GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

ESTATh OF LISA MCPHERSON, by and through the Personal Representative, DELL
          Plaintiff,     CASE NO: 00-5682-Cl-li
                         Division 11




                         AND OTHER RELIEF


INTRODUCTION                                                     2

SUMMARY OF BRIEF                                                 6

THE EVIDENCE                                                     7

  A. The Filing of the Wrongful Death Case                       7

  B. The Evolution of the Sham                                   8
      1. The "A-Team" Joins Plaintiff s Trial Team               8       
      2. With Minton s Money Came Minton s Interference         12
          a. Key West                                           20
          b. Philadelphia                                       22
          c. The First Fifth Amended Complaint                  25
          d. "The Meeting That Never Happened"                  26
      3. The Interference Expands with the Creation of LMT      32
          a. The Establishment of LMT                           32
          b. The Allegations of the Prince Affidavit and the 
             Fifth Amended Complaint in the Litigation
             Mirror LMT s Contemporaneous Attacks Upon Mr.
             Miscavige and the Church Outside the Litigation    34
          c. The Use of LMT Staff as Witnesses                  37
          d. LMT's Discovery Obstruction                        40
          e. The Final Obstruction of Discovery by LMT          48
          f. New Hampshire, Contempt, and Setting the Record
             Straight                                           59
          g. Mr. Dandar s Extortion of Mr. Minton               61
          h. Mr. Dandar s Denials of Misconduct                 63

  C. False Statements, Subornation and Other Misconduct         66
      1. "Backtrack Big Time"                                   66
      2. The Nature of Mr. Minton's Financing                   70
      3. The False Statements and Subornation Concerning 
         The UBS Bank Checks                                    75
      4. Dandar's Patterns of False Testimony                   80
      5. Prince's Patterns of False Testimony                   85
          a. The PC Folders                                     85
          b. Key West                                           88
          c. The $500,000 UBS Check                             90
          d. Prince's False Testimony That Mr. Minton Told 
             Him the $500,000 UBS Check (dated May 1, 2000) 
             Was Given to Mr. Dandar in August 2001             91
          e. Prince s Resignation Letter                        92
          f. Prince's Invented Story of How He Pulled Loaded 
             Guns On Numerous Scientology Officials Including 
             David Miscavige                                    94
       6. Mr. Dandar s Harassive Trial Tactics                  96
       7. The Sham Murder Allegation                           109

ARGUMENT                                                       110

OF DEFAULT ON DEFENDANT S COUNTERCLAIM                         110
  A. Damage to Aggrieved Party                                 113

  B. Party Personally Involved in Fraud                        115

  C. Fraud Bears on Issue of Damages                           120

  D. Seriousness of the Misconduct                             122

  E. Prior Sanctions                                           123

SEVERELY SANCTIONED                                            123
  A. The Egregious Nature of Mr. Dandar s Misconduct Is Not
     Mitigated or Excused by its Purported Lack of 
     Materiality to the Underlying Proceeding                  127

  B. Florida Law Authorizes Attorney Disqualification for 
     Serious Misconduct in the Case, Whether or Not the 
     Conduct Is Related to the Merits of the Case              130

  C. Florida Law Permits an Award of Attorneys Fees for 
     Serious Misconduct                                        133

CONCLUSION                                                     136

                       TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Babe Elias Builders, Inc. v. Pernick,

Bitterman v. Bitterman,
714 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1998)

Burns v. Huffstetler,
433 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1983)
130, 131

Carnival Corp. v. Beverly,
744 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)

Cbs v. Pugia,
420 S.E.2d 774 (Ga. App. 1992)
132, 133

Cox v. Burke,
706 So. 2d43 (Fla. 5thDCA 1998)               111, 116,

David S. Nunes, P.A. v. Ferguson Enterprises, Inc.,
703 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)

Desimone v. Old Dominion Insurance Co.,
740 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 4thDCA 1999)        110, 111, 121,122

Essex County Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger,
18 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.J. 1993)

Figgie International, Inc. v. Alderman,
698So.2d563 (Fla.3dDCA 1997)

Florida Bar v. Lopez,
406 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1981)

Florida Department of Law Enforcement v. Ortega,
508 So. 2d493 (Fla. 3dDCA 1987)

Hanono v. Murphy,
723 So.2d892 (Fla. 3dDCA 1993)

Henriquez v. Temple,
668 So. 2d 638 (3rd DCA Fla. 1996)
126, 130

Interamerican Car Rental, Inc. v. Icaro,
559 So. 2d634(Fla. 3dDCA 1990)


Johnson v. Landmark First National Bank,
415 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1932)

Kleiner v. First National Bank of Atlanta,
751 F.2d 1193 (llthCir. 1985)             131, 132, 133,

Knox v. Hayes, 933 F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Ga. 1995),
affd., 108 F.3d 343 (llthCir. 1997)
133, 134

Kornblum v. Schneider,

Kozel v. Ostendorf
629 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1993)        111, 114, 123

Lathe v. Florida Select Citrus, Inc.,
721 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)

Metropolitan Dade County v. Martinsen,
736 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 3rdDCA 1999)
111, 122

Moakley v. Smallwood,
2002 WL 276466,
27 Fla. L. Weekly 5175 (Fla. Feb. 28, 2002)

Norton v. Tallahassee Memorial Hospital,
689F.2d938(llthCir. 1982)

Patsy v. Patsy,
666 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)

Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Finance Corp.,
811 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla. 1992), affd., 43 F.3d 1439 
(11th Cir. 1995)     126, 127, 132

Rotante v. Lawrence Hospital,
46 A.D.2d 199, 361 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1974)

Savino v. Florida Drive In Theatre Management, Inc.,
697So.2d 1011 (Fla. 4thDCA 1997)          110, 111, 120,122

State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Company v. KA. W,
575 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1991)

State v. Espinosa,
686 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 1996)

The Florida Bar v. Agar,
394 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1980)

The Florida Bar v. Hmielewski,
702 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1997)

The Florida Bar v. Lathe,
774 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2000)

Tramel v. Bass, 672 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996),
rev, den., 680 So. 2d426(Fla. 1996)           110, 111, 117

Tn Star Investments, Inc. v. Miele,
407 So.2d292 (Fla.2dDCA 1981)

Tutor Time Merger Corp. v. MeCabe,
763 So.2d505 (F1a4thDCA2000)

                         RULES & STATUTES
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2)(D)                               130
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)                                     134
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(d)                                     135
Fla. Rules Prof. Conduct 4-1-8(f)(2)                         124
Fla. Rules Prof. Conduct 4-3.3(a)(1)                    128, 129
Fla. Rules Prof. Conduct 4-3.3(a)                            127
Fla. Rules Prof. Conduct 4-3.4                               128
Fla. Rules Prof. Conduct 4-4.1 (a)                           128
Fla. Rules Prof. Conduct 4-8.4                               124
Fla. Rules Prof. Conduct 4-8.4(a)                            124
Fla. Rules Prof. Conduct 4-8.4(b)                            124
Fla. Rules Prof. Conduct 4-8.4(c)                            128
Fla. Rules Prof. Conduct 4-8.4(d)                       124, 128
Fla. Rules Prof. Conduct 4-3.3(4)                            123
Sixth Circuit Standards of Professional Courtesy, Standard A-4              126

                        OTHER AUTHORITIES
Black s Law Dictionary (6th Edition 1995) 


     In this 35-day hearing, plaintiffs counsel has continued and multiplied the very abuses

which led to the filing of this Omnibus Motion for Terminating Sanctions and Other Relief in the
first place. Seven weeks and twenty-three witnesses later, the record confirms what defendants

alleged and what Robert Minton set out in his recanting affidavits. In Appendix A to this Brief

  the "Testimony Corroborating Robert Minton s Second Affidavit"   we set forth the record
testimony of all witnesses which corroborates, paragraph by paragraph, the affidavits of Mr.

Minton. In addition, defendants have compiled and submitted other appendices of testimony, both
by witness and subject, to aid the Court. ~'

The record of this hearing shows, first, that plaintiffs contrived claim that the senior
ecclesiastical leader of a worldwide religion ordered the "murder" of a parishioner during a
religious rite for public relations purposes is a sham pleading without a shred of evidentiary
support or truth.

The record shows much more than that. Mr. Dandar s multiple, self-conflicting versions of
the "truth" figuratively ricochet across the record. Mr. Dandar has changed his testimony to

meet his perception of the exigencies of the moment with such frequency that the notion of the

     These appendices are as follows: A - Testimony Corroborating Robert Minton s Second
Affidavit; B - Statements of Minton, Dandar, Liebreich & Family Regarding "Agreement" to
Distribute the Bulk of the Proceeds of a Potential Judgement to LMT or Another Anti-cult Group
Associated with Minton; C - Dandar s Statements Regarding Minton Money; D - Liebreich
Statements Regarding Minton Money; E - Representation of LMT and its Principals and
Obstruction of Discovery by Ken Dandar; F - Testimony about the Trip to Key West; G - Jesse
Prince s Testimony Regarding His Lack of Opinions on this Case; H - Vaughn Young Was Not
Involved in Drafting the First Amended Complaint; I - Vaughn Young "Literal" Testimony; J -
No Extortion, Blackmail, or Threat; K - Graphic Representations of Selected Events in the Death Case.

truth has been completely obscured.

In trying to deny the transparent influence that Mr. Minton exerted on the prosecution of
this case by virtue of his more than $2 million dollars invested and his ubiquitous participation
along with that of his agents (the Lisa McPherson Trust, Ms. Brooks and Jesse Prince), Mr.
Dandar has variously testified that despite over 500 telephone calls between Mr. Dandar and Mr.
Minton or LMT, despite 2 ~/2 months when Mr. Dandar and LMT shared offices, and despite Mr.
Dandar s recollection of being with Mr. Minton at five restaurants, three hotels, two private
residences, two locations of Dandar & Dandar, the LMT building, and at a "vigil," Mr. Minton
had "zero involvement" in the "shape, manner or activities in this suit," and that Mr. Dandar
"[doesn t] think [he] ever had a meeting with Mr. Minton." (Ex. 1, Dandar, May 30, p. 9:8-14,
19:23-20:7; June 4, p. 251:8-253:18; Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, p. 139:11-23; May 13, p. 877:16-

878:1; Ex. 3, Minton, May 21, p. 409:13-15).

In trying to find a way to avoid the undeniable truth that he knew Mr. Minton was the
source of a $500,000 Swiss bank check handed to him by Mr. Minton, Mr. Dandar has testified
that the identity of his benefactor was "friends in Europe," "the Fat Man," "anonymous," "I have
no idea," and perhaps even some guy named "Fred." Beyond that, Mr. Dandar has changed his
story of the purpose, beneficiary, and intended use of the millions he received from Mr. Minton so
many times that it is impossible to extract the truth from his self-contradictory morass of
assertions that it was "donations" (either to a law firm or to an estate), loans to defray litigation
costs, donations to cover litigation costs, or personal loans to him which he could use to buy
"estates, cars, yachts, planes" or whatever else he wished. Mr. Dandar has also orchestrated
systematic perjury so that Mr. Minton s and Dell Liebreich s testimony and affidavits addressing

the distribution of any recovery in this case shifted 180 degrees in unison to corroborate Mr.
Dandar s idea of what "truth" was needed at a particular moment in time and to help, him conceal
both Mr. Minton s interference with this case and Mr. Dandar s own effort to pocket Mr.
Minton s money with no strings attached.

Strikingly, one person lost in Mr. Dandar s effort to deny his pervasive misconduct is the
plaintiff  the Estate of Lisa McPherson, personified by her estranged aunt, Ms. Liebreich.
Despite Mr. Dandar s statement in which he asserted that Ms. Liebreich alone made the decisions
that propelled plaintiffs case, and despite Mr. Dandar s later testimony "that the only one who
does have control over the litigation is Ms. Liebreich, the personal representative," (Ex. 1,
Dandar, May 30, 22:2-3) there is not one fragment of evidence on the record   other than her own
conclusory statements that she made the decisions   that Ms. Liebreich participated in any
meeting, any discussion, or even a telephone call concerning the claims brought in her name or
which defendants she should sue. Just as Ms. Liebreich was a distant relative of Lisa McPherson
and never really part of her life, Ms. Liebreich, as plaintiff, is a distant afterthought of her lawyer,
the for-profit anti-Scientology business named for her niece, and the multi-millionaire who joined
with that lawyer and that business to steer this case.

None of that absolves Ms. Liebreich from what participation she did have in creating the
circumstances that now merit sanctions. She ratified the misconduct of her lawyer and his
confederates; specifically and under oath, took credit for it as her own, and changed her testimony
at Mr. Dandar s direction to conceal the plans to share any recovery in this case with Mr. Minton
and his LMT. Indeed, were it not for Ms. Liebreich s authorization and imprimatur, the
misconduct apparent in this proceeding would not have been possible. Ms. Liebreich shared one

trait of all participants: she was (when Lisa was alive) and is an anti-Scientologist and is motivated
by an all-consuming hatred of Lisa s chosen religion. Her shifting and contradictory testimony
shows that she also shared in the "anything goes for the good of the cause" mentality that has
resulted in the misconduct in this case.

In the end, what emerges from this lengthy process is a wrongful death lawsuit taken over
from a willing plaintiff by a lawyer inextricably bound to an anti-Scientologist millionaire and the
like-minded zealots he employed, who changed this case from a lawsuit into a crusade against a
religion and its ecclesiastical leader. ~ To accomplish that improper purpose, they fabricated and
pursued a sham complaint, supported it with perjury and subornation, subjected defendants to

During the course of the proceedings on this motion, plaintiffs counsel has filed four
lawsuits. One lawsuit, Courage Productions, LLC v. Brooks & LMT, was clearly intended to
intimidate witnesses in the case and itself is rife with conflicts of interest. Plaintiffs counsel sued
Ms. Brooks on behalf of a corporation of which Mr. Minton was 50% owner   without Mr.
Minton s consent   and presumably with Mr. Minton s money. The lawsuit was served upon Ms.
Brooks while Mr. Minton was being cross-examined by that same lawyer.
The other three suits, two by the Estate to prevent collection of final judgments of RTC
against the Estate and one a counter-counterclaim in this very action, are permeated with verified
allegations contrary to the very position plaintiffs counsel was contemporaneously asserting to
this Court. For example, while Mr. Dandar asserted, and led witnesses to support, the notion that
the $2,050,000 received from Mr. Minton in this case was a personal loan for Mr. Dandar to use
however he wanted   including for "real estate, yachts, etc."   eight days after the close of evidence
the counter-counterclaim alleges that:
          "In October 1997, counsel for the ESTATE entered into a contractual relationship
          with Robert Minton, wherein Minton agreed to provide or obtain loan money to
          counsel for all funds necessary to complete litigation between the ESTATE and
          FLAG concerning the wrongful death of LISA MCPHERSON. The ESTATE is a
          third party beneficiary of this agreement in that counsel agreed to fund all
          litigation, including attorney fees and costs, on behalf of the ESTATE, and the
          agreement with Minton and counsel was intended to achieve that purpose for the
          benefit of the ESTATE."

enormous legal costs and an exhaustive evidentiary proceeding which only proved, with more
certainty than set forth in defendants  opening brief, that the defendants are entitled to the
following relief both cumulatively, and in the alternative:

          (1)  The striking of plaintiff s Fifth Amended Complaint;

          (2)  An order precluding plaintiff from answering the counterclaim;

          (3)  The dismissal of plaintiff s claims with prejudice;

          (4)  The disqualification of plaintiffs counsel from representing plaintiff in any matter in
          this case; and

          (5)  Sanctions  substantial sanctions   including attorneys  fees, in an amount to be
          determined, against both plaintiff and her counsel.

                        SUMMARY OF BRIEF

In this Brief, we do not attempt to show the sham nature of the murder allegations which
are the basis of the wrongful death claim, and which permeate the Fifth Amended Complaint. As a
practical matter and for ease of comprehension, that showing is made in the contemporaneously
filed "Defendants  Final Reply Brief in Support of Summary Judgment and Sanctions on Wrongful
Death Claim." We incorporate the arguments made in that Brief here, in particular with respect to
our legal arguments that the Court should issue terminating sanctions and disqualify Mr. Dandar.

In this Brief, in the section entitled "The Evidence," we set forth a discussion of the key
incidents in this case by which plaintiff and its counsel engaged in misconduct, including:

               false testimony;

               subornation of false testimony;

               improper interference by Mr. Minton and his agents;

               litigating for an improper purpose; and abuse of process.

In the Argument section, we first review the law concerning issuance of terminating
sanctions and demonstrate that such sanctions are necessary under the governing law and the
circumstances of this case, including the sham murder allegations discussed in the separate,
incorporated Brief. Second, we argue that Mr. Dandar s misconduct also independently requires
that he and his firm be disqualified and required to pay very substantial monetary sanctions.

                           THE EVIDENCE

          A.   The Filing of the Wrongful Death Case

Lisa McPherson died in December of 1995, leaving her mother, Fannie McPherson, as her
sole surviving heir and, under Florida law, the only person who could bring a wrongful death
action. She never did so before she passed away in February of 1997. However, a few days before
Fannie McPherson s death, her sister, Dell Liebreich, filed a petition to become the personal
representative of Lisa McPherson s Estate. (Ex. 4, Def. 1kg Ex. 285 atEx. D, Petition for

Less than two days later, on the morning of February 2, 1997, Fannie McPherson died.
Although aware of Fannie McPherson s death two days earlier, Ms. Liebreich s lawyer   Mr.
Dandar   did not inform the Pinellas County Probate Court that she had died. That court, believing
it had the authority to do so based upon the consent of the sole heir whom the court had been led
to believe was still alive, approved the appointment and issued letters of administration to Ms.
Liebrich. (Ex. 5, Letters of Administration; Ex. 6, Order Appointing Personal


Thus, Ms. Liebreich, who scarcely knew Lisa and had not seen her for five or six years
prior to her death, became both personal representative and beneficiary of Lisa McPherson s
Estate through the artifice of Mr. Dandar s material omission in the probate proceeding. In other
words, in the first of the many deceptions of Mr. Dandar that were to become the signature of the
lawsuit, a plaintiff was manufactured. ~'

The complaint, a single count negligent wrongful death action, was filed on February 19,
1997, at a time when Mr. Dandar admits he had done no pre-suit investigation and "didn t know
anything about the Church of Scientology." (Ex. 7, Dandar, May 3, p. 60:24-61:5). Church of
Scientology Flag Service Organization answered that complaint on March 12, 1997.

          B.   The Evolution of the Sham

          1.   The "A-Team" Joins Plaintiff s Trial Team

The LMT s integral role as the litigation support and strategic planning service for
plaintiff is documented in this Brief, but the LMT did not spring from nothing. As the hearings
made clear, to understand the pernicious influence Ms. Brooks, Mr. Prince and Mr. Minton  
whom Mr. Prince labeled "The A-Team" (Ex. 8, Prince, July 8, p. 426:6-11; July 9, p. 639:5-
17)1    had on the litigation of this case, it is necessary to set it in historical context, for "the A-
Team" had been playing the same game for some time prior to its involvement here. One must go
back at least to

In the Church s April 30, 2002 Renewed Petition for Removal of Personal
Representative, Ms. Liebreich s fraudulent representations to the Probate Court are detailed  
including evidence that Ms. Liebreich s appointment was predicated on a forged signature of
Fannie McPherson. (Ex. 4, Def. 1-kg Ex. 285).

