks told her there was no agreement.	o Double
hearsay. o No foundation for impeachment.Completeness Designation:During
Summers' subsequent cross examination, it came out that in September
2001, two days before she resigned from the LMT, Summers was deposed and
testified several times that she "never had any discussions with any of
the people at LMT as to this alleged agreement."  Summers also said of
Minton, "No, I don't believe I ever asked him" about it. (Ex. 21,
Summers testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/10/02, 124-129)
30	Garko testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/11/02, Appendix 1,
100:2-8.Dr. Garko testified in the Schaeffer hearings that he was not
aware of an agreement regarding the bulk of the proceeds.	o
Hearsay.Completeness Designation:Garko testified he was aware the family
testified in their depositions that the monies would be used to fight
against Scientology. (Ex. 18, Garko testimony before Judge Baird,
8/29/02, pp. 71-72)
32-36	Merrett testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/23/02, Appendix 10,
35:10-19, 36:6-37:6, 38:3-39:19, 40:16-43:1.Merrett testified that he
and not Mr. Dandar prepared an affidavit for Grady Ward, one for Robert
Minton, and one for Stacy Brooks.	o Hearsay.
36	Minton Deposition, Liebreich v. FSO, 1/13/98, Appendix 4,
65:14-66:1.A Well, he says, I've already had that idea but I haven't
discussed it with Dell Liebreich yet.Q Has he since told you that he
discussed it with Ms. Liebreich?A Yes.Q What did he say?A He said she
agreed to do just that.Q What cult awareness group was agreed on?A No
specific groups were discussed. The only one that ... I was discussed
was one that Mr. Lottick is involved in...	o Hearsay.o
Immaterial.Completeness Designation:The testimony Dandar cites does not
state there was no agreement. There is additional testimony before what
Dandar cited which further confirms there was an agreement. (Ex. 22,
Minton Deposition, 1/13/98, pp. 64-65)
36-37	Minton Deposition, Liebriech v. FSO, 5/24/00, Appendix 4,
239:13-18.Q Do you have any agreement of any kind with the Estate of
Lisa McPherson?A NoQ Does the Lisa McPherson Trust have any agreement
with the Estate of Lisa McPherson?A No	o  The transcript is
hearsay.Completeness Designation:Minton does state in this deposition
that there is an agreement, and also authenticates public statements he
had made on this subject.  (Ex. 23, Minton Deposition, 5/24/00, pp.
391-394)
37	Minton Deposition, Liebreich v. FSO, 9/18/01, Appendix 4,
158:18-25.Minton testified he does not know of anyone investing in the
case.	o Hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment.
38-44	Minton Deposition, Liebreich v. FSO, et al., 1/13/98, Appendix
4, 219:2-19, 223:1-17, 239:10-18, 391:18-398:10.Minton testified in a
deposition taken in the wrongful death case that his conversations
regarding the agreement were with Dandar, not directly with the family.
o Hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment.
45	Merrett testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/23/02, Appendix 10,
13:5-17.Merrett testified in the proceedings before Judge Schaeffer that
he is not aware of Dandar preparing Minton for his May 24, 2000
deposition. It was his understanding that the reason that Minton came to
Merrett was because there wasn't anybody involved in the case who could
do that without creating a conflict of interest. 	o Hearsay.o
Merrett's unawareness is irrelevant.o Goes to a collateral issue.
47	Brooks testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/6/02, Appendix 13,
308:14-22.LMT got $500,000 from Minton.		o Hearsay.o No
foundation for impeachment.o Goes to a collateral issue.
49-51	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6,
367:2-17, 368:2-6, 446:5-447:23.Prince testified in the hearing before
Judge Schaeffer that Minton told him that the check to Dandar was from
friends in Europe.	o Hearsay.o No foundation for
impeachment.Completeness Designation:Prince's first testimony on this
was his affidavit, where he said the conversation was in August 2001.
That affidavit also says nothing about friends in Europe, but only says
Dandar getting the money was a big secret.  (Def. Hrg. Ex. 7, April 2002
Affidavit of Jesse Prince, p. 11:2-8)Prince was cross-examined on this
point, demonstrating a lack of credibility.  (Ex. 24, Prince testimony
before Judge Schaeffer, 7/10/02, pp. 982-985; Ex. 16,  Prince testimony
before Judge Baird, 8/30/02, pp. 430-439.)