1  Citations to testimony in this proceeding will be made parenthetically, identifying the Exhibit to
this Brief, the witness  last name, the date, and the page and line numbers.

the creation of LMT s historical antecedent, Fight Against Coercive Tactics Network, or
"FACTNet" and the A-Team s use of that organization for similar ends. As Mr. Minton testified:

          FACTNet was a group that   an anti-Scientology litigation group that was set up.
          That was its original purpose, that it was to sell its services to help other people
          who wanted to litigate against Scientology.

(Ex. 3, Minton, May 17, p. 21:19-23).

FACTNet was incorporated in Colorado in 1993 by Larry Wollersheim and Gerald

Armstrong. both of whom were later funded by Mr. Minton in anti-Scientology litigation, and
both of whom later became LMT Advisory Committee members. (Ex. 9, Def. Hrg Ex. 81).
FACTNet s original funding was provided by anti-Scientology litigator Graham E. Berry~  using
proceeds from insurance coverage of one of his clients in Church of Scientology International v.
Steven Fishman, et aL, the very case in which Stacy Brooks first concocted the strategy to target
David Miscavige in such litigation. (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, 3 1:9-33:22; Ex. 11, Def. 1-kg Ex. 309
at p. 8)Y In Fishman, Mr. Berry used those insurance funds to pay for witness testimony,
beginning this strategy of labeling apostates as "experts." ~' To a one, each of these "experts" were

Mr. Berry has since been adjudicated a vexatious litigator by a California court for filing a
series of frivolous lawsuits against Scientology churches, their attorneys (including Mr. Moxon),
and individual Scientologists (including, particularly, Mr. Miscavige). He also has been suspended
from the practice of law by the State Bar of California for his unethical conduct in those cases.
(Ex. 10, Def. Hrg Ex. 80).

Def. Ex. 309 is the Declaration of William T. Drescher and an accompanying Harassment
Time Line. This is a lengthy exhibit. Only the cited pages are attached as exhibits hereto.

These "experts" are, in reality, fact witnesses paid for their testimony. Not one of them
ever qualified for trial testimony as an expert, and attempts to qualify Ms. Brooks in Cult
Awareness Network v. Sterling, Case No. BC043 028 and Dickerson v. Raphael, Case No.
NGWA 92-0071 17-NZ were abandoned, afIer Retired California Chief Justice David Eagleson,
sitting asa Special Master, made it clear that she was not qualified as an "expert."

affiliated with FACTNet, specifically Mr. Wollersheim, Ms. Brooks, and Vaughn Young, who
submitted sworn statements setting forth their biased conjectures to tarnish their former religion
and its leadership, attorneys, and parishioners. Indeed, Ms. Brooks and Mr. Young were both still
"consultants" for FACTNet when they were first retained in this case by Mr. Dandar in 1997.

(Ex. 12, Brooks Affi., Def. 1kg. Ex. 72, 9f 2, 7). ~'

Mr. Minton took control of virtually all outstanding anti-Scientology litigation by
investing substantial sums in each. By way of example, he loaned $700,000 to Mr. Wollersheim
and $500,000 to Mr. Wollersheim s California counsel, Daniel A. Leipold "to assist in their
litigation against Scientology." (Ex. 14- Def. 1kg Ex. 3,  3). When the Fishman insurance funds
ran out, Mr. Minton became FACTNet s main source of revenue, which enabled Mr. Minton to
gain control of FACTNet by securing positions on FACTNet s Board of Directors both for
himself (Ex. 3, Minton, May 23, p. 844:5-10) and for Ms. Brooks. (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, p.

Mr. Prince embarked on his career as a professional anti-Scientology witness for hire
when Ms. Brooks "got reacquainted with Mr. Prince" in July 1998.2  Ms. Brooks introduced Mr.
Prince to Mr. Minton, and "told him [to go] to Colorado to work for FACTNet." (Ex. 2, Brooks,
May 14, p. 1206:4-14). From his initial association with FACTNet as a professional anti-

Scientology witness in 1998 until April of 2002, Mi. Prince was paid exclusively by Mr. Minton

It was, in fact, shortly after Mr. Minton contributed the first $100,000 to the cause of this
case that Mr. Dandar appeared as counsel for Mr. Young in a deposition in a case in which
FACTNet itself was a defendant. (Ex. 13 - Def. [kg Ex. 210 at pp.676-677). Mr. Dandar stated
that he was appearing pro bono. (Def. Ex. 210 at p. 703).

Like Ms. Brooks and Mr. Young, Mr. Prince had recently completed personal bankruptcy
proceedings when he went to work for Mr. Minton. (Ex. 8, Prince, July 10, p. 741:22-742:3).

or by someone else using money Mr. Minton provided. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 17, p. 52:13-53:16).
The terms of his retention were vague and seemingly perpetual; Mr. Prince was to work on and be
paid for "cases that are going on against Scientology that I may be able to help in as well." (Ex.
15, Prince Depo., August 19, 1998, p. 372:7-21). His role, however, and his willingness to play
that role, were clear:

         BY MR ROSEN:
          Q. I couldn t buy your testimony. ff1 wanted to offer you money to testify to
          something, I could   no matter how much money it was   if I offered a million
          dollars, I couldn t buy your testimony, right?

          A. You know, there is a possibility that you could if you were doing something to
            to get rid of Scientology and other cults, maybe you could entice me in that way.

(Id., p. 380:6-14).

It was through Mr. Wollersheim that Mr. Dandar and Mr. Minton first met:

          On March 9, 1997, I met attorney Ken Dandar for the first time when I
          participated in a picket in Clearwater, Florida against the Church of Scientology.
          The picket focused on the death of Lisa McPherson. Mr. Dandar was introduced
          to me by Mr. Lawrence Wollersheim at the Howard Johnson s Motel on U.S. 19
          in Clearwater. Mr. Dandar had an extensive discussion with Mr. Wollersheim at
          that meeting in my presence to learn about the pursuit of other Scientology
          corporations and church leaders as a litigation tactic to "go after" Scientology.

(Ex. 14- Def. 1-kg. Ex. 3,  2). It was around that time that Mr. Minton determined that this
wrongful death case would be "a far more effective centerpiece" than the FACTNet litigation for
his anti-Scientology crusade. (Id,  4).~  He then contacted Mr. Dandar and provided the first

  10/ FACTNet s utility as an anti-Scientology litigation clearinghouse later eroded when
  FACTNet agreed to settle a copyright infringement suit to avoid an inevitable adverse judgment
  and potentially tens of millions of dollars in statutory damages for infringing the copyright rights

$100,000 to fund the McPherson litigation on October 6, 1997 "to defray costs and expenses so
this case could become a vehicle to attack Scientology on a broad scale." (Id.). Notably, on the 
same day, Mr. Minton provided an additional $50,000 to Vaughn Young and Stacy Brooks (then
Young), whom Mr. Dandar already had retained as experts. (Ex. 11  Def. Hrg. Ex. 309, p. 38).
Ten days later, he bought a $247,000 house near Seattle for the use of the Youngs. (Ex. 11   Def.
1kg. Ex. 309, p. 39).

          2.   With Minton s Money Came Minton s Interference11 

It is clear that Mr. Minton regarded this case as an opportumty to attack Scientology,
and as an investment which would "endow" an organization which could continue that attack in
the future. He was willing to finance this lawsuit, but insisted that it be expanded and refocused as
an attack on the Scientology religion generally, and upon the religion s ecclesiastical leader, David
Miscavige, specifically. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 17, pp. 101:15-103:7). Indeed, on October 10, 1997,
only four days after making his first $100,000 payment to defray litigation expenses, Mr. Minton
made an Internet posting calling Church staff members murderers who "watched Lisa~

  10/ (...continued)
  in more than 2,000 works of Scientology s founder, L. Ron Hubbard. Moreover, the settlement of
  the FACTNet case ended virtually all litigation involving churches of Scientology in the U.S. as
  most of the outstanding litigation had related to copyright infringement.

As we argue,post, Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.8(f)(2), provides that itis
improper for an attorney to permit a third-party who pays that attorney for representing a client
"to interfer[e] with the lawyer s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer
relationship." It is not necessary that the third-party s conduct rise to that level of "control"; mere
"interference" renders the attorney s action misconduct. "Interfere" generally is legally defined to
include "enter into, or to take part in, the concerns of others." Black s Law Dictionary, p. 329
(6~ Ed. 1990). As the text above shows, in this case Mr. Minton continually interfered with the
concerns of the wrongful death case both personally and through the acts of his agents   Mr.
Prince, Ms. Brooks and LMT.

die." (Ex. 16  Def. Hrg. Ex. 103; Ex. 3, Minton, May 17, pp. 101:22-102:1). On that same day,
Mr. Minton and Mr. Dandar spoke by telephone for 41 minutes, during which Mr. Minton states
that he 'urged Mr. Dandar to amend the complaint to go after Scientology and charge the Church
with murder. (Id., p. 102:18-21) Characteristically, Mr. Dandar testified that the only thing he
remembers about the conversation is that they did not discuss the case at all. (Ex. 1, Dandar, June

4.,p. 118:5-22).

Mr. Minton testified that Mr. Dandar, as counsel for plaintiff, followed Mr. Minton s
suggestions as to the direction of the case and "immediately began consulting [Mr. Minton] about
the conduct of the litigation." (Ex. 14  Def. 1kg. Ex 3,  6; Ex. 3, Minton, May 21, 254:11-16).
Mr. Dandar also began to engage in conversations with Stacy Brooks   who was being paid by
Mr. Minton and who first conceived the anti-Scientology litigation strategy of targeting Mr.

     Miscavige. (Ex. 12  Def. Ex. 72, 9f 3, 7; Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, pp. 32:14-35:10, 59:24-
     60:16). Shortly after Mr. Minton s initial funding of this lawsuit, he and Mr. Dandar

     discussing the investment aspect of their arrangement:

          Mr. Dandar and I had a discussion about this and I d asked him early on   by early
          on I mean sometime in 1998  whether the family was okay financially, or
          whether they actually needed money.

          And he said, you know, all of them were retired, you know, they had sufficient
          income to live on, so it wasn t like they were looking for, you know, a huge
          windfall out of this.

          Q. And was it your understanding that you were going to   if the case were
          successful, there would be enough money to pay back what you had put in, as well
          as fund the anticult organization that you were talking about?

          A. Well, with the amount   with the numbers that were being bandied about, yes,
          that was clearly the likelihood that there would

                              - 13 -
          be more than enough money to take care of Mr. Dandar s contingency fee, pay me
          back the principal amount of what I loaned to the estate, and fund this anticult
          group that would, you know, forever be on the Scientology case.

(Ex. 3, Minton, May 21,406:21-407:14).

The financial reciprocation scheme began to take shape on or about December 1, 1997 at
the Tampa Club:

          Scientology was making a big issue that, you know, that Dell Liebreich was a
          money grubbing whatever, you know, just out for the money. And I suggested to
          Mr. Dandar to deflate that argument that the Estate should agree to donate the
          bulk of the proceeds or a large   substantial part of the proceeds to an anticult
          organization to fund, you know, a cult awareness type organization in the future.

(Ex. 17, Minton, April 19, pp. 62:12-63:19; see also Ex. 3, Minton, May 17, pp. 77:12-78:3).

At that same Tampa Club meeting, Mr. Dandar told Mr. Minton that he had had the same
idea. (Ex. 18  Def. 1kg Ex. 6, pp. 64:15-65:15). A few days later, on December 5, 1997, Mr.
Dandar told Mr. Minton that:

          [H]e had discussed the matter with the   with Dell Liebreich and that, yes, indeed
          that is what they decided that they were going to do with the substantial part of
          the proceeds of the wrongful death litigation.

(Ex. 17, Minton, April 19, p. 64:15-24).

Mr. Minton s testimony about this arrangement at the hearing is consistent with his

January 13, 1998 deposition in this case, which Mr. Dandar attended and made no effort
whatsoever to correct or contest. (Ex. 18  Def. Hrg Ex. 6, pp. 64:14-65:15). Indeed, Mr.

121 At that time, the LMT did not yet exist. However, Mr. Minton "was soon to be a director of
FACTNet," which would have been a suitable recipient for part of the recovery. (Ex. 17, Minton,
April 19, p. 63:15-19).


validated the accuracy of this very excerpt of Mr. Minton s 1998 deposition testimony at the April
30, 2002 hearing before Judge Baird: "Well, this deposition testimony is probably correct, in

1998. That s probably correct." (Ex. 19, Dandar, April 30, p. 141:13-20). Mr. Dandar also
admitted that Ms. Liebreich "thought [it] was a good idea" to donate this money to a cult
awareness group and that "[s]he was very excited about it." (Id., pp. 150:8-151:11). Ms. Brooks
also confirmed that the Estate reached this agreement with Mr. Minton "as a way of repaying him
for his help on the case." ~ (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, p. 136:14-23).

Thus, four significant events occurred in rapid succession in less than a week. On or about

12/ It is necessary to put in perspective the entirely separate legal question of whether and to
what extent the agreement in question was or is judicially enforceable. There is, of course, a legal
distinction, of some importance, between a binding "contract" and an informal "agreement."
          Although often used as synonymous with "contract," agreement is a broader term;
          e.g., an agreement might lack an essential element of a contract.
(Black s Law Dictionary (6ffi Ed., 1990), p. 67.)
Thus, an agreement may be unenforceable as a matter of law. It may even constitute a
cr¤ninal conspiracy, which no court could or would enforce. Nevertheless an "agreement" may
reflect the meeting of the minds between or among two or more parties which they enter into with
a good faith intention of honoring, even knowing that no party could enforce it if he or she
wanted to.
The evidence in this case makes clear that there indeed was an agreement by which Ms.
Liebreich and her siblings undertook to donate some substantial, but unspecified, percentage of a
potential windfall judgment in the wrongful death case to LMT or some other similar organization
associated with Mr. Minton. That the agreement was unwritten, that the terms were not
sufficiently specific to be enforced, or that the agreement in other ways may have lacked an
element of an enforceable contract, is simply not the point. In fact, when it is convenient to Mr.
Dandar, he relies on a host of "informal," unwritten "agreements," including his purported no
strings "personal loan" arrangement with Mr. Minton, his purported agreement to repay "friends
in Europe" or the "Fat Man," whose identity he does not even know, and his shifting contingency
agreements with the plaintiff. Rather, the point is that Ms. Liebreich, her siblings, Mr. Minton, and
Mr. Dandar all adhered to the broad concept of the agreement, and proceeded with an intention of
honoring it. Mr. Dandar s later attempts to deny any such agreement ever existed are belied by the
testimony of all other witnesses.

December 1, 1997, Messrs. Minton and Dandar agreed that it would be a good idea if the Estate
were to endow an anti-cult group with some significant portion of any recovery in this case. On
December 4, 1997   the very day Mr. Minton announced that Mr. Dandar had been named
"FACTNet s Man of the Year" for his work in this case (Ex. 20  Def. [kg Exs. 134-A, 134-B;
Ex. 3, Minton, May 30, pp. 1788:25-1793:9)   Mr. Dandar filed the First Amended Complaint,
alleging for the first time that the Church purposely imprisoned Lisa McPherson, denied her food,
water, and medical care, and attacked the Scientology religion, including an allegation that
Scientology practices, such as the Introspection Rundown, "can be used to murder" someone like
Lisa McPherson. (Ex. 21   Def. Hrg Ex. 104,  38). ~ Also on that same day, December 4, 1997,
the Estate entered into an agreement with defendant in which the Estate agreed not to sue, among
others, RTC, or any of its directors, officers, or employees. ~-' (Ex. 24, Agreement at  2). The

The First Amended Complaint, like the Second, Third, and Fourth Amended Complaints,
contained allegations that Mr. Miscavige was "the ultimate head" of Scientology and "would
have" received reports about "situations," including that Lisa McPherson had been taken to
Morton Plant Hospital after her traffic accident. (See Ex. 21, First Amended Complaint, 91 14,
16.) None of those earlier complaints, however, contained the key allegation that Mr. Miscavige
ordered an "End of Cycle" on Lisa McPherson by which she was permitted to die to avoid a PR
"flap." That allegation did not come until the Fifth Amended Complaint, which made the claim of
intentional murder the exclusive basis of the wrongful death count. Indeed, the earlier complaints
alleged that the religious workers reported in writing to Mr. Kartuzinsld, and that "Flag staff and
management" were culpably negligent in not caring for Lisa s medical condition. (See Ex. 22,
Fourth Amended Complaint, 9121,28).

Despite losing two breach of contract cases to RTC in Texas and FSO in Florida, Mr.
Dandar continues to prevaricate as to whether the contract specifically applied to Mr. Miscavige.
Nothing could be clearer, since in addition to named church corporations and their officers and
directors, Mr. Miscavige was not only specifically contemplated in the contract, he was the only
person mentioned by name in pre-contract discussions, as reflected in Mr. Dandar s letter of
November 21, 1997 to FSO s co-counsel, Laura Vaughan, stating that the agreement was to
"prevent the addition of CSI, CST and RTC, as well as David Miscavige, as party defendants in
this action..." (Ex. 23).

next day, December 5, 1997, Mr. Dandar confirmed to Mr. Minton that Ms. Liebrich had agreed
to the arrangement to donate a substantial part, or the bulk, of any recovery to an anti-cult group.

Mr. Minton regarded as another of his contributions to this case the creation of a hostile
public relations climate for Scientology. In that regard, Mr. Dandar was among his most earnest
vocal supporters, as Mr. Minton explains:

          Mr. Dandar indicated his excitement at the possibility of more sensational
          anti-Scientology coverage on national television, especially if I could get Dateline
          to focus on the wrongful death case. Mr. Dandar told me he was anxious to have
          any media against Scientology especially if it would have some impact on the jury
          pool in Florida.

(Ex. 14  Def. 1kg Ex. 3,91 12).

Indeed, Mr. Dandar encouraged Mr. Minton "to get as much negative media about
Scientology as possible" (id. at 91 13) in the hope of creating an unfavorable reaction toward the
Church among the general public, the media, and state, local, national and international
government authorities)-~  That campaign was also devised to increase the Church s cost of

Thus, in these initial discussiOns about the "agreement," Mr. Minton communicated with
Ms. Liebreich through Ms. Liebreich s attorney, Mr. Dandar. As the Court is well aware, Mr.
Dandar, Ms. Liebreich, and Mr. Minton would all later disclaim any such agreement with respect
to the proceeds from a verdict or a settlement, despite the foregoing, and despite a wealth of
other evidence that such an agreement existed. Mr. Minton has admitted perjuring himself in those
denials; neither Mr. Dandar nor Ms. Liebreich has recanted, but the weight of the evidence
overwhelmingly supports Mr. Minton. That evidence is presented infra and in Appendix A.

16! As reflected in the Timeline of Harassment submitted by the defendants, Mr. Minton and his
allies worked diligently to put pressure on the Church Through relentless picketing, media
appearances, and making their false and slanderous accusations known to government officials
around the world. (See Ex.1 1   Def. [kg. Ex. 309,passim (all blue entries reflecting activities of
people ultimately affiliated with LMT.))

defense and to try to position the case for a coerced, highly inflated settlement. (Ex. 3, Minton,
May21, pp. 381:18-384:13; Minton, May28, pp. 1478:22-1480:10).

His accords thus in place with Mr. Dandar and Ms. Liebreich, Mr. Minton continued
funding this litigation by means of a series of $100,000 personal checks made payable to Dandar
& Dandar for "McPherson" or "McPherson case" on February 6, 1998, November 30, 1998, and
May 22, 1999, respectively. (Ex. 25  Def. Hrg. Exs. 93B, 93C, 93D)

In their May 24-25, 1999 depositions, Ms. Liebreich and her siblings all confirmed the
agreement to endow an anti-cult group named after Lisa McPherson with "the bulk" of the
proceeds from this case. (Ex. 26, Liebreich (video), June 10, pp. 56:11-21, 57:2-5; Davis (video),
June 10, p. 61:16-21; Skelton (video), June 10, p. 66:14-20) ~-~' Ms. Liebreich s sister, Ann
Carlson, in her July 27, 2000 deposition, in an excerpt played at trial, not only confirmed the
existence of the agreement, but identified the intended recipient as "the Lisa McPherson Trust."
(Ex. 26, Carlson (video), June 10, p. 73:10-21). Secure in the knowledge that his investment
interest was in place, Mr. Minton registered the Internet domain name "The Lisa Foundation" so
it would be ready to use as part of the website and e-mail address of his planned organization:

          [I]n 1999, Mr. Dandar had told me about the fact that the family wanted to set up,
          you know, a Lisa McPherson type   a Lisa McPherson-named organization. And
          that was probably in June or July. And ... I registered a domain name for the Lisa
          Foundation for the website, for E-Mail, things like that.

(Ex. 3, Minton, May 28, pp. 1482:22 - 1483:8.)

Throughout 1998 and into mid-1999, the litigation focused on a succession of amended

The excerpts of the testimony of Ms. Liebreich and her siblings confirming the existence
of this agreement are set forth in full in Appendix B to this Brief.

complaints, which contained vitriolic denunciations of the Scientology religion and David
Miscavige and attempted to allege, under various legal theories, that Scientology beliefs were
false and fraudulent and that Scientology s peaceful religious practices were harmful and tortious.
Judge Moody repeatedly disallowed most of these claims   including, inter alia, claims sounding
in fraud, consumer fraud, breach of contract, and violation of nursing home statutes   on a variety
of grounds, including the First Amendment, and struck portions of the complaints as scandalous
or otherwise improper. After December 1997, a total of4l motions to dismiss and to strike, filed
by the Church and the other defendants were argued, resulting in a total of 48 counts of the
various complaints being dismissed. As a result, considerable portions of the "Scientology"
aspects of the case were eliminated by Judge Moody. Finally, on July 22, 1999, at the strong
suggestion and urging of Judge Moody, Mr. Dandar agreed on the record to strike all references
in the complaint to David Miscavige. ("I can strike it. I can strike it. That s fine.") (Ex. 27, July
22, 1999, Hearing Transcript at 88~90).i~!

Mr. Minton and Ms. Brooks had repeatedly and consistently emphasized to Mr. Dandar
that the purpose of their participation in the wrongful death case was twofold: 1) to use the case
as a vehicle to attack Scientology publicly and in court, to cause it to be investigated by
government authorities and the media, and to destroy its leadership; and 2) to target David
Miscavige and thus maximize the potential for a large settlement or judgment against the Church,
a substantial portion of which could then be used to "endow" a group to continue their attacks
into the future. (Ex. 12  Def. [kg. Ex. 72, 913, 5-8, 11-13, 15, 17-18; Ex. 14  Def. [kg. Ex.
3,9191 16, 17; Ex. 2, Brooks,

As we show, Mr. Dandar s promise to the Court did not sit well with the A-Team, and
Mr. Dandar reneged on it in spades when he sought leave to file the Fifth Amended Complaint.

May3,pp. 46:11-48:13, l09:24-l12:9;Ex. 3,Minton,May l7,pp. 101:15-103:7; Minton,May 21, p.
335:2-13; Minton, May 22, p. 659:21-663:12).

How thoroughly Mr. Minton interfered, what Mr. Dandar did to maximize the funding he
received, and why this wrongful death case became the sham and fraud and textbook example of
abuse that it did, is best illustrated by the events of the late summer of 1999.

          a. Key West

Mr. Dandar, his trial consultant, Michael Garko, "expert" consultant Brian Haney, and
Jesse Prince all testified that a four to five day gathering took place in Key West between August
9 and 13, 1999. (Ex. 8, Prince, July 10, pp. 848:22-25, 849:18-850:4; Ex. 1, Dandar, June 6, pp.

841 :24-842:25; Ex. 28, Garko, June 11, p. 75:8-17; Ex. 29, Haney, June 19, pp.102:13-103:15,
187:12-21). The meetings were also attended by Mr. Dandar s investigator, Thomas Haverty, and
by California-based litigators Ford Greene and Daniel Leipold, both of whom had been financed in
anti-Scientology litigation by Mr. Ivlinton in which both Ms. Brooks and Mr. Prince had
submitted sworn statements in exchange for cash. (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, pp. 28:9-2 1, 29:5-30:3,
30:15-31:4, 33:23-35:10; Ex. 8, Prince, July 10, p. 967:13-25). Messrs. Leipold, Prince, Garko,
Haverty, and Dandar were all being paid regularly by Mr. Minton, or by Mr. Dandar with money
from Mr. Minton, at the time of the Key West meetings. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 21, p. 298 :4-9;
Minton, May 29, pp. 1728:24-1729:8; Ex. 30, Dandar, July 17, p. 118:7-14). Mr. Minton
arranged for Mr. Leipold and Mr. Greene to come to Key West to assist and educate Mr. Dandar
with respect to litigating against the Church (Ex. 3, Minton, May 17, pp. 169:17-170:25), and to
suggest ways to attack the religiosity of Scientology, and to target Mr. Miscavige. (Ex. 3, Minton,
May 21, pp. 348:22-349:7). These suggestions, of course, were directly contrary to Mr. Dandar s

                              -20 -
July 22, 1999 promise to Judge Moody to strike all references to David Miscavige from the
Complaint and to make Mr. Miscavige the focal point of the litigation.

Mr. Prince s affidavit in this case, and the Fifth Amended Complaint which it supports,
were born in Key West. Mr. Dandar testified that he first spent extensive time with Mr. Prince in
Key West. (Ex. 7, Dandar, May 3, pp. 89-92). He also testified that he and Mr. Prince "talked and
talked" (id., 90:23-24), and that discussions went on for four days with "every waking moment"
consumed by talk of Scientology litigation and the wrongful death case. (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 6,
pp. 841:24-842:25). Mr. Dandar stated that immediately after the Key West trip, Mr. Prince
traveled with Mr. Dandar on his plane directly to Mr. Dandar s office and began drafting his
affidavit that accused Mr. Miscavige of murder, and that culminated in the Fifth Amended
Complaint. (Ex. 7, Dandar May 3, pp. 90:24-92:15, 102:7-18, 105:9-107:2). '9 

Mr. Dandar testified that he was in regular telephonic communication with Mr. Minton
from Mr. Dandar s office while Mr. Prince worked on his affidavit. (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 4, pp.
146-147). Mr. Minton testified that he was in regular communication with Mr. Prince and Ms.
Brooks from August through December of 1999, expressing his views on how best to attack

19/ As shown in greater detail, post, at 88, and in Appendix F, just six weeks later, Prince was
deposed and the subject of the Key West meeting was addressed. Prince repeatedly lied in his
deposition by denying that he had substantive discussions with Mr. Dandar about the case in Key
West, that the subject of Scientology or litigation was discussed, and, until he "corrected" himself
following a break, denied Mr. Dandar was even in attendance. Instead, Prince stated that it was
just a "fishing" trip, that Mr. Dandar had just come for dinner one evening and that Mr. Prince did
not recall how he returned home from the trip (even though Mr. Dandar has now disclosed he
piloted Prince to Tampa in a rented plane). Considering this Key West trip marked the birth of the
sham pleading, comporting with Mr. Minton s wishes regarding the direction the litigation must
take to receive further funding, Prince obviously thought he should cover up the content of those
discussions. Mr. Dandar took no steps to correct Mr. Prince s false deposition testimony.

Scientology in the wrongful death case in the hope of "basically nailing the cult s ass to the floor."
(Ex. 3, Minton, May 21, p. 366:11-20).

               b.   Philadelphia

After the Key West meetings, even while Mr. Prince was in Mr. Dandar s office working
on his affidavit, Mr. Dandar was apparently not yet prepared to abandon his representation to
Judge Moody to streamline the complaint and strike the allegations about David Miscavige. Mr.
Minton also wanted Messrs. Leipold and Greene to appear in this case as co-counsel with Mr.
Dandar. Mr. Dandar balked at that idea, reluctant to yield any portion of his contingency fee to
them. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 21, p. 302:1-16).

Mr. Dandar sought a meeting with Mr. Minton in Philadelphia, to which Mr. Minton
agreed. Mr. Dandar wanted to discuss additional funding (Ex. 3, Minton, May 17, p. 143); Mr.
Minton wanted to make sure the litigation targeted Mr. Miscavige. In Philadelphia, Mr. Minton
told Mr. Dandar that he wanted Stacy Brooks and Jesse Prince to have more input into the case -
and to emphasize the anti-Scientology issues more. Mr. Minton explained to Mr. Dandar that Mr.
Prince and Ms. Brooks had told Mr. Minton that they were dissatisfied with Mr. Dandar giving
"lip service" to the Scientology aspects of the case. (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, pp. 52, 68).
Accordingly, Mr. Minton delivered an ultimatum to Mr. Dandar   either get Ms. Brooks and Mr.
Prince more involved in shaping the case, or the money stops. (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, pp. 66-67).

Mr. Dandar responded that, to comply with Mr. Minton s wishes, it would cost more
money. Eventually, Mr. Dandar and Mr. Minton reached agreement. On the evening of August
26, 1999, in a Philadelphia hotel room, Mr. Minton wrote a personal check dated August 27,
1999 for $250,000 to Dandar & Dandar and handed it to Mr. Dandar   the first check in the case

                              -22 -
     more than $100,000. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 17, pp.146-147; Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, p. 68). ~' As
     part of that meeting of the minds, Mr. Dandar abandoned his July 22, 1999

representation to Judge Moody that he would strike references to David Miscavige in a new
amended complaint. Instead, he agreed to move in the opposite direction, by using Mr. Prince s
affidavit to support a Fifth Amended Complaint which would aver even more extreme and specific
allegations against Mr. Miscavige, including that he ordered the death of Lisa McPherson.
Indeed, that allegation of intentional murder would become, for the first time, the exclusive basis
for the wrongful death claim. (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, p. 70). Ms. Brooks  testimony that this
scenario was, in fact, fabricated for Mr. Prince s affidavit and the Fifth Amended Complaint is
foreshadowed and corroborated by the February 1999 videotaped discussion in which Ms. Brooks
chastises Mr. Prince for his fabrication of his fictional scenario equating "End of Cycle" with
death. (Ex. 31   Def. [kg. Ex. 92). While that videotape clearly reflects that Ms. Brooks was
opposed to using the "End Of Cycle" fabrication prior to targeting Mr. Miscavige, in her apparent
recognition that its demonstrably false nature would weaken the attack, her objections were
evidently ignored by Mr. Prince and Mr. Dandar. 21/

20/ Both Mr. Minton and Ms. Brooks have testified that, at the time of the Philadelphia
meeting, they were unaware of the contract not to sue RTC or any if its directors, officers, or
employees, which Mr. Dandar and the Estate had executed on December 4, 1997. (Ex. 3, Minton,
May 17, p. 151; Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, p. 105). Evidently, the price for breaching that agreement,
as well as reneging on the representation to Judge Moody that Mr. Miscavige would not be part
of this case, was $250,000.

21! Mr. Dandar, having already testified to having had no meetings with Mr. Minton, virtually no
contact with LMT, and that Mr. Minton (and therefore his agents such as Ms. Brooks and Mr.
Prince) had "zero involvement" with this case, tried to distance himself from Ms. Brooks 
statements in the video with the lame excuse that he was not counsel for LMT when the tape was
produced. Mr. Dandar, however, forgets it was he who personally produced the -

                              -23 -
Mr. Dandar s denial that Mr. Minton and Ms. Brooks spoke to him about this case in
Philadelphia, insisting instead that they merely had dinner and discussed Mr. Minton s personal
life in front of a total stranger to Mr. Minton, begs credulity. Especially indicative of Dandar s
lack of candor is this testimony that he could not recall whether or not Mr. Minton had handed
him a $250,000 check in Philadelphia. (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 4, 260:11-14). Similarly revealing,
Mr. Minton received a draft copy of the Fifth Amended Complaint, dated August 30, 1999, from
Mr. Dandar by e-mail (Ex. 33  Def. [kg. Ex. 264, Ex. A thereto), thereby strongly suggesting
that Ms. Brooks and Mr. Minton accurately recall what was discussed in Philadelphia four days
earlier. 22/

The Prince affidavit was the principal basis for the motion to amend the complaint filed
less than two weeks after the $250,000 check was handed to Mr. Dandar in exchange for his
agreement to utilize Mr. Prince and Ms. Young more extensively in the litigation, to press the
anti-Scientology aspects of the case, to retreat from his July 22, 1999 promise to Judge Moody to
strike all references to Mr. Miscavige from his complaint, and especially to breach the contractual
comxmtment not to sue RTC or any of its directors, officers or employees. This corroborates Mr.
Minton s and Ms. Brooks  testimony that Mr. Dandar s only hesitation in fulfilling Mr. Minton s
paramount concern   to target David Miscavige   was to get more money. Indeed, in the ten

21/ (...continued)

videotape to the Church during a hearing before Judge Moody on April 28, 2000 in response to
Church requests for videos reflecting on witnesses. (Ex. 32, Hearing Transcript, April 28, 2000,
at pp. 53-54).

22/ When the e-mail from Mr. Dandar forwarding the draft complaint to Mr. Minton was put
in evidence, Mr. Dandar unconvincingly said he "would not have done that" and that he did not
"remember" having sent Mr. Minton the draft, and suggested that he perhaps gave it to Ms.
Brooks or Mr. Prince. (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 4,2002, pp. 191-192).

months between Mr. Dandar s commencement of his efforts to file the Fifth Amended Complaint
accusing Mr. Miscavige of ordering Lisa McPherson  murder in August 1999 and June 6,2000
when Mr. Miscavige was dismissed as a defendant, Mr. Minton gave Mr. Dandar $950,000. (Ex.
25  Def. [kg Ex. Ex. 93 E-I.). ~

          c. The First Fifth Amended Complaint

On September 7, 1999, Mr. Dandar sought leave to file a Fifth Amended Complaint and
to add Mr. Miscavige, Marty Rathbun, Ray Mithoff, Religious Technology Center (RTC) and
Church of Scientology International (C SI) as defendants, relying principally on the August 20,
1999 affidavit of Jesse Prince  44. Both the i~  and the first Fifth Amended Complaint focused
on Mr. Miscavige s position as Chairman of the Board (COB) RTC, and argued that he "would
have" acted from that position. On October 8, 1999, Judge Moody denied the motion for leave to
amend on the basis that the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint violated the December 4, 1997
contract which precluded plaintiff from seeking to add as a party any church organization or
officer, director or employee of those church organizations including RTC.

As seen below, Judge Moody s rejection of the first version of the Fifth Amended

23/ Further corroborating Ms. Brooks  and Mr. Minton s testimony that the $250,000 was given
upon Mr. Dandar s promise to utilize Ms. Brooks and Mr. Prince more extensively, is the fact
that, for the first time ever, Ms. Brooks and Mr. Prince began appearing with Mr. Dandar at
hearings and depositions in the wrongful death case, starting with the next scheduled hearing on
September 13, 1999. (Ex. 35).

24/ Mr. Prince s affidavit stated that reports that a person had a psychotic break "would be sent
uplines to Ray Mithoff at RTC [sic: Mr. Mithoff was not employed by RTC, but by CSI] by
KartuzinskI. Ray Mithoff would then take the report to RTC," where it would be reviewed by
Marty Rathbun. (Ex. 36, Prince Affi, August 20, 1999,  39.) According to Prince, Mithoff,
Rathbun and Miscavige would have met and discussed "various optiOns." (Id.,  41.) Plaintiff
also relied on the affidavit of Mr. Young ("RTC would have been the first to be told and be kept
updated") (Young Affi,  38) and Ms. Brooks (Brooks Affi,  21).

                              -25 -
Complaint sent Mr. Dandar and the A-Team back to the drawing board. The impediment to
proceeding as planned   the December 4, 1997 Šontract   had to be overcome.

               d.   "The Meeting That Never Happened"

Mr. Dandar s false testimony to the contrary notwithstanding, there was a meeting in the
offices of Dandar & Dandar, with Mr. Dandar and others present, in the fall of 1999 in which the
decision was finalized to make a renewed motion to seek to name David Miscavige as a defendant
and to specifically allege that Lisa McPherson was murdered pursuant to an order of Mr.
Miscavige." On that, Mr. Minton (Ex. 3, Minton, May 17, pp. 148-150), Ms. Brooks (Ex. 2,
Brooks, May 3, pp. 111-112), Dr. Garko (Ex. 28, Garko, June 11, pp. 11-13) all agree. Both Mr.
Minton and Ms. Brooks identify five participants   themselves, Mr. Prince, Mr. Dandar, and Dr.
Garko. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 17, p. 149; Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, p. 104). Dr. Garko does not
recollect Mr. Prince being there. (Ex. 28, Garko, June 11, p. 12). Predictably, Mr. Dandar says
there was no meeting. (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 4, pp. 274-277). ~' True to form, Mr. Prince first says
that Mr. Minton was not at that meeting (Ex. 8, Prince, July 8, p. 437), and then testifies to what
Mr. Minton said during that meeting. (Ex. 8, Prince, July 9, p. 574-576.)

Moreover, after that meeting, in the elevator, Mr. Dandar did expre~sly instruct Mr.
Minton and Ms. Brooks to be aware that that meeting "never happened." (Ex. 3, Minton, May 17,
p. 157; Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, 13 1-132). Despite Mr. Dandar s blanket denial that there was ever
such a meeting or that he told Mr. Minton, "Look, this meeting never happened and we can t talk

25/ Mr. Dandar s general lack of candor is explored fully, infra. Mr. Dandar not only refuses
to acknowledge that he ever had a meeting with Mr. Minton (Ex.l. Dandar, May 30, p. 9), he also
contends despite receiving more than $2 million (all but $750,000 of which was in the form of
personal checks) from Mr. Minton, that Mr. Minton had "zero involvement" in this case. (Ex. 1,
Dandar, May 30, 19-22).

about it," (Ex. 3, Minton, p.157), Mr. Minton is so confident of his recollection that he has~
admitted to perjury resulting from Mr. Dandar s suboming on this very issue.

On the eve of his October 11, 2001 deposition in the breach of contract case pending
before Judge Baird, Mr. Minton conferred with Mr. Dandar. At that time Mr. Dandar reminded
Mr. Minton of the position to be taken concerning the meeting in which it was decided to
continue the pursuit of David Miscavige as a defendant in this case.

          he [Mr. Dandar] asked me about the meeting that never happened. That is not
          my phrase. That was his phrase, "the meeting that never happened." And I think he
          asked me, "do you remember
            do you remember the meeting that never happened?" I said "no.~~ And he
          laughed quite vigorously and he said, "That s a good answer, you know, remember
            remember that answer."

(Ex. 3, Minton, May 22, pp. 680- 681).