53	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6, pp.
386-387."Even though Minton had no account at the UBS Bank, Scientology
amazingly was able to obtain a copy of this UBS check before Minton
could get a copy!"	o Hearsay.o No personal knowledge.
54	Garko testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/11/02, Appendix 1, pp.
35:22-36:13.Dr. Garko testified that in New Hampshire Minton said
"generally perhaps people from Europe might be able to fund the case - "
o Hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment.o Irrelevant.Completeness
Designation:The testimony Dandar quotes is from the wrongful death case
hearing.  In the hearing in this case, Church counsel objected and
Dandar admitted it was irrelevant and not an issue. (Ex. 18, Garko
testimony, 8/29/02, pp. 80-83)Immediately after the testimony Dandar did
cite, Garko testified that he recalled the name "Fred" being discussed
as a person who might be able to fund the case (Ex. 25, Garko testimony
before Judge Schaeffer, 6/11/02, p. 36), which corroborates Minton's
testimony on the discussions of money in New Hampshire.
54	Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/21/02, pp. 443-446
[not in Appendix]During the hearing before Judge Schaeffer, Minton
admitted that the $300,000 Clambake transfer to the LMT and the
anonymous $500,000 transfer to the LMT from Europe were really from
Minton.  Dandar states Minton lied about this in his deposition in this
case on 4/8/02.	o Hearsay.o Goes to a collateral issue.Completeness
Designation:At the end of the 4/8/02 deposition a break was taken.
After the break, it was put on the record that there would be some
things that would need to be corrected, which Minton would correct when
the deposition resumed. (Ex. 26, Minton deposition testimony, 4/8/02,
pp. 119-120)  Minton then corrected his testimony (Ex. 27, Minton
testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/21/02, 444-446; Ex. 28, Additional
Affidavit of Robert Minton Recanting Testimony, 6/3/02,  6-7.)
56-57	Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/23/02, Appendix 4,
926:6-928:17.Dandar quotes for almost two pages a discussion between
Judge Schaeffer and Mr. Howie, counsel for Robert Minton.	o The
comments of the court and counsel are not evidence.o Irrelevant.o
Hearsay.o The testimony is not relevant to any material issue in this
action.
57-58	Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/28/02, Appendix 4,
1251:7-22.Minton caused a check to be issued to Gerry Armstrong.  Dandar
alleges Minton did this to evade taxes.	o Hearsay.o No foundation for
impeachment.o Irrelevant and immaterial.Completeness Designation:Just
before the testimony Dandar cited, he asked Minton if he had done this
to evade taxes and Minton denied it.  (Ex. 5, Minton testimony before
Judge Schaeffer, 5/28/02, pp. 1250-1251)
58-59	Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/28/02, Appendix 4,
1252:23-1255:3.Minton testified that he does not recall if he paid taxes
on the repayment of the $100,000 loan from Gerry Armstrong.  Dandar
stated this was an attempt to conceal tax evasion.	o Hearsay.o
Irrelevant and immaterial.Completeness Designation:Minton testified
several times before Judge Schaeffer that he was not concerned about
allegations of tax evasion. (Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer:
Ex. 29, 5/24/02, pp. 1085-1086, 1132-1133; Ex. 5, 5/28/02, pp.
1250-1251; Ex. 30, 5/29/02, p. 1772.)
60	Order in RTC v. Estate of Lisa McPherson, Appendix 14.	o
Irrelevant and immaterial.
66-67	Merrett testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/23/02, Appendix 10,
48:21-49:8, 49:15-16, 49:21-22, 51:8-23, 54:8-13, 55:7-21.Merrett
arranged a donation from Operation Clambake to LMT. Merrett claims he
did not know the money was from Minton.	o Hearsay.o Goes to a collateral
issue.
69-70	Dandar testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/4/02, Appendix 5,
345:14-346:14.Judge Schaeffer refused to allow counsel to ask if the
"personal loans" were deposited in Dandar's personal accounts. 	o
Comments of the court are not evidence.o Irrelevant and immaterial.
75	Minton Deposition, Liebreich v. FSO, et al., 1/13/98, Appendix
4, 46:20-24, 47:1-9. Q My question is: Was this $100,000 a loan to Mr.