At Mr. Dandar s direction, Mr. Minton perjured himself on both days of his October 11
and 12, 2001 deposition in the breach of contract case. (Ex. 37, Minton, April 9, p. 12-16; Ex. 17,
April 19, 10 1-104; Ex. 3, May 22, p. 68 1-684). Specifically, Mr. Minton testified that he lied
when he denied speaking with Mr. Dandar on the subject of adding any defendants to the case
(Ex. 37, Minton, April 9, 12-13); when he stated that he could not recall if he had advance
knowledge that Mr. Dandar would try to add Mr. Miscavige as a defendant (id. at 13); when he
denied having communicated his viewpoint about the addition of Mr. Miscavige to Mr. Dandar
(id. at 13-14); when he gave a false and contrived explanation of why he never spoke to Mr.
Dandar about amending to name Mr. Miscavige (id. at 14); when he denied having "any input
whatsoever" on the subject of naming Mr. Miscavige (id, at 15; Ex. 3, May 22, 683- 684); and
when he disclaimed knowing anyone outside of Mr. Dandar s "litigation team" who was involved

                              N    ,

in the "decision making process" concerning the addition of defendants. (Ex. 37 at 15-16). ~-~'
Apart from urging such perjury, Mr. Dandar was present when Mr. Minton gave these false
answers and, in some of those instances, actually elicited the perjured testimony himself)2 

What happened at the meeting that never happened? The final decision was reached to
pursue Mr. Miscavige as a defendant in an action for wrongful death by murder. (Ex. 3, Minton,
May 17, pp. 154-157); (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, pp. 111-112). Mr. Dandar s trial consultant, Dr.
Garko, testified that he was present in the conference room at Mr. Dandar s new office in the fall
of 1999, with Mr. Minton, Ms. Brooks and Mr. Dandar, when a "conversation" took place
regarding the subject of "adding David Miscavige as a defendant in the wrongful death case." (Ex.
28, Garko, June 11, pp. 11-13). ~-~' Indeed, Dr. Garko testified to a specific recollection of Mr.
Minton s demeanor at the meeting, where Mr. Minton sat and what each of the participants said.
(Id.,pp. 14-19).

After first denying that Mr. Minton was at this meeting. Mr. Prince let slip that Mr.
Minton was, in fact, present:

26/ The perjured testimony to which Mr. Minton has admitted and recanted is found at pages
393-396; 400-401; 629; and 63 1-632 of Mr. Minton s October 11-12,2001 deposition. (Ex. 38.)

27/ Ex. 38, Minton Depo., Oct. 12, 2001, 629, (no input into naming Mr. Miscavige); 632
(no knowledge of trial team members beyond Dandar & Dandar); 634 (no knowledge of paid

28/ Dr. Garko insisted on characterizing this occasion as a "visit," with the attendees "having
a conversation in Mr. Dandar s conference room," rather than a "scheduled meeting" with a "pre-

set agenda." (Ex. 28, Garko, June 11, pp. 12- 13). Whether a conference, a meeting, a
conversation, a visit, a chat, or a coffee ldatsch, the point is the issue of naming Mr. Miscavige as
a defendant in a claim premised on "murder" was discussed and decided in that gathering at which
Mr. Minton was present.

              THE COURT: Just so we see if the testimony s consistent   At this
              meeting, Jesse Prince was not in favor of adding Mr.
          Miscavige; Stacy Brooks really wanted to add David Miscavige.
          What about Dr. Garko?
              THE WITNESS: Dr. Garko was hesitant about it. And   THE COURT:
              THE WITNESS: And Mr. Minton didn 't care one way or the other. I
              mean   THE COURT: I thought Mr. Minton wasn t there.
          THE WITNESS: You know, later, when we discussed it, when, you know,
          Stacy   we went to the office. And Stacy says, "Well, I think, we re going to do
          this," and he s, like, "Yeah, okay. So what?"

(Ex. 8, Prince, July 9, pp. 575-576) (emphasis supplied.).

Initially, Mr. Dandar denied under oath that any meeting occurred in his office as
described by Ms. Brooks, Mr. Minton, and Dr. Garko. By the time Dr. Garko corroborated Mr.
Minton s and Ms. Brooks  testimony, Mr. Dandar was acknowledging the meeting while
quibbling with its details on cross-examination. Finally, Mr. Dandar brought in Brian Haney  
whom no one places at the meeting   to testify that he, too, was there.

Amazingly, Brian Haney made the same "mistake" as Mr. Prince. Mr. Haney claimed to
have attended several 1999 meetings which addressed adding Mr. Miscavige as a defendant. (Ex.
29, Haney, July 19, pp. 93- 94). Describing one such meeting in which he claimed Mr. Minton
was not present, Mr. Haney then proceeded to recount Mr. Minton s participation therein, and
other relevant facts.

          Mmm, I can just characterize what each person did at the meetings. -

          It [the addition of Mr. Miscavige] was Stacy s idea. Jesse supported
          it. They were both very emphatic. Michael Garko opposed it.

          And you [Mr. Dandar] just kept asking Bob and Stacy, "Are you sure you have
          enough direct evidence to show that he was in charge?" A nd you just kept asking
          them over and over again, because you had signed some agreement based upon  
          you told me
            advice you got from Dan Leipold at the beginning of the case about not adding
          parties. And I don t really know the specifics of it.

(Id., at 95- 96) (emphasis supplied.) ~' Mr. Haney corroborates Ms. Brooks  testimony that this

was her idea, and that Dr. Garko was not in agreement and that the earlier agreement not to add
additional parties was of concern.

Putting aside all of Mr. Dandar  s dissembling, along with the clumsy efforts at coaching
the testimony of Messrs. Prince and Haney, all that matters is that Mr. Minton, Mr. Prince, Ms.
Young and Mr. Dandar all participated in the implementation of Mr. Minton s strategy and
compulsion to target Mr. Miscavige with murder allegations.

Having decided to proceed with a renewed attempt to add Mr. Miscavige as a defendant,
Mr. Dandar was confronted by the problem of how to get around Judge Moody s order denying
the initial motion on the basis of the contract. Judge Moody had refused to let plaintiff file the first
version of the Fifth Amended Complaint precisely because it had alleged that Mr. Miscavige, Mr.
Rathbun and Mr. Mithoff had acted as officers or directors of RTC. The answer was to fabricate a
new scenario, but based upon the same affidavits of Mr. Prince and Mr. Young that had
emphasized Mr. Miscavige s role and authority as stemming from his position in RTC. The new
proposed Fifth Amended Complaint was entirely different than the first one in this respect: it
eliminated references to Mr. Miscavige as COB RTC, and replaced them with allegations that his
authority derived as "the Captain" of the Sea Org. an unincorporated association which Mr.

29/ Mr. Haney later said he meant Mr. Prince, not Mr. Minton.

Dandar claimed was not covered by the contract. Moreover, by omitting all references in the new
version of the complaint to Mr. Mithoff and Mr. Rathbun, plaintiff s new complaint was at
complete variance from the "supporting affidavit" of Mr. Prince upon which it relied, since Prince
had stated that Kartuzinski would have communicated with Mr. Mithoff, not directly with Mr.
Miscavige. Moreover, both the Prince and Young affidavits stated that Mr. Miscavige s authority
derived from his corporate position at RTC. Mr. Dandar s attempt to justify the shift in his
allegations from RTC to the Sea Org on the ground that he just learned about the Sea Org (Ex.
39, Hearing Tr. October 8, 1999, p. 47), was false; he had made identical allegations about the
Sea Org as early as the First Amended Complaint (see  18), but had de-emphasized those
allegations in favor of RTC in the first version of the Fifth Amended Complaint, undoubtedly
because it was premised on the affidavit of Jesse Prince who attributes his status to having
worked in RTC, not to rank in the Sea Org religious order. This willingness to completely change
the allegations to serve the intended purpose was, of course, consistent with the entire set of
allegations underlying the new Fifth Amended Complaint, i.e., they were fabricated scenarios,
both as to David Miscavige and as to the Sea Org.~  Both Mr. Mithoff and Mr. Rathbun are also
members of the Sea Org. Their omission from this new complaint can only be attributed to their
lack of public prominence compared to Mr. Miscavige. Instead of one sham, plaintiff alleged two.

30/ The fabricated scenario resulted in the granting of two summary judgment motions
against the Estate in the Texas and Florida breach of contract actions. The Texas case, as noted,
has been reduced to final judgment in the amount of $600,000; the Florida case awaits a trial on
damages and attorneys  fees.

          3.   The Interference Expands with the Creation of LMT

               a.   The Establishment of LMT

During this hearing, Mr. Dandar repeatedly scoffed at the idea that Mr. Minton, Mr.
Prince and Ms. Brooks would have assembled in his office sometime between October 8, 1999
(when Judge Moody denied the first attempt to file a Fifth Amended Complaint) and November
19, 1999 (when the renewed motion for leave to file a Fifth Amended Complaint was filed). That
is just false. They were there and there frequently. LMT was incorporated by Mr. Dandar on
October 21, 1999 and the unrebutted testimony is that LMT operated out of Mr. Dandar s office
from its inception until Mr. Minton purchased a building two months later (Ex. 2. Brooks, May 3,
p. 139) freely using his floor space, equipment, and even telephones. (Id., p. 877-878). LMT s
telephone bills were in the name "Dandar & Dandar" for its first three months of operation at
which time they were switched to Mr. Minton s name. (Ex. 40  Def. Hrg. Ex. 97). Mr. Dandar s
office remains the address of LMT s registered agent for service of process. (Ex. 3, Minton, May
22, p. 619; Ex. 41  Def. 1kg. Ex. 118C).

On November 4, 1999, Mr. Minton reserved and paid for Mr. Dandar s website s domain
name and worked on the design of that website. (Ex. 1, June 5, pp. 628-629).

At Mr. Dandar s suggestion, LMT was incorporated as a for-profit entity specifically  
and as is now clear, significantly   to conceal the source of its funds from public disclosure. ~ (Ex.
2, Brooks, May 6, pp. 342-343). It had been operating out of Mr. Dandar s office for a month

31/ Clearly, the LMT was originally conceived as a "non-profit" entity to receive the
proceeds of any judgment. Hence, the use of "Foundation" and "Trust" in its name. It was
organized as a for-profit entity to avoid the financial disclosure required of non-profit
organizations, and its name was ready-made for its future conversion to a non-profit when the
hoped-for "bulk of any judgment" would be received.

the Renewed Motion for Leave to File a Fifth Amended Complaint was filed on November 19,
1999. But the connection between LMT, the wrongful death case, and the sham pleading alleging
Mr. Miscavige s involvement in ordering the death of Lisa McPherson is best illustrated by the
fact it was Mr. Dandar who made the first public announcement of LMT s formation at a press
conference on December 4, 1999. Mr. Dandar also announced at the same LMT press conference
that he was seeking to add Mr. Miscavige as a defendant in the wrongful death case and a hearing
would be held on December 14, 1999. This was the same press conference where Mr. Dandar
accused Mr. Miscavige of murder and told the gathering how Jesse Prince had shown him the
Scientology dictionary defined "End of Cycle" as "to die." (As the court has seen, this was false
and no such definition appears in the Scientology Dictionary.) Ten days later Mr. Dandar advised
Mr. Minton to march down to the Church with the St. Petersburg Times article detailing the
granting of leave to file the Fifth Amended Complaint and advised him to "stick it somewhere."
(Ex. 3, Minton, May 29, pp. 1692-1693).

On January 6,2000, Mr. Minton purchased a building to house LMT in headquarters next
door to the Church s staff dining facilities, and employed several anti-Scientologists full time. Mr.
Dandar attended the closing of the new LMT building, handling its insurance personally and
announcing this as a "good day for downtown Clearwater." (Ex. 42  Def. Hrg. Ex. 307S). Thus,
the opening of LMT s new building and the actual order permitting the filing of the Fifth
Amended Complaint, with its intentional murder allegations against Mr. Miscavige and the
Church, occurred on the same day.

               b.   The Allegations of the Prince Affidavit and the Fifth Amended
               Complaint in the Litigation Mirror LMT s Contemporaneous Attacks
               Upon Mr. Miscavige and the Church Outside the Litigation

LMT s formation served at once to broaden the avenues of media attack, to step up

complaints to and cooperation with hostile public agencies, and to focus and multiply attempts to
diminish Scientology in the eyes of the public in Clearwater and its environs. LMT s emergence
also served to merge into one the litigation and non-litigation exploitation of Lisa McPherson s

Within days Mr. Dandar was holding formal attorney conferences to advise Robert
Minton and LMT staff (including Prince and Brooks) on how to lawfully picket in the face of an
injunction entered by Judge Penick. (Ex. 43  Def. 1kg. Ex. 307BB). In truth, Mr. Dandar was as
much part and parcel of LMT from its inception as was the A-Team.

Minton and the LMT were literally "in the face" of Church staff and parishioners every
day. (Ex. 11   Def. [kg Ex. 309, p. 93; Ex. 3, Minton May 17, pp. 176-177). LMT staff picketed
exclusively at meal times, obstructing and taunting Church staff as they arrived for and departed
from meals on an almost daily basis. Extensive and expensive measures were taken by the Church
to protect its staff and parishioners from the relentless harassment, including the implementation
of costly busing of staff to and from meals.

The pre-LMT harassment by the A-team was often marked by vulgar, distasteful displays
such as Mr. Prince exhorting a Fort Harrison Hotel security guard to "Tell David [Miscavige] I m
coming with a dick so big, I m going to knock his goddamn spine out," (Ex. 44  Def. 1kg. Ex.
3070) and Mr. Minton s Internet posting of Mr. Miscavige s mother s telephone number and
encouragement of the world at large to do what he did and call her (Ex. 45  Def. Hrg. Ex. 94F

and 94G). See also, Mr. Minton threatening to burn Mr. Miscavige in effigy in front of Church
premises (Ex. 45  Def. Hrg Ex. 94A); and Mr. Minton calling for Mr. Miscavige s "head on a
pike." (Ex. 54). The campaign to discredit and to target David Miscavige intensified following
LMT s incorporation, reflecting and bolstering the allegations of the Fifth Amended Complaint
and the Prince affidavit. Thus, the purpose of this subversion campaign was the same as at least
one major purpose for converting the lawsuit into an attack on Mr. Miscavige,   i.e., to try to
diminish his ecclesiastical authority in the Church, and thus destroy or undermine the stability of
the religion.

The public attacks on Mr. Miscavige and the Church undertaken by LMT and by Mr.
Dandar were synchronized and designed for maximum smear value, especially in the community
of Scientologists. Thus   as graphically depicted in Defendant s Time Line of Harassment, Threats
and Attacks (Ex. 11   Def. 1kg. Ex. 309)   public picketing and public statements included the
ecclesiastically abhorrent allegation that Mr. Miscavige did not properly apply Scientology
religious technology, resulting in the death of Lisa McPherson. See, e.g (Ex. 46  Def. [kg Ex. 3
07(G)) (LMT videotape alleging that Mr. Miscavige "changed the Tech" of Scientology); (Ex.
47  Def. 1kg. Ex. 307(H)) (Minton picket: "Dump David Miscavige. He s a squirrel. ~ RTC has
totally perverted the tech. RTC is a squirrel group."); (Ex. 48  DefHrg. Ex. 307(L)) (Minton
picket: "Make Scientology something to be proud of. Reform it now before David Miscavige
ruins it."); (Ex. 49  Def. [kg Ex.307(M)) (Minton yelling to witnesses outside Church property:
"Tell David Miscavige.he is wrong! Tell him that L. Ron Hubbard would never

In Scientology terminology, a "squirrel" is someone who perverts orthodox Scientology
Scripture and practice. This is particularly offensive since RTC s unique role in the religion of
Scientology is to maintain orthodoxy and prevent "squirreling."

approve of what he is doing to destroy your Church!"); (Ex. 50  Def. [kg. Ex. 397(N); (Ex. 51
  Def. 1kg Ex. 307(R)) (A videotape from Germany of a toast among Minton, Prince, Brooks,
and German Government official Ursula Caberta in which Minton is referring to David Miscavige
as the "former ecclesiastical leader of the Church" and "Pope David the First" and Ms. Caberta
sending a message to David Miscavige that "we will finish Scientology soon.") (Ex. 52  Def. [kg
Ex. 3 07(Z)).

The homes of prominent parishioners were surveilled and picketed at night. Church staff
and parishioners took additional measures to avoid confrontation. The more Scientologists
avoided confrontation, the more aggressive and outrageous LMT s picket tactics became, as
shown by the videos of the midnight picket by Frank Oliver and Mr. Minton, who taunted security
guard Paul Kellerhaus and shined a laser beam in his eye; and by Oliver s orchestration of taunting
and disruptive picket by the "punk rock" band. (Ex. 53   Def. [kg Ex. 307W, 307H.) Finally, at
the urging of the City of Clearwater, the Church hired off-duty City police officers to protect its
parishioners and staff between January 2000 and December 2001, to relieve the burden on the
Clearwater Police Department s on-duty officers.

The picketing sometimes took a more disturbing turn, with Mr. Minton once provoking a
physical altercation. Ultimately, Judge Penick issued injunctions between November 1999 and
June 2000 to keep the peace. Litigation ensued to enforce those injunctions. Later, Mr. Minton
and another LMT staff member were held in contempt for violating the injunctions.

The unrelenting assaults against the religion and its ecclesiastical leader were laced with
vile accusations of Lisa McPherson s death resulting from the practice.of Scientology. (Ex. 11  
Def. Ex. 309, pp. 29-1 17,passim). But the obsession with attacking and denigrating also became

increasingly vicious and personal, including Mr. Minton s aforementioned videotaped toast, in
which he refers to Mr. Miscavige as the "Rear Admiral," and claims that he "went ballistic over
the thought of Graham Berry spending time mounted on the back end of David Miscavige" (Ex.
51, Def. [kg. Ex. 107R).

The escalating nature of these attacks, starting with unfounded murder allegations and
culminating in death threats, including the Internet posting by LMT Advisory Board Member,
Keith Henson, of the global satellite positioning coordinates   those used by the military for
isolating missile targets   to Mr. Miscavige s office desk in California with exhortations to strike it
with ballistic explosives, is well documented in Defendants  Hearing Exhibit 309, and exemplifies
that the murder allegations against Mr. Miscavige in this case served as the catalyst for the most
profound and invidious sort of sustained harassment.

              c.  The Use of LMT Staff as Witnesses

All the LMT staff engaged in direct daily harassment of the Church became increasingly
involved in the wrongful death case. The sharing of personnel between Mr. Dandar s office and
LMT was as comprehensive as it was extensive. Among those identified in evidence as
consultants to, or trial team members of, Mr. Dandar in this action were LMT officers (Ms.
Brooks, Mr. Prince, Mr. Haney), LMT directors (Mr. Alexander, Ms. Brooks, Ms. Greenway,~2 
Mr. Haney, Mr. Jacobsen, Mr. Prince), and LMT advisory committee members (Mr. Emmons,
Mr. Leipold, Mr. Oliver, and Mr. Dandar himself). (Ex. 9, Def. [kg. Ex. 81). The payments to all

Mr. Dandar s statements to the Court in this very hearing as to the role of Ms. Greenway
are totally contradictory. Compare "I heard someone call Patricia Greenway my trial consultant.
That s a joke." (Ex. 3, May 23, 787: 24-25) with "Miss Greenway is a volunteer consultant for
me and does talk to me about things." (Ex. 29, June 19, 205 :4-6.)

such persons made for their participation in this litigation as LMT affiliates came from Mr.
Minton s funding of LMT; the payments to all such persons made by Mr. Dandar came from
money furnished to Mr. Dandar by Mr. Minton. Other LMT directors included Dell Liebreich and
her niece Kim Krenek, both of whom were recommended for directorships by Mr. Dandar (Ex. 3,
Minton,  May 22, 62 1-622), and, of course, Mr. Minton himself. (Ex. 9  Def. Hrg. Ex. 81).

Mr. Minton gave instructions to Ms. Brooks, and Messrs. Prince, Jacobsen, and Bunker
to assist Mr. Dandar with anything he needed in relation to this case, as a priority of their LMT
work. Minton observed that they carried out his instructions. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 22, pp. 625-
626). Teresa Summers became an employee of LMT through Brian Haney; Mr. Haney was
referred to Ms. Summers by Mr. Dandar (Ex. 56, Summers, June 10, pp. 53- 54) while Mr. Haney
was both an LMT officer and director and a consultant to Mr. Dandar. (id. at 142).

When LMT picketing became a subject of controversy in court, the picket signs which
had been stored at LMT were removed as a result of discussions among Mr. Dandar, Ms. Brooks,
and Mr. Jacobsen. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 22, p. 622). Moreover, Mr. Dandar coordinated the dates
of LMT picketing with Mr. Minton to ensure that McPherson family members would be present,
and so information packs could be sent to the media to garner as much coverage as possible. (Ex.
3, Minton, May 22, pp. 623-624). Whether he acknowledges it as picketing, or relies on the
euphemism "vigil," Mr. Dandar publicly demonstrated against Scientology with LMT personnel.

     LMT officers, directors, advisory committee members, and employees identified as Mr.

Dandar s trial witnesses include Kim Krenek, Dell Liebreich, Jesse Prince, Teresa Summers, Peter

Alexander, Gerald Armstrong, Marjorie Wakefield, Daniel Leipold, David Cecere, and Frank

Oliver. (Ex. 57  Def. [kg. Ex., pp. 149 & 150). Mr. Dandar was accompanied to depositions in

this case on numerous occasions by Ms. Brooks, Mr. Prince, and Mr. Haney and he relied on
LMT affiliates Ms. Brooks, Mr. Prince, Mr. Ward, Mr. Alexander, Mr. Keller, Mr. Leipold, Mr.
Emmons, Ms. Liebreich and Mr. Minton for affidavits in this and the related cases.~ 

As stated by Ms. Brooks under questioning by Mr. Lirot:

         Q ... [Y]our affidavit makes it look like if you want to be a witness in this
         case, go to the Lisa McPherson Trust and we ll give you a handout, if you want to
         help us with this case. That is not the way it was, was it?

          A Well, that is pretty much the way it was, Mr. Lirot.

(Ex. 2, Brooks, May 6, p. 342)

Witnesses for the case were provided with employment. Mr. Dandar nominated them

variously as "consultants" and "experts" depending on his need to avoid discovery into the
incestuous relationship between his law firm and LMT   which Ms. Brooks described as "an
adjunct to the case." (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 6, p. 354). LMT was a referral service for witnesses
and possibly clients for Mr. Dandar as evidenced in Teresa Summers  e-mails. (Ex. 59, Def. [kg.
Ex. 268).

>From the moment it was incorporated until the day it closed its doors, LMT was under
Mr. Minton s absolute dominion and control. He owned all the stock (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 14, pp.
1231- 1232), and drafted LMT s mission statement. (Ex. 60, Alexander, June 7, pp. 144-145).

All of LMT s expenses, including payroll, were paid with funds received from Mr.
Minton. (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 14, p. 1231). Even the allegedly "anonymous" funds paid into LMT

~'~" Mr. Dandar also used LMT advisory committee member and private investigator Ray Emmons,
as his own investigator (Ex. 3, May 22, Minton, p. 605) and claimed work product for his
utilization of former LMT President David Cecere as a consultant. (Ex. 58, Cecere Depo., 20 Dec
2001, p. 7.)

from Europe came from Mr. Minton. (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 6, p. 308). Mr. Minton transferred
funds from Europe to LMT, and then had Brooks write LMT checks to him in the amounts of the
transfers. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 21, pp. 444- 445). ~-~' As Mr. Minton has  testified, the activities of
LMT were devoted to the wrongful death case, and not to counseling ex-members, although
LMT claimed they were to seek to legitimize its activities.

              d.  LMT s Discovery Obstruction

When the Fifth Amended Complaint was filed on January 20, 2000, the case was
transformed from a generalized attack on Scientology with collateral insinuations regarding the
religion s ecclesiastic leadership to a focused claim of intentional murder alleged to have
originated from David Miscavige himself. As a result, the focus of discovery necessarily
broadened from inquiry into Lisa McPherson s physical and medical condition to inquiry into the
various "Scientology" witnesses who Mr. Dandar claimed supported the murder allegation, and
inquiry into the collateral purposes and motives that gave rise to such a fabricated scenario. Those
inquiries led directly to Mr. Ivlinton, Ms. Brooks, Mr. Prince, and LMT. The Church could hardly
defend against such scandalous allegations without conducting such discovery.

Defendant s counsel explained the ramifications of the Fifth Amended Complaint on the
litigation at the December 14, 1999 hearing in which leave to file that pleading was granted.

~   John Merrett, LMT s in-house counsel, seemed to relish the idea of concocting disguised
foreign funds transfers. In an August 9,2001 e-mail to Mr. Minton, Merrett, the self-proclaimed
architect of the Operation Clambake funding scam and putative creator of the Fat Man moniker,
proposed a plan whereby a Panamanian corporation, which is not legally obliged to respond to
United States civil process, would be established in the name of Merrett s "retarded 26-yew old
nephew who has a signature of sorts, but who cannot speak intelligently." (Ex. 33  Def. [kg. Ex.
264, Ex. D thereto). Merrett continued, saying that "[t]he idea is that transfers from overseas
would go to the offshore corporation, which would then from a position of impunity, fund the
LMT and indicated individuals." (Id.)

          MR. LIEBERMAN: Yes. The agreement,~1 Your Honor, was to end the
          process of amending the complaint to add new defendants so that we could move
          on and so that there wouldn t be further expenses and new parties added and new
          expenses and new depositions and new legal theories.

          If you add Mr. Miscavige on this theory, look at what kinds of questions
          are going to be added to this case. Four years after the events, three years after the
          complaint was filed. These are complex, factual issues which raise legal questions
          which are of incalculable difficulty constitutionally.

         Now, I m not standing here arguing the merits of that question with Your
         Honor because obviously that would be a very complex question, and it is not
         before us, but that is what we re looking at down the road in this case.

              All the discovery will have to be done over.

(Ex. 61, Dec. 14, 1999, Hearing, pp. 33-34).

And so it was, with the focus of the start-from-scratch discovery on LMT where all the
various components of the Dandar-LMT-Minton group werenewly housed. On March 26, 2000,
defendant served a subpoena for an LMT corporate representative to produce at deposition,
records reflecting payments to witnesses, witness statements, and videotapes depicting witnesses.
That subpoena ignited a chain-reaction of obstruction and motion practice, which culminated in
LMT closing its doors in September of 2001 and which led to the events that set the stage for this

In the early stages of discovery into the LMT and its payments to witnesses and influence
on the litigation, Mr. Dandar overtly represented LMT and its principals on a myriad of occasions.

36/ The "agreement" to which counsel was referring is the December 4, 1997 agreement
whereby Plaintiff covenanted not to name RTC or any of its directors, officers, or employees as
defendants in this action. (Ex. 24).

                              -41 -
See Appendix F which enumerates Mr. Dandar s representation. Mr. Dandar contrived to
represent LMT covertly after the hiring of John Merrett to appear of record for LMT. Mr.
Merrett testified he regularly coordinated the filing of briefs and shared work product. ~'

In response to the March 26, 2000 subpoena, LMT, through Mr. Dandar, moved for a
protective order, which was denied on April 7, 2000 by Judge Moody. (Ex. 64. pp. 147-149). Mr.
Dandar tried again, and failed again, to stop the LMT deposition and document production,
resulting in Judge Moody stating, on April 10, 2000, that "[i]f they have tapes or documents or
information where they ve paid money to someone who is going to be testifying in this case, I
want that information revealed." (Ex. 65, p.23).

The resulting deposition was a farce. On April 24, 2000, LMT produced an employee of
one week s tenure who testified that he had been informed that morning by Ms. Brooks that he
would testify~as LMT s corporate representative. (Ex. 66, pp. 25-26). Beyond knowing nothing,
that witness produced nothing, and a motion to compel followed. At that hearing, Mr. Dandar
represented to the Court that a new search for responsive documents was in progress, and Judge
Moody reserved ruling on the motion to compel and request for sanctions. (Ex. 32, pp. 56-57).

Meanwhile, defendant noticed the depositions of Mr. Minton and Ms. Brooks. Ms.
Brooks failed to appear and sought a protective order; Mr. Minton, too, sought a protective

Since the omnibus hearing Mr. Minton has furnished additional documents that
demonstrate Mr. Dandar s continuing involvement. On January 31,2001, Mi. Dandar faxed a
motion titled Emergency Motion for Stay Concerning Ordered Depositions and Production to
John Merrett along with the cover instruction to "sign, file and arrange a hearing." That pleading
was m fact filed on the same date. Mr. Merrett apparently received the pleading by e-mail,
changed the type style, signed it and filed the brief. (Ex. 62, Affidavit of Robert Minton,
authenticating fax). That is evidenced by the same typographical error (a space between the letters
"t" and "h" in the word "this") that appears at line 7, page 1 of Mr. Merrett s brief is also evident
at page 1, line 7, of the same Mr. Dandar faxed version. (Ex. 63.)

                              -42 -
While those motions were pending, on May 1,2000, Mr. Minton furnished Mr. Dandar with the
$500,000 Swiss bank check upon Mr. Dandar s suggestion that such payments be made with
untraceable funds. (Ex. 14, ~f 34-3 6). That "coincidence" certainly could not have been
coincidental. Two days after the check was paid, Judge Moody denied both motions (Ex. 67, pp.
52, 53, 57), thus intensifying LMT s calculated campaign to eVade discovery into Mr. Minton s
and LMT s finances, influence on the case, and payments to witnesses and counsel   the very
information which Judge Moody stated that he wanted revealed.

Accordingly, Ms. Brooks again failed to appear for her deposition. In response, on May
15, 2000, Judge Moody ruled:

          They re entitled to find what witnesses in this case have been paid by the Lisa
          McPherson Trust, if any, and if so, how much they ve been paid, what witnesses
          are on video, a video statement about any of the issues in this case or about the
          issues of Scientology, and they re entitled to see those videos.

(Ex. 68, p. 41) and again ordered LMT to produce documents and unedited video statements of

witnesses and sanctioned Ms. Brooks and again ordered her to appear. (Ex. 69, Order, May 15,


By this point it was clear that Judge Moody was going to permit discovery into LMT s
and Mr. Minton s funding, because it might reflect on the motive for, and veracity of, the extreme
allegations of the Fifth Amended Complaint and the credibility of plaintiffs witnesses. (Ex. 70,
Judge Moody order of May 23,2000 sanctioning Ms. Brooks for failing to appear at her
deposition.) It was, however, discovery into the money that most alarmed Ms. Brooks, Mr.
Ivlinton, and Mr. Dandar. As Ms. Brooks explained, when "Scientology started to interject an
argument into the wrongful death case saying that, you know, this was all a business deal; Minton

                              -43 -
was going to benefit from the case," Mr. Dandar got "really upset that Scientology was doing
this." (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, 156: pp. 10-16)

Things quickly turned from bad to worse. The LMT deposition went forward on May 18,
2000, with Mr. Minton appearing as LMT s corporate designee. He.failed to produce any
documents, and produced only three brief excerpts of videotaped statements of Ms. Liebreich,
Ms. Carlson, and Mr. Armstrong. (Ex. 71, pp. 27-28). Six days later, on May 24,2000, Mr.
Minton appeared for the continuation of his own deposition, in which, inter alia, he reaffirmed the
agreement he had with the Estate that a substantial part of any recovery in this case would go to
an anti-Scientology organization, namely LMT. (Ex. 72, Minton, May 24, 2000, pp. 391-392; Ex.
14, DeL Hrg. Ex. 3,  28). That testimony   which reflected the agreement had been in place for
2 V2 years   did not sit well with Mr. Dandar. Shortly after Mr. Minton s May 24, 2000 testimony,
Mr. Dandar told Mr. Minton that he was going to have to "backtrack" on what he said about the
agreement to donate the bulk of the proceeds to an anti-cult group and testify falsely that that was
not really the case. Mr. Dandar told Mr. Minton the reason backtracking was necessary was
because "this is going to be a huge issue in the wrongful death case" and it "looks bad for the case
because it appears that there s some improper business deal between the Estate and Bob Minton."
(Ex, 17, Minton, April 19, pp. 66- 68.)

Further proceedings before Judge Moody followed, resulting in Mr. Minton, as LMT s
corporate representative, twice being ordered to file sworn statements of full compliance. In that
same period, Mr. Minton s own deposition was obstructed from going forward through a series
of pretextuai schedulings and cancellations engineered by Mr. Dandar. As a consequence, Mr.
Minton neither filed his notice of compliance nor appeared to resume his own deposition prior to

                              -44 -
transfer of the action to this Court. A motion to compel further testimony from Ms. Brooks was
also pending before Judge Moody when this action was transferred to Judge Quesada, in
September 2000.

The transfer of the case to Pinellas County did nothing to abate the obstruction. On
November 20,2000, Judge Quesada ordered Mr. Minton back into deposition and ordered LMT
to produce all responsive documents and other records. (Ex. 73). Astonishingly, 'Mr. Dandar,
who repeatedly argued on behalf of LMT and Minton throughout the period 2000-2001, ~-~'
responded by seeking sanctions against the Church, despite the Church having prevailed on its
motions to compel.

On December 13, 2000, while Mr. Dandar s frivolous sanctions motion was pending, the
Church filed a motion to convert its abuse of process affirmative defense into a counterclaim.
Within days, Mr. Dandar obtained affidavits from both Mr. Minton (Ex. 74) and Ms. Liebreich
(Ex. 75), asserting inter alia, that there was no agreement relating to the proceeds of the case and
that the case was controlled entirely by Ms. Liebreich. When Mr. Minton received his affidavit for
signature from Mr. Dandar,~  which stated that Ms. Liebreich had made no commitment and was
under no obligation regarding the proceeds of the case, Mr. Minton complained to Mr. Dandar.
"Well, I was extremely uncomfortable about the affidavit because, number one, it was

38/ Contrary to Mr. Dandar s assertion, he was involved in LMT s discovery obstruction.
(See Appendix, E).

Mr. Dandar s attempt to disclaim responsibility for Mr. Minton s affidavit by suggesting
that it was produced by Mr. Merrett s word processor begs credulity. First, the fact that the
affidavit ultimately may have been printed in Mr. Merrett s office in no way undercuts Mr.
Minton s testimony that Mr. Dandar told Mr. Minton he (Mr. Dandar) prepared it. (See fn. 37,
ante). Second, Mr. Dandar himself filed an affidavit to the same effect as Mr. Minton s in State
Court in Massachusetts in support of Mr. Minton s motion to that Court to quash. (Ex. 76)

                              -45 -
false. Number two, I was concerned because it was effectively a possibility of the Estate being
able to renege on the agreement that we already had, about the proceeds of this case." According
to Mr. Minton, Mr. Dandar s response was to say:

          [F]rom henceforth the agreement will have to be secret, but the agreement still
          exists.  And   but with respect to the fact that the thing was untrue he said, you
          know, this is the only way we can get this argument taken out of the case is [sic]
          for everybody to backtrack on this.

(Ex. 17, Minton, April 19, pp. 72- 74; Ex. 3, Minton, May 22, pp. 636-63 8; Ex. 74, Minton
Affidavit of December 13, 2000). As a result, in October 2001, Mr. Minton was deposed in the
breach of contract case assigned to Judge Baird, and falsely testified that there was no agreement
at all. He did so based on Mr. Dandar s request and "because I had signed this affidavit that he
wanted me to sign and I had to backtrack at that point." (Ex. 17, Minton, April 19, pp. 80- 81).
By that time, Mr. Minton had also been convinced by Mr. Dandar that the Pinellas Court system
had been corrupted by the Church,~  and had adopted the attitude of the end justified the means,
including perjury, obstruction and destruction of evidence.

On December 14, 2000, Judge Quesada told Mr. Dandar: "... the argument here is that
issue of the Trust supporting the litigation, and it s   you know, that inextricably intertwined
financial argument." (Ex. 78, Hearing Tr., Dec. 24, p. 20:15-18). Then, on January 10,2001,
Judge Quesada issued lengthy memorandum rulings to Mr. Minton, Ms. Brooks and LMT, finding
the discovery sought by the Church to be appropriate. (Exs. 79-8 1). Judge Quesada also

~ Mr. Minton and Ms. Brooks testified to that belief. (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 6, p. 285; Ex.
38, Minton, October 11-12, pp. 164-167). Mr. Dandar s scandalous assertion is reflected in his
recent letter to the Florida Bar, where he states, "I have seen the influence that Mr. Pope and his
law firm have on the jurists in the Clearwater courthouse based upon his many years of service
and the fact that he or his firm represent many of the judges." (Ex. 77).

sanctioned them for their obstruction. (Exs. 82-84).

A petition for writ of certiorari was filed jointly by Mr. Dandar and Mr. Merrett on behalf
of Mr. Minton, Ms. Brooks, and LMT in January 2001, making false assertions of fact relating to
the "secret agreement," and claiming that the money received by Mr. Dandar from Mr. Minton
was merely a "loan" to him personally and not a loan to the Estate. The petition also offered as
exhibits the false affidavits of Ms. Liebreich and Mr. Minton denying the existence of the
agreement to donate a substantial portion of any recovery to.LMT. (Ex. 85, pp. 4-5, 10).

Meanwhile, discovery was also progressing in the breach of contract case before Judge
Baird. Mr. Minton was served with a subpoena in that case, and a motion for protective order was
filed, argued, and denied by Judge Baird on February 28,2001. The Church then filed a motion for
contempt for Mr. Minton s failure to appear, and Judge Baird issued an order on June 14,2001
sanctioning Mr. Minton in the amount of $13,877, finding him in contempt, and ordering him to
appear for his deposition or be sanctioned another $1,000 a day until he complied. (Ex. 86  Pltf
Hrg Ex. 70, June 14,2001, Order).

The appellate court had stayed Judge Quesada s discovery orders from January 2001 to
July 2001, at which time the petition was dismissed and the discovery stay was vacated. The
Church immediately sought to schedule the depositions of LMT and Mr. Minton, but both Mr.
Merrett and Mr. Dandar refused to cooperate. Accordingly, LMT was subpoenaed on August 1,
2001 to appear for deposition and to produce the records previously ordered by Judges Moody
and Quesada. Mr. Dandar responded by filing a motion for sanctions for failure to "coordinate"
the deposition date with him. A cross-motion to compel LMT s deposition was filed by the
Church on August 7,2001, along with another motion to compel Mr. Minton s deposition.