Dandar?A. It was			Q Or a gift to Mr. Dandar?A It
requires a little bit of thought because it could be ... either
depending on what happens in the case.Q Can you explain that?A What I
have said and what he has said is that if they - "they" being the estate
of Lisa McPherson - are successful in getting money back over and above
their legal expenses in this case and they had $100,000 left to pay me,
I would get paid back my $100,000. If they do not succeed in this case,
they're under no obligation to pay me back.	o The testimony has not
been provided in the Appendix.o Hearsay.	Completeness
Designation:In that deposition, Minton additionally testified that the
money was to be used for the McPherson case, not for Dandar's personal
use. (Ex. 22, Minton Deposition, 1/13/98, pp. 43, 44, 158)
75	Minton Deposition, Liebreich v. FSO, et al., 5/24/00, Appendix
4, 217:11-218:1. Q What is the agreement with Mr. Dandar with respect to
the over one million dollars that you've given him?A The agreement is
basically that if and when the Estate of Lisa McPherson prevails against
the Church of Scientology and collects money, that the estate will pay
back out of the proceeds of that, if the proceeds are sufficient to
cover all the expenses, the principal amount that I have advanced to the
estate of Mr. Dandar. That's it.Q Advanced to the estate for Mr.
Dandar?A No, to Mr. Dandar for - to prosecute the case of the estate.
o Hearsay.	
78	Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/29/02, Appendix 4,
1525:20-1526:2, 1528:16-18.Minton testified in the hearings before Judge
Schaeffer that Mike Rinder implied during meetings that Dandar had used
Minton's money to buy properties.			o Hearsay.
79	Minton testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/7/02, Appendix 4,
920:16-921:2.Minton testified that Dandar told him he took some of the
money Minton had been giving him for his personal use. Minton said
"okay".		o The testimony has not been provided in the Appendix.o
Hearsay.	
80-82	Dandar testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/16/02, Appendix 5,
35:2-38:11.Dandar testified that the conditions of the loan were
originally vague and at the end of '99 or beginning of 2000 Dandar went
to Minton and Minton said Dandar could use the money any way he wanted.
o The testimony is not included in the Appendix.o Hearsay.  
85	Pltf's Ex. 15 before Judge Schaeffer, Dandar letter to Liebreich
of 2/10/97, Appendix 15.	o Letter was not introduced.o Not
authenticated.o Irrelevant and immaterial.
85-86	Monique Yingling notes of meetings, Appendix 16.	o
Hearsay.o Not authenticated. o Not introduced.
88	Yingling testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/12/02, Appendix 19,
61-62.Ms. Yingling testified that the list of church litigation costs,
about 35 million dollars, was the magnitude of the damages which
Minton's lawyer, Jonas, said would be for the planned RICO case.
o Hearsay.	
89, 121-122	Leipold testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/3/02,
Appendix 20, 27:14-24.Leipold testified that originally he received a
telephone call from Brooks in which she said that she and Robert Minton
were attempting to settle with the Church and she wished him to withdraw
her declaration from the court.  Later that day, Bob Minton asked
Leipold to dismiss the action on behalf of his client.	o Hearsay.o
Double hearsay. 
92-93	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6,
200:25-202:5.Jesse Prince testifies regarding "noisy investigations."
o Hearsay.o Not authenticated.o Not introduced.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29
Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Witness lacks personal
knowledge.o Witness not qualified to offer interpretation.
93	Pltf's Ex. 157 before Judge Schaeffer, "HCO Policy Letter of 16
February 1969, Battle Tactics."	o Not authenticated.o Not introduced.o
Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o
Hearsay.
94	Pltf's Ex. 109-C before Judge Schaeffer, "HCO Policy Letter of
15 August 1960, Dept. of Govt Affairs."	o Not authenticated.o Not
introduced.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and
immaterial.o Hearsay.
94	Pltf's Ex. 169 before Judge Schaeffer, Ability, "The
Scientologist."	o Not authenticated.o Not introduced.o Excluded (Ex. 10,
8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Hearsay.
95	Pltf's Ex. 109J before Judge Schaeffer, "HCO Executive Letter of
5 September 1960."	o Not authenticated.o Not introduced.o Excluded
(Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Hearsay.