                              -47 -
These were the first motions heard by this Court. On August 9,2001, this Court ordered
LMT s representative to appear for deposition on August 15, 2001 before Judge Beach. (Ex. 87,
Hearing, pp. 38, 40-41, 43). The Court also ordered Mr. Minton s deposition to go forward on
September 18 and 19, 2001, (Id., pp. 37-44). After hearing the history of obstruction, the Court
admonished Mr. Minton, stating:

          I don t fool around with that and I don t fine rich people money that doesn t mean
          a thing to them. You don t disobey a court order of mine, and I m going to tell
          you men that, and if there are any women there I ll tell you that, you disobey court
          orders of mine and you go to jail if I have to do that.

(Ex. 87, August 9, 2001 Hearing Transcript, pp. 27-28.)

This Court s admonition doubled Mr. Minton s escalating fears. He now realized that he
could go to jail for stonewalling discovery. He also knew he might someday be jailed for
succumbing to Mr. Dandar s entreaties and committing perjury.

               e.   The Final Obstruction of Discovery by LMT

Less than a week later, Ms. Brooks found herself in the same dire straits as Mr. Minton.
On August 15, 2001 the LMT depositionwent forward, with Ms. Brooks appearing as the
corporate representative. Ms. Brooks produced very little, but to her surprise and dismay, she was
specifically directed by Judge Beach, to provide information relating to the $300,000 Operation
Clambake "donation" and of a $500,000 "anonymous" donation to LMT. (Ex. 88, August 15,
2001, LMT Depo., pp. 29-44, 47- 48, 89, 143-144). Not only was Ms. Brooks shocked, as Mr.
Dandar acknowledges, so was Mr. Minton. According to Mr. Dandar, when "Stacy Brooks
opened her mouth about the wire transfer[,] that was the big   that was the   probably the biggest

 the first of the big turning points." (Ex. 30, Dandar, July 17, p. 269.) However, none of the


documents she produced were of statements of witnesses, and no computer records or
correspondence or e-mails of any of the witnesses or parties were produced at all. Ms. Brooks
admitted that there had been many responsive statements of witnesses at one time, but that they
had been deleted from LMT s computers. ~'No videotapes were produced beyond the excerpts
already available on the LMT website. (Ex. 88, pp. 6 1-62)

Judge Beach, who was supervising the deposition, pointedly noted:

          I am here, as I understand ... we re now including, in addition to my supervising
          discovery, to resolve all discovery motions.
               *    *    *

          Now, I think that the order s going to have to be issued from her (Judge
          Schaeffer) clarifying whether or not -- if I make afinding of contempt, do I have the
          authority to enforce the contempt by some penalty or by way of striking
          pleadings,~imposing afine, or even incarceration.

(Id., pp. 143-144).

Ms. Brooks described that moment inher testimony before this Court:

          Judge Beach sat there in that deposition and told me that if
          he ordered me to turn over documents and I didn t do it, he was
          going to put me in jail.

          Well, I went to the moon. I was so scared. 'Cause, you know, it really
          finally hit me, you know, what kind of-- what kind of situation that we were really
          putting ourselves in. You know, we were about to go to jail for this case. And --
          and even if we did go to jail for the case, it wasn t going to save the case, because
          it was already so off the rails with all of this stuff that was going on.

(Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, 171-172).

Mr. Minton, meanwhile, again failed to appear for a court-ordered deposition in Judge

41/ As of the date of filing this brief, defendants have still not received any of the encrypted
e-mails and have no way of knowing how many were destroyed or how many are unrecoverable.

                              -49 -
Baird s breach of contract case. Accordingly, Judge Baird issued an order to show cause, set for
August 23, 2001. When Mr. Minton failed to appear before Judge Baird for the OSC hearing,
Judge Baird cited him for contempt and ordered Mr. Minton to appear on October 4, 2001. (Ex.
89, Plff. Hrg Ex. 73, Sept. 12,2001, Order). Judge Baird also sanctioned Mr. Minton $20,408.75.
(Ex. 90  Pltf. Hrg Ex. 75). Mr. Minton finally appeared before Judge Baird on October 4, was
held in contempt, and he was again ordered to appear for deposition on October 11 and 12,2001.
(Ex. 91). Mr. Minton finally appeared for his deposition on those dates, but committed more
perjury at the instruction of Mr. Dandar. (Ex 14, Minton Affidavit, 91 2 1-22; Ex. 37, Minton,
April 9, pp. 12-16).

On August 22, 2001, the Church filed a motion before Judge Beach for contempt and
coercive sanctions against LMT based upon the admitted destruction of records. The very next
day, Mr. Merrett sent an e-mail to Ms. Brooks and Mr. Minton suggesting that:

          "the way to go may be to talk to Ken and Dell and try to persuade them to cut a
          global deal."

(Ex. 33, Ex. E thereto).

         Mr. Merrett s e-mail also warned that:

          if this case is disposed of NEITHER OF YOU SHOULD EVER, EVER OFFER
         Any explanation suggests (DUUH!) that you were calling the shots on the case,
         which could have repercussions down the road

(Id. (upper case original, italics supplied)). Between August 24 and August 29, 2001   the date set
for a contempt motion against LMT before Judge Beach   a number of significant events
transpired. First, on August 24, Mr. Merrett sent an e-mail to Mr. Dandar on behalf of Mr.
Minton, informing him that the "well is dry" and there will be no further finding of the case and

                              -50 -

that Jesse Prince is withdrawing as an "expert" witness and consultant.

                    The short version of what s going on is this:
               the well is diy, as far as money goes. Jesse is going to withdraw as an
               expert witness. Bob feels that the case is way out of control, and is focused
               100% on him - and specifically on trying to put him in jail. He wants Dell to
               settle the case or otherwise make it go away. Bob isn t coming into Florida
               anytime soon. Can you meet with me & Stacy this weekend to discuss this?

(Ex. 92  Pltf. 1kg. Ex. 45).

Also, on August 24,2001, Ms. Brooks, following the suggestion of Mr. Merrett s e-mail
of the preceding day, and in a clear attempt to avoid further judicially ordered discovery into the
LMT and Mr. Minton s finances, attempted to contact Ms. Liebreich in the hope of persuading
her to put an end to the litigation. ~' (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, pp. 173-175). That effort was a
complete failure when Mr. Dandar instructed Ms. Liebreich not to speak with Ms. Brooks. (Id.,
pp. 175-176). That same day at Mr. Dandar s urging, Ms. Liebreich resigned from LMT s Board
of Directors (Ex. 93  Def. Hrg. Ex. 186) and posted an Internet message asking for
contributions to continue this litigation. (Ex. 94).

Perhaps most significantly, however, LMT s discovery obstructions expanded to epic
proportions. Between August 24 and 28, 2001, during the pendency of the Church s motion for
contempt, LMT employees Jesse Prince, Jeff Jacobsen, and Dee Phillips removed a large number

Mr. Prince did indeed withdraw pursuant to Mr. Minton s instructions.

~" This attempt to extricate themselves from the litigation occurred six months prior to Mr.
Minton s initiating settlement discussions with the Church and the alleged extortion and blackmail
of Mr. Minton and Ms. Brooks. It further and independently corroborates the testimony of Mr.
Minton and Ms. Brooks that the real pressure they faced was orders from Pinellas Courts and
threats of incarceration.

of banker s boxes from LMT. (See Video   Def. 1kg. Ex. 127). On August 27, 2001, Mr. Dandar,
counsel for the Estate, not Mr. Minton, appeared before Judge Beach to argue against disclosure
of Mr. Minton 's financial records yet again. Judge Beach would hear nothing of it:

          THE COURT: [Mr. Minton] apparently has some personal interest in the outcome
          of this case to be against the Scientologists, so I think they have a right to know
          exactly what his financial interest is in the case, so for those reasons I m going to
          allow the inquiry to be made and for the production of documents since you
          produced the last documents showing Mr. Minton s contribution.

          And I think because Mr. Minton seems to have a great interest in the outcome of
          this case by evidence of the amount of money he has contributed, that they have a
          right to know to what extent he has that financial interest and under what the
          conditions are.

(Ex. 95, Hearing Tr, Aug 27, 2001, pp. 62-64).

Then on August 29, 2001, at the hearing on the Church s Motion for Contempt, Judge
Beach orally ruled:

          The Trust is not to dispose of any records in any form of recording, any form;
          computer, video, whatever form there may be that s in its control directly or
          indirectly until further order of the Court.

          Insofar as the videos are concerned, if there s any recording by photograph or
          otherwise, I want those produced in full. If the videos are on a computer or any
          other way, I want them produced in full on September the 7th.

          I want the Trust to account for all records that fall within the purview of the order
          of July the 18th, 2000 that have been destroyed accounted for by a description of
          the record, its date, if possible, when it was originated, what it contained and when
          it was destroyed. And that also includes any videotapes that fall within the scope
          of this order.

          If it appears to me on September the 7th or at any time in the future that materials
          have not been produced in accordance with this order and within the scope of this
          order, I may order an independent examiner to examine the records of the Trust to
          determine whether

                              - 52 -
          or not there are any other records that fall within this order that have not been

(Ex. 96, August 29,2001, Hearing Transcript, p. 113).

The next day, August 30, 2001, Judge Beach issued an order requiring plaintiff to update
prior document productions with all records showing payments to plaintiff and Mr. Dandar from
Mr. Minton, since the prior disclosures in January 2000. (Ex. 97). Judge Beach s August 30, 2001
discovery order struck at the heart of Mr. Minton s financial perjury in his May 24,2000
deposition. (Ex. 72, Minton, May 24,2000, pp. 212-213).~  In tandem with this Court s
admonition about jail for contempt, the situation had become very serious for Mr. Minton.

Judge Beach issued a written order, dated September 5,2001, requiring LMT to produce
the videotapes and other records that came within his oral ruling on August 29, 2001. (Ex. 98,
Sept. 5,2001 Order.) The next day, September 6,2001, the LMT staff was assembled and
informed that, as of two days earlier, LMT was dissolved. (Ex. 56, Summers, June 10, 2002, p.
117; Ex. 100  Def. Hrg. Ex. 187.) In other words, LMT dissolved retroactive to the day before
Judge Beach s order to produce the documents and tapes that defendant had first subpoenaed 18
months earlier.

On September 12, 2001, in the breach of contract case, Judge Baird issued an Order
Finding Robert S. Minton in Contempt and for Arrest for his failure to appear at his August 3,
2001 deposition. (Ex. 89). That order stated that if Mr. Minton failed to appear for sentencing on

"' In that deposition, Mr. Minton asserted that he furnished "only" $1,050,000 to plaintiff as of
May 24, 2002. (Ex. 72, Minton, May 24,2000, p. 212). The truth was, and is, that the figure is
false. He had already given Mr. Dandar an additional $500,000, in the form of a UBS bank check,
on May 1,2000. (Ex. 250). Mr. Dandar, too, had made the same false statement on January
25,2001. (Ex. 99, May 25,2001, p. 44).

                              - 53 -
October 4,2001, an arrest warrant would issue.

Then, on September 17,2001, Mr. Dandar unleashed yet another round of false
representations and a further proliferation of the perjury he had suborned when he filed a petition
for writ of certiorari challenging Judge Beach s September 5, 2001 order. That petition (Ex. 101),
besides attaching as evidence the perjurious affidavits Mr. Dandar had drafted for Mr. Minton and
Ms. Liebreich noted above, also set forth the following misrepresentations of fact:

                    "[T]he record evidence indisputably shows that, no matter how many
               millions of dollars plaintiffs counsel has borrowed to fund this litigation,
               only the personal representative controls the litigation." (id., p. 3.)

                    "Mr. Minton has no control or interest in the litigation. See attached
               affidavits of Mr. Minton and Mrs. Liebreich." (Id., p. 5.)

                    "All of the funds are collected personally by Plaintiffs counsel to spend as
               he chooses." (Id., p. 9.)

Caught in the trap of nearly revealed perjury arising out of Mr. Dandar s insistence that he
lie under oath as to the funds provided to the Estate, Mr. Minton asserted a Fifth Amendment
selfincrimination privilege as to most of the questions asked at his September 18 and 19,2001
deposition in this ~-~' At that deposition, Judge Beach, who was presiding, made the following
cogent observation:

          It s hard to distinguish the trust, Mr. Minton and the plaintiff in this case. They re
          so intertwined, as a matter of fact, it almost appears that Lisa McPherson has been
          overshadowed by the activities of the trust and Mr. Minton in pursing this case
          against the Scientologists.

~'~' Mr. Minton, however, did confirm (falsely) that he had given only $1,050,000 to the estate.
(Ex. 102  Def. 1kg Ex. 16, Depo., Sept. 18-19, 2001, pp. 29-30.)

That s the way it appears to me. (Ex. 102, Minton Depo., September 18, 2001, p.

Not one ever to turn back, Mr. Dandar subornedfiirther perjury from Mr. Minton in his
deposition cross-examination before Judge Beach, on the pivotal issues of Mr. Minton s payment
to plaintiff in exchange for adding parties, amending the pleadings, and attacking Seientology
through the amended complaint:

          BY MR. DANDAR:
          Q Mr. Minton, have you ever directed in any manner whatsoever the prosecution
          of the wrongful death action brought by the estate of Lisa McPherson?
          A No way whatsoever.
          Q Have you -- do you have any agreement with the personal representative, or
          myself as counsel for the estate, as to disbursement of any proceeds, if ever derived
          from the wrongful death case?
               THE DEPONENT: Judge, is it possible to consult my attorney?
               THE COURT: Sure.
          (Deponent conferring with counsel.)
               MR. MOXON: Could you read back the question?
               THE COURT: Well, just a minute.
          A Could you repeat the question?
          BY MR. DANDAR:
          Q I can rephrase the question, actually.
               THE COURT: Or   well, he wants it read back.
               MR. MOXON: That s fine.
               MR. DANDAR: I ll rephrase the question.
               THE COURT: Okay.
          MR. DANDAR: Make it simpler. BY MR. DANDAR:
          Q As your -- the prior testimony that you ve given in this case by way of affidavit
          or deposition, about not having any agreement whatsoever with the personal
          representative or the estate as to allocation of any proceeds derived from the
          wrongful death case, has   has any of that testimony that you ve previously given
          changed? A Again, I want to clarify something with my attorney if I can.
          MR. DANDAR: Okay.
          (Deponent conferring with counsel.)

          A Okay. No. All that testimony was truthful.
          BY MR. DANDAR:
          Q Is it still truthful today?
          A Itis.

(Ex. 102, Minton Depo., Sept. 18-19, 2001, pp. 297:6-298:19). ~'

Following these perjurious responses to the questioning of Mr. Dandar, Mr. Minton opted
to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to similar questions from defendant s counsel.

Meanwhile, on September 10, 24, and 25, 2001, more records were carted away from
LMT. (Ex. 103, Merrett, May 23, 2002, pp. 185-186, 188-189, 198-203; Def. Hrg Ex. 127.)
Accordingly, on September 26, 2001, the Church filed an emergency motion to preserve records
and for the appointment of special master, to be heard on September 28, 2001 at 4:00 p.m.
However, after hand service on Mr. Merrett, LMT s counsel, on September 26, still more records
were removed from LMT on September 27 and 28. (Def. Hrg Ex. 127.)

On September 28, 2001, Judge Beach, stated:

          [T]he history of this case with respect to this subpoena over
          your client is that there has been continuing orders entered for the
          production of this, these materials which have not been produced.

          And I think at this point there s ample evidence to demonstrate that there is
          a complete reluctartce by LMT to follow the orders of these courts. And so I think
          that in and of itself justifies the Court to preserve these materials until there can be
          an inspection of them.

(Ex. 104, September 28, 2001, Hearing Transcript, pp. 4445). A written order appointing a
special master followed on October 17, 2001. (Ex. 105, Oct. 17, 2001 Order).

"' Mr. Minton s request to consult his attorney twice in one page suggests the discomfort with Mr.
Dandar s questions locking in the perjury. That discomfort is plainly evident on the deposition

                              - 56 -
On October 4,2001, in the breach of contract case, Mr. Minton appeared before Judge
Baird for sentencing based on his September 12 civil contempt citation. He was ordered to post a
$20,000 bond to secure his appearance for deposition on October 11, 2001. He was also ordered
to pay attorneys fees and costs. (Ex. 91, Order of 5 October 2001).

At his October 11,2001 deposition, Mr. Minton opted to forego his Fifth Amendment
claims, and in coordination with Mr. Dandar and based upon instructions from Mr. Dandar, Mr.
Minton provided still more perjurious testimony. (Ex. 38, pp. 393-396, 400-401, 629, 63 1-632).
He changed his earlier testimony that the Estate had agreed to give a substantial part of the
proceeds of the case to the LMT, now saying it was "completely incorrect" and the family never
agreed to donate anything. (Id., 269-270). He falsely stated that Mr. Dandar had merely told him
that the family would "probably.., be interested in helping support" anti-cult groups; that it would
not be a "substantial" amount of recovery, but merely some (id., 27 1-272) and that the money
would not go to anti-Scientology groups like the LMT, but to groups who fight various cults, not
just Scientology. (Id., 272). He also denied that he suggested the family give the money to LMT.
(Id., 272). Mr. Minton also falsely testified that his statement on a Detroit radio show that the
money would be donated to the LMT merely "was a hope" and denied that the family had made
that agreement. (Id., at 587). He said he believed it was true when he said it, but falsely stated that
Mr. Dandar told him afterwards he had made a mistake (id., 588), and claimed to remember
nothing of the circumstances. (Id., 589-590).

All this testimony was false (Ex. 3, Minton, May 22, p. 682), and Mr. Dandar knew it was
false when he elicited it from Mr. Minton. (Id., pp. 636-63 8). This false testimony was part of
Mr. Dandar s "backtracking" to attempt to sidestep the myriad legal problems which arose from

Mr. Minton s prior truthful testimony, and to "protect" Mr. Minton, "as Scientology had been
closing in with discovery orders that I was seeking to avoid." (Ex. 14  Def. 1kg. Ex. 3,  31).

On November 19, 2001, this Court in this case, held that Mr. Minton had waived his Fifth
Amendment privilege with respect to at least 88 questions, and ordered him to answer them in
deposition. (Ex. 106). Thus, Mr. Minton was now confronted with the reality that he would have
to answer questions he had been avoiding for many months, or face the possibility of a substantial
fine or even jail. He either had to continue to obstruct, continue to lie, or finally tell the truth. It
was because he was faced with this reality that he ultimately instructed his lawyer, Mr. Howie, to
attempt to reach a settlement with the Church. Mr. Howie contacted Mr. Pope to attempt to settle
the breach of contract case in early February. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 24, p. 1159-1161).

Meanwhile, Stacy Brooks  problems were mounting as well. On February 18, 2002,
computer experts hired by Special Master Michael Keane produced a written report stating they
found that five of LMT s computers had their hard drives removed, and two others had new hard
drives recently installed. (Ex. 107, Def. Hrg. Ex. 71, Ex. 12,  27). Voluminous files had also
been deleted the day before the Master and his computer technician arrived, and another computer
had a scramble program run that same day, making the hard drive unreadable. Also, an estimated
600 CD s of computerized information had vanished between the first visit by Mr. Keane and his
second visit on February 19, 2002. Moreover, substantial video records and computer files were
removed from LMT during the pendency of these orders. Some, on the advice of John Merrett,
were left outside the LMT door from where, Mr. Merrett said, he would "take care of them." (Ex.
12, Brooks Affi,  27). Some video files were carried off by LMT s Mark Bunker. It was not
until this hearing that a number of these videos were recovered and only then because this Court

ordered Mr. Merrett to leave the witness stand and, accompanied by the bailiff, retrieve them
from his automobile. (Ex. 103, Merrett, pp. 15-16, 197-203).

Even after inspection by the Special Master and the production of e-mails, Internet
postings and videos and the wealth of incriminating evidence they have provided, there is no way
of telling how much evidence has still not been turned over or was destroyed forever. The hard
disks contain intentionally scrambled documents and encrypted messages that have not been
decrypted. There is no inventory of the videos taken by John Merrett, so there is no way of
knowing what has or has not been turned over to the Court. Moreover, Jeff Jacobsen, who
acknowledges carrying his video "camera with [him] almost constantly during [his] entire stay in
Clearwater," while he was employed by LMT (Ex. 108, Letter; Ex. 109, Jacobsen Depo., p. 124),
has not turned over any of his footage.

Had this discovery not been obstructed for so long, and had the evidence been available
earlier, this litigation would have taken a very different course. The Church has been stonewalled
since the day Dandar filed the current complaint in an attempt to cover up the relationship to
LMT and the improper purpose of this litigation.

               f.   New Hampshire, Contempt, and Setting the Record Straight

Mr. Dandar contacted Mr. Minton in late February of 2002 and arranged to go to New
Hampshire with Dr. Garko to visit Mr. Minton and Ms. Brooks. (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 4, pp. 279,
280; Ex. 2 Brooks, pp. 193). In contrast to Mr. Dandar s false testimony (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 4,
p. 283-285, 288-289), Mr. Dandar s purpose in going to New Hampshire was to obtain additional
funds from Mr. Minton. (Ex. 14, Minton 2nd Aff., 9f 40, 42). Dr. Garko confirmed Mr. Minton s
testimony. (Ex. 28, Garko, June 11, pp. 22, 23, 27, 28). Hence it is no surprise that Mr. Dandar

gave Mr. Minton advice on how to deal with his upcoming deposition in which he had been
ordered to answer the questions concerning his funding of the litigation and the as yet undisclosed
$500,000 UBS check to which he previously had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. (Ex. 38, Minton, October 11 and 12, pp. 72, 74). Mr. Minton asked Mr.
Dandar to get the Scientology critics on the Internet who had been attacking him since he stopped
funding the case in August of 2001 to stop their attacks. Mr. Dandar agreed to do so and returned
to Florida where he accomplished this task. (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 4, pp. 305-306). In anticipation
of further communication with Mr. Minton concerning the case, Mr. Dandar caused a telephone
encryption device to be sent to Mr. Minton and the other members of Mr. Dandar s "trial

~, Subsequently, on March 7, Mr. Minton sent to Mr. Dandar s post office box another
UBS check for $250,000 in a plain envelope, inserted in between the pages of an essay of
Caroline Letkeman. (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 4, pp. 311-313).

On March 8,2002, Judge Schaeffer issued an Order to Show Cause Why Robert Minton

Should Not Be Held in Contempt, setting a hearing for April 5,2002. On March 14, 2002, Judge

Baird found Mr. Minton to be in contempt in the breach case and scheduled sentencing for April

9,2002. Mr. Dandar was unable to stern Mr. Minton s multiplying legal problems. Facing

imminent hearings in front of both Judge Baird and this Court, knowing the extent of the

Mr. Dandar s firm and LMT had shared encryption software which Mr. Minton installed
on Mr. Dandar s computer. Mr. Dandar s "video production specialist," Rick Spector, wrote that
the telephone encryption device was Mr. Dandar s idea and for future conversations between Mr.
Minton "and other members of the trial team." (Ex. 110, Spector letter, Def. Hrg. Ex. 50). Mr.
Spector concluded his letter by stating that Mr. Dandar wants "to find out from you how many
other individuals on your end will be needing these devices." Enclosed with the letter is an
invoice, and on the invoice is Mr. Spector s handwritten suggestion that Mr. Minton "may wish to
use money order to preclude trace." (Id.) (See also, Ex. 1, Dandar, pp. 300-304).

discovery obstruction in which they had engaged, and having achieved no progress in attempting
to settle the litigation as a result of Mr. Howie s communications with Mr. Pope in early February
(see, p. 58, ante), on March 16, Mr. Minton and Ms. Brooks approached the Church to directly
explore the possibility of global settlement. (Ex. 111, Pope, 17 July, pp. 10-13).

The first meeting, in New York, was attended by a Church representative, Mr. Minton,
Ms. Brooks, two lawyers for the Church, and Stephen Jonas, counsel for Mr. Minton. (Ex. 112,
Yingling, June 11, pp. 11). The Church representatives made clear that they were unwilling to
discuss even limited settlement with Ivfr. Minton alone, at least unless and until he set the record
straight concerning his financial and other interference with the case. "They said, you know, 'We

  we don t believe that you ve been completely forthcoming in what has gone on in this ~ (Ex. 3,
Minton, May 28, p. 1384). The meetings broke up in apparent stalemate. Mr. Minton spoke to
Mr. Dandar to see if he could avoid disclosure of his perjury and undisclosed checks to Mr.
Dandar by getting agreement from him to drop the wrongful death case.

          g.   Mr. Dandar s Extortion of Mr. Minton

On March 28, 2002, Mr. Minton called Mr. Dandar requesting a meeting among Mr.
Minton, Ms. Brooks, Mr. Dandar and Ms. Liebreich to discuss the wrongful death case. The
following day, Mr. Minton called again and stated he wanted to meet to discuss the wrongful
death case. Mr. Minton stated he had consulted with his Boston counsel, and concluded that he
had to be truthful in all matters concerning the case, commencing with his scheduled deposition
on April 8, in the breach of contract case.

          Specifically, I told Mr. Dandar I would be revealing the existence of
          the $500,000 check issued to him by Union Bank of Switzerland
          (UBS) in May 2000 and the March 7,2002 UBS check for
          $250,000. Mr. Dandar said that I could not possibly disclose that

          information, that he had not disclosed this to the court and it would land him in
          serious trouble. Mr. Dandar was quite frantic about this and said I didn t need to
          reveal the checks as they did not have my name on them, and, as he had said
          several times previously, "I ve told you before to just concentrate on the checks
          you have written.

(Ex. 14, Minton Second Affidavit,  59 (emphasis added.))

Mr. Dandar then began a concerted effort to stop Mr. Minton from recanting his
testimony. Mr. Dandar wrote Mr. Milton a self-serving e-mail on March 30, 2002, accusing him
of "doing a deal with the devil" and alleging   as is his custom, with no evidence or even any
regard for the truth   that Mr. Minton was being blackmailed, while reciting for no apparent
reason Mr. Minton s purported lack of involvement in the wrongful death case. (Ex. 113, March
30, 2002 Letter from Dandar to Minton). Mr. Dandar even contacted Mr. Minton s wife and
sought to elicit her assistance in stopping Mr. Minton from abandoning Mr. Dandar s cause. (Ex.
112, Yingling, June 12, pp. 94-95; Ex. 30, Dandar, July 17, pp. 224-225). Then on April 5,2002,
this Court dismissed the criminal contempt charges against Mr. Minton on procedural grounds.
(Ex. 114, Tr. of Proceedings, April 5,2002, pp. 82-83). The Court, however, did admonish Mr.
Minton who stated that he felt he had been poorly advised, and would seek counsel from Mr.
Howie and Mr. Jonas as to a future course of action. "On Mr. Howie s advice, I m trying to make
sure that these things are done properly henceforth, and perhaps I ve had some bad advice in the
past." (Ex. 114, Minton, Tr., April 5,2002, p. 85). It was as a result of those consultations that
Mr. Ivlinton decided to recant his prior false testimony and set the record straightM!  The next
            48/     A    Look, Mr. Dandar, the   the number of lies that have been

          told in this case -- this case, was of a consequential enough nature that based on
          what my discussions with my attorneys have been in terms of setting any part of
          any record straight was enough to hang

                              -62 -
he and Ms. Brooks met with Mr. Rinder and Ms. Yingling and disclosed their perjury and the
undisclosed payments to Mr. Dandar.

It should be noted that while telling Mr. Minton that he was being extorted by the Church
in his e-mail of March 30, Mr. Dandar attended Mr. Minton s contempt hearing on April 5,2002
in this courtroom but did not mention this supposed extortion to the Court. Clearly, Mr. Dandar
believed that Mr. Minton would not disclose the checks once he narrowly escaped being found in

Mr. Dandar and Mr. Prince then embarked on a scheme to threaten Mr. Minton with a -
criminal RICO prosecution, and threats of physical harm (by Mr. Prince) if he proceeded to come
clean. (Ex. 17, Minton, April 19, pp. 146-150; Ex. 3, Minton, May 29, pp. 1595-1600; Ex. 2,
Brooks, May 13, pp. 972-974).

               h.   Mr. Dandar s Denials of Misconduct

Confronted with all of the foregoing, plaintiffs counsel can do nothing more than to deny
the evidence of his misconduct and call Mr. Minton a liar. Mr. Dandar, however, offers no cogent
reason, and none exists, as to why Mr. Minton would admit to instances of multiple perjury, and
would subject himself to significant civil and perhaps even criminal penalties, unless it was true
and unless he faced even more significant legal problems if he persisted in his course of perjury.

          me. I don t mean literally, but in terms of going to jail. You know, this was   this
          was the overriding concern of all of this, the discovery requests, you know, every
          conceivable aspect of my life, Stacy Brooks  life, the LMT life, all of this, you
          know, the   being added as defendants in these cases where additional liabilities
          were going to occur for me, for LMT, for Stacy Brooks, whether it is one big ball
          of wax or not, the liability was going to fall on me.
(Ex. 3, Minton, May 28, 1461:19-1462:6).

                              -63 -
Mr. Dandar can only allege, without any basis and contrary to evidence and logic, that Mr.
Minton invented his corroborated accounts of perjury, as suborned by Mr. Dandar, because the
Church purportedly threatened him with a 100-page civil RICO lawsuit, ~2  had illegally obtained
a copy of the $500,000 UBS check (which Mr. Minton later gave to defendants), and had
engaged in a pattern of harassment over several years. (Ex. 112, Yingling, pp. 217-218; Ex. 2,
Brooks, May 16, pp. 1403-1404; Ex. 30, Dandar, July 17, pp. 185-186).

These allegations are as preposterous as they are unsubstantiated. As we have shown, it
was the lawful court proceedings in this case and the breach of contract case which finally forced
Mr. Minton into a position in which he was required either: (a) to refuse to answer questions and
provide documents, with an imminent threat of substantial civil and criminal contempt penalties;
(b) to commit further, more serious and more dangerous perjury, with no end in sight, with a
virtual certainty that his misconduct would be revealed, and with attendant criminal and civil
consequences; or (c) to try to reach an immediate "global" settlement with the Church, which
might permit him to escape further judicial proceedings and the penalties for perjury. When the
Church refused even to discuss the terms of any such agreement until Mr. Minton first came
forward with the truth, he chose the fourth and only appropriate course open to him   recantation
and disclosure. He did so upon the advise of counsel. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 28, p. 1239).

The testimony of Monique Yingling and Wally Pope (Ex. 112, Yingling, June 11,2002,
pp. 20-22; Ex. 111, Pope, July 17, pp. 8-13), the meeting notes of Ms. Yingling and Mr. Rosen

'~" As this Court has seen in the contemporaneous notes of Mr. Jonas, Mr. Rosen and Ms.
Yingling, at the meetings in New York, no one from the Church even claimed to have drafted a
civil RICO lawsuit and no draft was shown or used. The only reference to a civil RICO lawsuit
during the discussion was that the Church had expended approximately $40,000 to research the
possibility of bringing such a lawsuit.

                              - 64-
(Ex. 115, Rosen Notes; Ex. 116, Yingling Notes), and the correspondence between Mr. Dandar
and Mr. Minton s attorney, Steve Jonas (Ex.1 17), establish that no blackmail or other unlawful
threats were made against Mr. Minton whatsoever. Indeed, that New York meeting included
many demands by Mr. Minton to the Church including compensation for funds Mr. Minton had
provided Mr. Dandar for litigation of this case, as well as requiring the Church to purchase the
LMT building and Mr. Prince s house. (Ex. 112, Yingling, June 11,25:10-26:13).

Mr. Minton s testimony, and his history of anti-Scientology activities over the past four
years, belie any assertion that instances of alleged personal harassment   pickets, public attacks,
letters, even overt surveillance   had anything to do with Mr. Minton s decision to recant. Rather,
the motivating factor was the court proceedings and the court orders. (Ex. 2, Brooks, May 3, pp.
15-2 1). Indeed, even Mr. Prince, in his affidavit, acknowledges that the reason Mr. Minton
ultimately recanted his perjury and did what he did was precisely because of the series of orders
imposed upon him by this Court and by Judge Baird, ~' which left Mr. Minton with the stark
choices outlined above. (Ex. 118, Prince Aff, dated May 1, 2002, 9~ 9,11, 15).

In sum, nothing in the evidence or in Mr. Minton s behavior supports Mr. Dandar s
attacks on Mr. Minton s testimony or credibility with respect to the instances of misconduct in
this case to which Mr. Minton has testified. Mr. Minton s testimony has been corroborated in
crucial respects by, inter alia, the physical existence of the checks, the testimony of Dr. Garko on
the meeting that never happened, the testimony of Dell Liebreich and her siblings on the
agreement to donate proceeds to LMT, the previously undisclosed LMT videos, the testimony of
Ms. Yingling

50/ Mr. Prince, of course, criticizes and admonishes this Court and Judge Baird for the orders
which compelled Mr. Minton to recant his perjury. See Ex. 118, Prince Affidavit (May 1,2002),
pp.13:25- 14:2,9f 15.

                              -65 -
and Mr. Pope showing what really happened in the meetings with Mr. Minton and Ms. Brooks,
and the absurdity and contradictions of Mr. Dandar s denials and avoidances of the truth.

     -   C. False Statements, Subornation and Other Misconduct

The foregoing illustrates chronologically the facts as, they unfolded that led to this stage
of the proceedings. This section addresses in depth the manner and means by which specific
instances of false statements, subornation, and other misconduct propelled this case to its present

          1.   "Backtrack Big Time"

Shortly after Mr. Dandar caused Mr. Minton to execute a perjurious affidavit denying the
existence of the agreement to use proceeds from this case to endow an anti-cult group, Mr.
Dandar caused Ms. Liebreich to perjure herself on this issue as well. Her December 20,2000
affidavit is similar to Mr. Minton s December 13, 2000 affidavit, but not identical. She states that
there was no "binding agreement" (as opposed to any agreement at all), implying some form of
agreement certainly existed. (Ex. 119, Liebreich, April 30, pp. 74-75; Ex. 75, Liebreich affidavit
of -December 20,2000,  2). Ms. Liebreich backtracked even from this distinction, however, at
her deposition on January 10,2001, in the breach of contract case. Thus, she falsely testified as

          BY MR. ROSEN:
          Q.  Okay. Now when you say you ve never entered into a binding
          agreement, have you entered into a nonbinding or informal agreement?

          A.     No.

(Ex. 120, p. 299).

Yet in her deposition in this case on April 20, 2002, which was entered into evidence in

the hearings before Judge Baird, Ms. Liebreich acknowledged that there indeed was an agreement
made orally by her and her siblings to give a portion of the proceeds to LMT. (Ex. 121, Liebreich,
April, 22, 2002 depo.). Ms. Liebreich made it very clear that she and her siblings had had an
agreement to provide proceeds from the case to the LMT   until April of this year, when Mr.
Minton recanted his previous perjurious testimony. She personally decided to end the "deal" with
LMT and expressed her intention to bring this up with her siblings in the future:

          BY MR. MOXON:
          Q You talked to your siblings and you all agreed at
          the end of the case that some funds would be provided to
          the Lisa McPherson Trust, correct?
          A Some funds will be provided in it? I don t
          understand what you re talking about.
          Q You and your siblings talked about it, that money
          would be provided to the Lisa McPherson Trust at the end of
          the case, correct?
          A Well, we hoped so.
          Q Okay. What part of the proceeds, the expected
          proceeds in this case, was supposed to go to the Lisa
          McPherson Trust?
          A None.
          Q You just said some was going. Has that changed
          A Previously, I did. -
          Q When did that change?
          A Well, some time ago.
          Q When?
          A When Mr. Minton started lying.
          Q When was that?
          A Just recently.
          Q.  So you just recently decided to change that deal and no money is
          going to go to LMT?
          A.  That s my opinion. I haven t discussed it with my siblings.

(Ex. 121, Liebreich Depo, April 20, 2002, pp. 35 1-352).

Thus, Ms. Liebreich has testified first, that there was an agreement; second that there was
no binding agreement; third, that there never was even a non-binding or informal agreement; and

finally that there was an agreement to give part of the proceeds to LMT, but that the agreement
was cancelled, in her opinion, when Mr. Minton recanted his testimony. See Appendix B. And Mr.
Dandar, while admitting Mr. Minton told the truth in his original January 1998 deposition
testimony concerning the agreement that was struck with Dell Liebreich on the bulk of the
proceeds, contradictorily continues to stand by his sworn statement that no agreement was ever
even discussed with Mr. Minton.

In his affidavit executed on December 3, 2001, he swore:

          At no time has the ESTATE or the beneficiaries of the ESTATE entered into any
          informal or formal negotiations, discussions, or agreements with ROBERT
          MINTON or any other third party concerning the disposition of any proceeds
          realized from any litigation involving the ESTATE OF LISA MCPHERSON.

(Ex. 76, Deft. I-kg. Ex.1 13, Dandar). (Emphasis added). Mr. Dandar testified to the same effect
at this hearing:

          Q.     [Mr. Weinberg] Right. It says: "At no time has the estate, or
          beneficiaries of the estate, had any informal negotiations, discussions or
          agreements with Robert Minton." That is what it says. Right?

          A. Yes, that is true.

          Q. So   so there weren t even any informal discussions or understandings between
          you and/or Dell Liebreich on behalf of the estate, Mr. Minton, as to what might
          happen to the proceeds?

          A. That s right. As you know, the only discussions occurred between the family
          members themselves.

          Q. Then you say, "with Robert Minton or any other third party." In other words,
          the estate -- it says, "No informal discussions with Robert Minton or any other third

               So there was no one that had any discussions with anyone,
          as far as you know, between the estate, Robert Minton or a third

                              -68 -
          party concerning even informal discussions as to these proceeds?

          A. There were no discussions of any kind where the estate was going to give
          anything to Robert Minton or any third party. Period.

(Ex. 1, Dandar May 30, p. 26).

Mr. Dandar s denial is preposterous. Not only is it contrary to his above-quoted testimony
vouching for the truthfulness of the deposition testimony on May 24 and 25, 1999 of Ms.
Liebreich, Mr. Davis and Ms. Skelton, but it is contradicted by his own testimony before Judge
Baird only one month earlier on April 30, 2002, viz:

          I believe that the first time my clients got together and made a decision to donate
          the bulk of the proceeds to an anti-cult, nonprofit corporation or group was during
          their depositions in Dallas, Texas at dinner with me present in 1999.

(Ex. 19, Dandar, April 30, p. 138).