95-96	Pltf's Ex. 122 before Judge Schaeffer, "Manuel [sic] of
Justice."	o Not authenticated.o Not introduced.o Excluded (Ex. 10,
8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Hearsay.
97, 127	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/18/02, Appendix 6,
151:17-152:16.Prince reading from and interpreting portions of a policy
letter for the Department of Government Affairs.	o Not
authenticated.o Not introduced.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at
221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Hearsay.
98-103	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6,
205:13-208:16, 211:11-212:7, 219:2-20, 220:10-221:5, 222:3-24, 223:4-9,
230:9-21, 237:16-238:2, 243:18-244:8.Prince acknowledged very little
"experience" but nevertheless testified regarding specific events he was
told about in 1985 regarding alleged investigations of specific persons.
o Double hearsay.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o No personal
knowledge.o Probative value substantially outweighed by prejudice.o
"Other crimes, wrongs or acts" do not pertain to plaintiff.o Refers to
documents not introduced, not admitted, not offered.o Irrelevant and
immaterial.
103	Oliver testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/15/02, Appendix 9,
"beginning at [p.] 290".Frank Oliver, a former Scientologist, testified
regarding an alleged policy of finding or manufacturing evidence to make
"the enemy" sue for peace.	o Double hearsay.o Excluded (Ex. 10,
8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o No personal knowledge.o Probative value
substantially outweighed by prejudice.o  "Other crimes, wrongs or acts"
do not pertain to plaintiff.o Refers to documents not introduced, not
admitted, not offered.o Irrelevant and immaterial.
105	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6,
194:18-195:11.Prince testifies identifying policies of Scientology and
giving his interpretation of them.	o Not offered.o Not
authenticated.o Not admitted.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o
Irrelevant and immaterial.o Hearsay.o Witness not qualified to
interpret.
105-106	Nancy Many testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/12/02, Appendix
22, 156:18-157:6.Ms. Many testified that Minton said that the Church
said they could settle but no more money to Dandar.	o Triple
hearsay.  
106-108	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6,
384:17-385:10, 385:16-387:5, 388:13-389:6, 389:17-390:2, 391:1-9.Prince
testified that Minton called him and said he was "going to jail"
although he wouldn't say why.  Prince testified that Minton told him
Mike Rinder had somehow gotten a copy of the $500,000 check, and told
him that he knew that Bob Minton lied in deposition about this $500,000
check and they were going to prosecute him for it.	o Double
hearsay. o No foundation for impeachment.
109-112	Letter from Dandar to Minton, 3/30/02.	o Not authenticated.o
Not offered.o Not admitted.o Hearsay.o Inadmissible prior consistent
statement not made before the event giving rise to the motive that
affects the testimony of the witness.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at
221-223).
112	E-mail [sic - letter] from Jonas to Dandar, 4/12/02, Appendix
18.	o Hearsay.o Not authenticated.o Not introduced.
114-115	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/8/02, Appendix 6,
432:23-434:2.Prince testified that he went to see a criminal attorney
and reported what was going to be "created and done" against Dandar.
o Hearsay.o Improper and inadmissible prior consistent statement not
made before the event giving rise to the motive that affects the
testimony of the witness.
115	"Court order" for deposition of Therese Minton in Liebreich v.
FSO, et al., Appendix 23.	o The Church's proposed order
(represented by Dandar to be "a court order") in another proceeding is
unauthenticated, was not offered or admitted in this proceeding and is
hearsay and irrelevant.
116	Dandar testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/4/02, Appendix 5,
313:15-314:17.Dandar testified that Minton was extremely concerned that
Dandar hurry up and deposit the May 2000 check "Because something is
happening in the Swiss banks. And there is a new prosecutor in
Switzerland, there is a new judge. They had a hearing about me."
o Hearsay.o Dandar's testimony regarding what he "took" Minton's
comments to mean is speculation.
117	Pltf's Ex. 4 before Judge Schaeffer, Minton's Harassment Time
Line, Appendix 24.	o Not introduced.o Not authenticated.o Not
admitted.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and
immaterial.o Hearsay.
117-118	Brooks testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/16/02,
1398:25-1399:21, Appendix 13.Minton told Brooks if the case was not
dismissed immediately the "blood" of his daughters, his wife, and
himself would be on Dandar's hands.	o Hearsay.
119	Yingling testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/12/02,
217:22-218:14, Appendix 19.Ms. Yingling testified regarding statements
made about RICO.	o Double hearsay.Completeness Designation:Ms.
Yingling denied that the purpose of detailing the litigation costs was
to show the magnitude of the Church's RICO case against Minton. Jonas
said that, not Rosen.  (Ex. 8, Yingling testimony before Judge
Schaeffer, 6/12/02, p. 186)
120	Brooks testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/7/02, 563:2-22,
Appendix 13.Brooks testified that she did not recall a RICO suit being
shown at the meeting, then said Mr. Rosen may have held something up and
said this was a draft.  That "may have happened. I'm not sure."	o
Hearsay.
122-123	Alexander testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/7/02,
189:13-190:9, Appendix 8.Alexander testified that Minton said the
Scientologists were driving him crazy and he broke down into tears, said
he had tax problems with respect to the Nigerian money and that was
worrying him.	o Double hearsay.o No foundation for impeachment.
123	Summers testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/10/02, 75:9-16,
Appendix 11.Q Well, so why was it coming from Operation Clambake?A Mmm,
see, that was the tax evasion part. It was as a donation. Right? And I
guess if it comes in as a donation to a company, then rather than Bob
bringing  his own money in -- you know, I don't know all of the details
of this, but this was my understanding -- that then he didn't have to
pay taxes because it was a donation to a company.	o Double
hearsay. o No personal knowledge.o No foundation for impeachment.o Goes
to a collateral issue.Completeness Designation:Summers admitted she
didn't know any of the details about this and her testimony is just
hearsay of what Patrick Jost allegedly told her.  Minton never told
Summers he was concerned about taxes.  (Ex. 21, Summers testimony before
Judge Schaeffer, 6/10/02, pp. 75-76)
124fn 12	Patrick Jost Deposition, Liebreich v. FSO, et al.,
10/30/01, Appendix 25, pp. 62-63.Jost testified that he has assisted
Minton concerning tax implications of transfers of funds from Europe to
the United States.	o Hearsay.
124-125	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/18/02, Appendix 6,
119:6-22, 120:7-24.Prince testified that he observed the "noisy
investigation" of Bob Minton specifically as it related to his business
partner, Jeff Schmidt.	o Hearsay.
125	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/18/02, 124:13-20,
Appendix 6.Q Are you aware of any kind of trouble that was started with
Nigeria in reference to the Swiss government?A I know that certain
allegations were brought in Nigeria. And the private investigator
working on Scientology's behalf did go to Switzerland, talked to
prosecutors, talked to law enforcement, and to use whatever sway or
ability that they had to try to get charges brought against Bob in -
o Double hearsay.o No personal knowledge.
126-127	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 6/18/02, 127:12-22,
132:10-20, 133:7-10, 137:24-138:2, 139:3-7, 140:8-16, Appendix 6.Prince
testimony regarding the alleged harassment of Minton.	o Hearsay.
131-136	Hearing Tr., 6/7/02, 63:12-65:24; 6/10/02, 4:23-8:8; 6/11/02,
47-48, Appendix 26.Colloquy of counsel and Judge Schaeffer regarding
turning over Mr. Jonas' notes.	o Colloquy is not evidence.o Colloquy is
not relevant.
137, fn16	Pltf's Ex. 5 before Judge Schaeffer, Declaration of
Stacy Young, 12/14/94.	o Hearsay.o Irrelevant and immaterial.
137, fn16	Brooks testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 5/6/02,
Appendix 13, "questioning beginning at 411"	o Double hearsay.o
Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o
"Other crimes, wrongs or acts" do not relate to plaintiff.
138, fn 18;151-152	In Michael Hurtado v. Graham E. Berry, in the
Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles,
Case # BC 208 227, Robert J. Cipriano was deposed in the case on 8/7/00
and made numerous unsupportable personal attacks on counsel.	o
Hearsay.o Hearsay within hearsay.o Not offered.o Not authenticated.o Not
admitted.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr. at 221-223).o Irrelevant and
immaterial.o "Other crimes, wrongs, or acts" do not relate to
plaintiff.o Goes to collateral matter.o Statement quoted not submitted.
138,fn 20	Transcript in Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology of
California, Los Angeles County Superior Court, Appendix 27.This
transcript is presented to show that Mr. Rosen allegedly used the Brooks
recantation affidavit filed in this case as the basis to attack Mr.
Leipold.  Rosen testimony, 8/30, 152:8-14, Appendix 17.Rosen denied
doing this.	o Hearsay.o Irrelevant and immaterial.
139fn 24, 149-150	"The Two Faces of Scientology," American Lawyer,
July 1992, Appendix 28."Boston personal injury lawyer Michael Flynn, for
example, who at one time represented more than two dozen  plaintiffs
against the church, was sued by the church more than a dozen times in
four jurisdictions for everything from contempt of court to defamation.
All the suits were eventually dropped or dismissed. (Flynn declined
comment pursuant to the terms of a settlement he received from the
church in 1986.)"	o Hearsay and contains hearsay.o The article
included in Dandar's appendix is not the referenced article.
142	Pltf's Ex. 165 before Judge Schaeffer, HCO Policy Letter of 18
October 1967, Penalties for Lower Conditions.ENEMY - SP Oder [sic]. Fair
game. May be deprived of property or injured by any means by any
Scientologist without any discipline of the Scientologist. May be
tricked, sued or lied to or destroyed.	o Hearsay.o Hearsay within
hearsay.o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Not offered.o Not authenticated.o
Not admitted.o Excluded (8/29 Tr., at p. 255).Completeness
Designation:This policy was cancelled in 1970 by HCO Policy Letter of 6
October 1970, Issue III (Ex. 31 hereto).
142-147	Oliver testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/15/02, 272:2-3,
12-19, 280:11-281:10, 283:4-23, 286:10-288:10, 288:22-289:16, Appendix
9.Oliver testified in the hearing before Judge Schaeffer regarding
alleged policies and practices of the Church with regard to litigation,
information gathering, intelligence and fair game.	o Hearsay.o Not
offered.o Not authenticated.o Not admitted.o Excluded (Ex. 10, 8/29 Tr.
at 221-223).o Irrelevant and immaterial.o Goes to collateral issue.o No
personal knowledge.o Not qualified to interpret.Completeness
Designation:Oliver read into the record or acknowledged excerpts from
several church policies on these areas, demonstrating that whatever
action is taken is legal and truthful. (Ex. 19, Oliver testimony before
Judge Schaeffer, 7/15/02, pp. 472-486)
153	Prince testimony before Judge Schaeffer, 7/10/02, 988:2-5 [not
in the Appendices].Prince testified sarcastically that they "talked
about committing perjury on behalf of Scientology."	o Hearsay.
	
	CONCLUSION
	For all the foregoing reasons, this Objection to all of Dandar's
"evidence" submitted for the first time after the conclusion of the
hearing, should be sustained, and all such proffered evidence should be
stricken and excluded.
	I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy hereof has been furnished by
HAND DELIVERY to Thomas John Dandar, Esq. and Kennan G. Dandar, Esq.,
Dandar & Dandar, P.A., P.O. Box 24597, Tampa, FL 33623-4597; and by
REGULAR U.S. MAIL to Anthony P. Battaglia, Battaglia, Ross, Dicus &
Wein, P.A., First Union Building, 980 Tyrone Boulevard, P.O. Box 41100,
St. Petersburg, FL 33743-1100; Thomas H. McGowan, P.A., 150 Second
Avenue North, Suite 1500, St. Petersburg, FL 33701; and Luke Lirot,
Esq., 112 East Street, Suite B, Tampa, FL 3360, this 13th day of
September, 2002.
JOHNSON, BLAKELY, POPE,
						BOKOR, RUPPEL & BURNS,
P.A.	



					
					      By:
_______________________________________
						 F. Wallace Pope, Jr.
						 Post Office Box 1368
						 Clearwater, Florida
33757
						 Tel:  (727) 461-1818
						 Fax:  (727) 441-8617
						 SPN #00002797

	               Samuel D. Rosen				
						75 East 55th Street,
Room 503		
						New York, New York 10022
						Telephone:  (212)
318-6000			
						Telecopier:  (212)
319-4090
	
 						Attorneys for Plaintiff
						Church of Scientology
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Service Organization, Inc.




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