Mr. Dandar attempts to reconcile his own irreconcilable testimony by semantic
gamesmanship. Mr. Dandar cannot rely on the argument that no legally binding contract was
entered into to then deny the existence of even an informal agreement or discussion, which he also
categorically and falsely denied. And the fact that his client and the beneficiaries may have
communicated among themselves, and then through Mr. Dandar to Mr. Minton (as well as
directly) cannot possibly justify his false assertion that no agreement was discussed or agreed to
with Mr. Minton.

Mr. Dandar is clever, but he is too clever by half. He is caught in his own lies. In this light,
Mr. Minton s testimony is the only credible, believable, coherent account of what happened. That
is because it also has the virtue of being true.

          2.   The Nature of Mr. Minton s Financing

Mr. Dandar s conflicting testimony on whether the payments from Mr. Minton were
donations or loans earmarked exclusively for use in the wrongful death ease, or were purely
personal loans that Mr. Dandar could use for any purpose, including for personal consumption
items, is inherently incredible. We attach as Appendix C, a compendium of Mr. Dandar s various
statements on the subject. Their conflicting and irreconcilable nature is evident. Mr. Dandar
changes his story to meet his needs at any particular moment.

According to Mr. Dandar s most recent version of the story, at some point in either 1999
or 2000, Mr. Minton agreed that Mr. Dandar could treat the payments as personal loans for
whatever purpose he chose. (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 6, pp. 739-740; 753-754). Not only is Mr.
Dandar s testimony contradicted by Mr. Minton (Ex. 3, Minton, May 17, pp. 7 1-72), it is also
refuted by the personal checks Mr. Minton gave to Mr. Dandar, each of which contains the
notation either "McPherson case" or "McPherson." No check is notated "Dandar" or "Dandar
loan." Moreover, Mr. Dandar says that he even informed Ms. Liebreich about his receipt of the
untraceable Swiss UBS check in the amount of $500,000. Clearly, its intended use was for this

Moreover, as Appendix C, makes clear, at various times after the point in 1999 or 2000
when Mr. Dandar now claims Mr. Minton agreed that the payments were personal loans to Mr.
Dandar, Mr. Dandar stated, to the contrary, that they were for purposes of the wrongful death
case and for the benefit of the estate. For example, Mr. Dandar has stated or testified to, at
various times, all of the following:

               Robert S. Minton has provided funding to the Estate of Lisa
          McPherson through plaintiffs counsel to defray the costs of the

                              - 70-
          wrongful death lawsuit against the Church of Scientology for the death of Lisa

(Ex. 122, January 3,2001, Plaintiffs proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law on
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Witnesses and Motion for Protective Order,  6).

          BY MR. WEINBERG:
          ..... you say, quote, "Robert S. Minton has provided funding to the estate of Lisa
          McPherson through plaintiffs counsel to defray the costs of the wrongful death
          lawsuit ..."

          My question to you is, as of the time you submitted these findings of fact
          to Judge Quesada in January of 2001, where you said that the funding   you don t
          limit it to the first hundred thousand dollars   was to defray the costs of the
          wrongful death case   at the time you submitted this, did you   had you already
          entered into this new oral agreement with Mr. Minton, where you could use the
          funds any way you wanted to?

          A. I m pretty sure.

          Q. And is there a particular reason why you submitted these findings of fact to
          Judge Quesada?

          A. No. Because   well, yeah. That s because that was the evidence that was
          presented to him.

(Ex. 1, Dandar, June 6, pp. 765-766).

          BY MR. ROSEN:
          Q. This is for defraying costs in the wrongful death case?
          A. Yes.

(Ex. 99, January 25, 2001, Deposition of Kennan Dandar, p. 44).

 agreements exist between the Estate or any other person or -entity to do
          anything except repay loans used for the express. purpose of funding the litigation.

(Ex. 123, February 26, 2001, Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim with Prejudice Motion to Strike
and Motion for Sanctions,  12).

     Minton has loaned over a million dollars to plaintiffs counsel to defray litigation costs,
     for which he expects repayment....

(Ex. 124, March 16,2001, Petitioner s reply to Respondent s Response to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, p. 2).

     Mr. Dandar s current insistence, despite the above statements, that the payments were

purely personal loans that he was free to spend in any manner he chose, even extends to the two
UBS checks for $500,000 and $250,000 which he claims to have believed did not come from Mr.
Minton, but from either "friends in Europe" or "the Fat Man" or some other anonymous donor or
lender. Mr. Dandar could not explain why these unknown anonymous "friends" would agree to
loan money to him personally, as opposed to for purposes of the case, let alone how he knew that
that was their understanding:

     Q. But in this case you say that this $500,000 and the $250,000 was loans to you?
     A. Right.
     Q. Right? But you don t have any agreement?

(Ex. 1, Dandar, June 4, p. 334).

     THE COURT: ...Did you ever say to Mr. Minton, 'Well, did you check with them to make
     sure this is okay, that I put this money and use it for my food and
     payments and what have you ?
     THE WITNESS: No. I didn t do that.

(Ex. 30, Dandar, July 17, p. 164).

After having so testified at the hearing, however, Mr. Dandar has now filed a counter-

counterclaim on behalf of the Estate, in this case, in which he alleges that the Church interfered
with a purported contract between Mr. Minton and Mr. Dandar for the benefit of the estate by
which Mr. Minton would continue to fund the wrongful death case! The Estate evidently seeks

                              -72 -
damages in this counter-counterclaim as a third party beneficiary. Mr. Dandar s pleading reads as

     4.     In October 1997, counsel for the ESTATE entered into a contractual
     relationship with Robert Minton, wherein Minton agreed to provide or obtain loan money
     to counsel for all funds necessary to complete litigation between the ESTATE and FLAG
     concerning the wrongful death of LISA MCPHERSON. The ESTATE is a third party
     beneficiary of this agreement in that counsel agreed to fund all litigation, including
     attorney fees and costs, on behalf of the ESTATE, and the agreement with Minton and
     counsel was intended to achieve that purpose for the benefit of the ESTATE.

(Ex. 125, July 26, 2002 Estate s Counter-Counterclaim,  4).a/

Indeed, Mr. Dandar s conflicting testimony and statements are so bizarre as to be beyond
belief. It is clear that Mr. Dandar will create whatever account he deems is most beneficial to him
on any given day and stick with it until his falsehood catches up with him. Then he conjures up a
new, different story. His claim that the payments from Mr. Minton were personal loans to Mr.
Dandar to use in any way he saw fit, rather than payments earmarked for the benefit of the
wrongful death case, potentially serves several purposes:

A. It enables Mr. Dandar, who is representing plaintiff on a contingency fee basis, to have
disposable funds, expand litigation, and hire witnesses to support his fabricated scenarios, while
leaving his firm and plaintiff judgment proof when sanctioned or found liable for judgments
awarded against them for their abuse. ~'

This strange turn of events harkens back to Judge Baird s observation of the first day of
testimony on the Church s motion to disqualify Mr. Dandar: "This whole thing is very disturbing.
Very disturbing. Just when I thought it couldn t get any more bizarre, it gets more bizarre." (Ex,
37, Observation of Hon. W. Douglas Baird, April 9,2002, 33:21-23).

Thus, Mr. Dandar sent a self-serving letter to Ms. Liebreich stating that only the Estate
would have to pay any cost award   yet the Estate has no assets. (Ex. 127). Similarly, the

                              -73 -
B. It allows Mr. Dandar and plaintiff to prevent discovery into those funds in aid of
collection as all funds are apparently personal to Mr. Dandar, a claim only made once RTC had
obtained a monetary judgment against the Estate in Texas and once the FSO had won summary
judgment against the Estate in Florida.

C. It may create a defense should the Florida Bar inquire into what Mr. Dandar did with
money provided by Mr. Minton and should the IRS inquire whether Mr. Dandar properly took the
funds into income.

D. At least as to the two UBS checks, it gives Mr. Dandar the opportunity to disclaim any
repayment obligation altogether. 2 

E. It provides Mr. Dandar a defense to Mr. Minton s full involvement in the case by
claiming all monies were to Mr. Dandar personally and not necessarily a quid pro quo for
permitting Mr. Minton to interfere in the litigation of this case.

This Court, of course, need not determine the reasons for Mr. Dandar s obfuscatory,
contradictory, and incredible testimony. Rather, what matters here is that Mr. Dandar has made
false statements and testimony in this case and in this proceeding, demonstrated a willingness to
abuse defendants, and established beyond redemption a thorough lack of candor or credibility as a

Estate s recent accounting filed in the Probate (Ex. 126) proceeding failed to include any mention
of the funds given by Mr. Minton for the case, or the liabilities the Estate already has incurred,
including the judgments against it.

When questioned about repayment   specifically to whom repayment of the Swiss loans
should be made when and if that day comes, Mr. Dandar testified that if Mr. Minton said that it
was his money, "he s going to have to prove it to me" and if Mr. Minton were to identify some
other person as the source of the funds, "I ll cross that bridge when I get to it and it s none of
your business howl do it." (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 6, pp. 76 1-762).

general matter.
3.  The False Statements and Subornation
    Concerning The TiES Bank Checks

The following facts are not in dispute concerning the UBS checks:

1.   Mr. Minton caused the checks to be issued by instructing his bank to transfer his
funds to UBS. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 22, p. 714).

ii.  Mr. Minton personally delivered the $500,000 UBS check to Mr. Dandar in May,
2000 at the Bombay Bicycle Club in Clearwater. (Ex. 17, Minton, April 19, p. 51).

'11. Mr. Minton mailed the $250,000 to Mr. Dandar in late February/early March 2002. (Ex.
3, Minton, May 22, pp. 754-758).

iv.  Mr. Lirot s other client, Courage Productions, LLC, which was run by Mr.
Dandar s consultant/witness Peter Alexander and Patricia (ireenway, and which produced the
movie, "The Profit," also received UBS checks for $500,000 from Mr. Minton, as part of the
agreement by which Mr. Minton capitalized that corporation in the amount of $2,500,000. (Ex. 3,
Minton, May 22, pp. 713-715). Indeed, according to the limited liability company s operating
agreement, a payment of $500,000 was due from Mr. Minton on May 16, 2000, two weeks after
the $500,000 UBS check to Mr. Dandar. (Ex. 128, Def. [kg. Ex. 121, p. 18). It was clear to
everybody involved that the UBS checks to Courage Productions were from Mr. Minton, not
"friends in Europe," "the Fat Man," or "Fred." Indeed, it was Mr. Minton s contractual obligation
to supply those funds. Mr. Dandar clearly would have been aware of these facts, due to his close
relationship to Mr. Minton, Ms. Greenway, Mr. Alexander and Mr. Lirot. Indeed, Mr. Dandar
objected to defendants  efforts to obtain discovery of Courage s financing from Mr. Minton. (Ex.
129, Greenway Depo., pp. 60-61). Moreover, Mr. Dandar called Mr. Alexander as a witness in

                              -75 -
this hearing. He made no attempt to elicit testimony that Alexander believed the UBS check to
Courage Productions was from the "Fat Man" or anybody other than Mr. Minton. Patricia
(ireenway, Mr. Dandar s "volunteer consultant" was never called as a witness, but has never
alleged anybody but Mr. Minton financed "The Profit."

v.   Mr. Minton, with Mr. Dandar in attendance, testified falsely at his deposition on
May 24, 2000 that he had only given Mr. Dandar $1,050,000 at that time in support of the
litigation. (Ex. 72, Minton, May 24, 2000, pp. 212-213). In fact. Mr. Minton had given Mr.
Dandar at least $1,550,000, including the UBS check for $500,000, which Mr. Minton also failed
to produce.

vi.  Mr. Dandar s testimony at his own deposition of January 25, 2001 in the breach of
contract case that he had, at that time, received only $1,050,000 from Mr. Minton was false. (Ex.
99, Dandar, Depo., p. 44). Mr. Dandar made the same false statement to the Court of Appeal in a
petition for writ of certiorari filed on January 29,2001 in this case, attaching an affidavit of Mr.
Minton containing the same falsehood.

The dispute in the testimony, of course, is whether Mr. Dandar knew or should have
known that Mr. Minton s testimony was false, and whether Mr. Dandar in fact subomed the false
testimony. Mr. Minton s testimony could not be clearer. He provided the check for $500,000 to
Mr. Dandar openly, stated it was from him, and never pretended to Mr. Dandar that it was from
anyone else. (Ex. 17, Minton, April 19, pp. 48-50). According to Mr. Minton, he gave Mr.
Dandar a bank check, instead of a personal check, because Mr. Dandar wanted to hide it from the
Church to minimize the appearance that through his extraordinary levels of funding, Mr. Minton
was improperly interfering with the case, or investing in it. (Id., pp. 48-49). Indeed, Mr. Minton

                              -76 -
and Ms. Brooks are clear that Mr. Dandar said that he was willing to take payment in cash.

     At that dinner, Mr. Dandar then had the audacity to suggest to Mr. Minton that he give
     him another check "like the earlier one for $500,000," meaning a bank check without his
     name on it. Mr. Minton said he could not do that at that time, whereupon Mr. Dandar
     then suggested that Mr. Minton, who was planning a trip to Europe, could "get the money
     in cash" while he was there, or, he said, "I ll go to Europe or anywhere else in the world
     to pick up the cash for you."

(Ex.12, Def. Hrg. Ex. 72, Brooks Affi.  25).

     The Court has expressed the suspicion that Mr.. Minton wished to minimize public

acknowledgment of the amount of funding he was providing because of potential tax liabilities for
repatriating foreign dollars. See, e.g., Ex  1, Dandar, June 4, pp. 318-319, 325-326. This may also
have been an important motive for Mr. Minton s actions, but it was not inconsistent with Mr.
Dandar s scheme.

Mr. Minton testified that Mr. Dandar instructed him to not disclose that the payment of
the $500,000 UBS check came from him. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 23, p. 913). In so doing, Mr.
Dandar was urging that Mr. Minton should be meticulously literal   since the money was coming
from an intermediary bank, it therefore was not coming from Mr. Minton, although Mr. Minton
was, of course, the actual source of the money funding the check. (Ex. 3, Minton, May 22, pp.
708-709). Mr. Dandar, in so doing, of course, was telling Mr. Minton to lie. More than that, it
was Mr. Dandar who went to elaborate means to disguise not only the source of the Swiss bank
money, but also its ultimate destination. As Mr. Minton explained, "Mr. Dandar had told me ... [in]
May, 2000, that he had set up an account where Scientology, you know, couldn t find it ..." (Ex. 3,
Minton, May 22, p. 704). Were any question to arise as to the source of the funds, it was Mr.
Dandar who suggested that Mr. Minton "couch this in terms of, you know, overseas investors,

know, your friends." Mr. Dandar first came up with the name "Fred" for these "proceeds." "Fred
was Mr. Dandar s nickname for me. That, you know, as the source of like the UBS check." (Ex.
3, Minton, May 22, pp. 740-741).

Mr. Dandar, on the other hand, posits a contradictory, tortured, and unbelievable account
in support of his claim to have seen, heard, or smelled no evil)~  According to Mr. Dandar, he
was told and believed that both UBS checks were provided to Mr. Dandar as personal loans by
unknown friends of Mr. Minton in Europe. (Ex.1, Dandar, June 4, pp. 331, 334). If Mr. Dandar is
to be believed, he did not ask who these friends were. (Id., p. 311). He did not inquire why they
provided the checks to Mr. Minton, rather than directly to him. He insists that it never occurred to
him that Mr. Minton was the source of the funds (Id., p. 311.), despite the fact that he would have
been aware that Courage Productions also received virtually identical UBS checks from Mr.
Minton which clearly represented Mr. Minton s funds because they made Mr. Minton a 50%
owner of the company. Despite the fact that he claims to have been meticulous enough to check
with the Florida Bar before accepting Mr. Minton s first personal check for $100,000, Mr.
Dandar says that he did not ask the Bar whether it was permissible to accept $750,000 in
"personal loans" from purportedly unknown anonymous sources in conjunction with a client
matter. Mr. Dandar was also unable to explain to whom he would pay back such huge loans,
especially if Mr. Minton had died, or why such person or persons would be interested in making
large personal loans to a total stranger   for whatever personal use as he deemed appropriate. (Ex.
30, Dandar, July 16, pp. 58-60). Mr. Dandar says he did not even ask Mr. Ivlinton if the "friends"
knew that the checks were "personal" loans to Mr. Dandar, rather than payments for use in the

~' Mr. Dandar s testimony on this subject is compiled in Appendix C.

                              -78 -
case. (Ex. 30, Dandar, pp. 158-159). And, while the March 2002 UBS check   for $250,000 
was not the subject of the perjury, according to Mr. Dandar it came from the same source. For
reasons Mr. Dandar obviously also could not explain, this unknown source was insistent that
before payment was made, Mr. Dandar request certain internet critics of Mr. Minton (including
Mr. Dandar s "consultant" Patricia Greenway) leave Mr. Minton alone. (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 4,
pp. 282-284). Finally, if Mr. Dandar is to be believed, when Mr. Minton purportedly stated that
the check came from the "Fat Man," Mr. Dandar did not realize that Mr. Minton meant himself.
(Id., p. 321).

On cross-examination, Mr. Dandar was asked what he told Mr. Minton on April 1,2002
when Mr. Minton demanded that Mr. Dandar pay back the $250,000 March 2002 UBS check
provided less than one month earlier. Mr. Dandar s initial response was most revealing: he stated
that he explained to Mr. Minton that he had already spent the money, indicating that he did not
question that the money had come from Mr. Minton. (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 6, pp. 904-905). Mr.
Dandar then offered three additional pages of explanations he gave Mr. Minton, until Mr. Dandar
apparently realized his own testimony showed that Mr. Dandar understood that the $250,000
check had come from Mr. Minton. Backtracking once again, Mr. Dandar then stated:

     Mmrn, I also asked him about, well, you know, what do you mean, you want the money
     back? You know, this is a UBS check from a third party.

(Id., p. 907). Mr. Dandar s incredible testimony with respect to the $250,000 check thus further

serves to show the falsity of the testimony with respect to his $500,000 check.

As to who the European friends were, Mr. Dandar testified at this hearing that the $500,000
check was from "anonymous friends" and the $250,000 was from the "Fat Man." (Ex. 1, Dandar,

4, pp. 305, 306, 341). Yet when Mr. Dandar cross-examined Mr. Mintonin this case, he pointedly
asked him, "In fact, you said it [the $500,000 check] came from the Fat Man. Do you recall that
Mr. Minton"? (Ex. 3, Minton, May 23, pp. 88 1-882). On another occasion, Dr. Garko testified
that even he did not believe that the "Fat Man" ploy was credible and that he told Mr. Minton in
New Hampshire that no one would believe it if Mr. Minton attempted to use it in Court. (Ex. 28,
Garko, June 11, p. 33). Mr. Minton did not try to use it here; Mr. Dandar did.

In short, Mr. Dandar s story that Mr. Minton told him that the money came from
European friends or the "Fat Man" is inherently inconsistent and unbelievable. Moreover, even if
Mr. Minton did use those terms to pretend that he was not the source of the funds, there is no
way that Mr. Dandar could have or would have believed it, and thus no way that he could have
believed that Mr. Minton s testimony was truthful. In fact, in this hearing, Mr. Dandar finally
admitted to the Court that there were not any "pals in Europe" and there was not any "Fat Man."
(Ex. 1, Dandar, June 4, p. 341).

    4.  Dandar s Patterns of False Testimony

This record is permeated by Mr. Dandar s relentless revisions to his testimony to serve his
perceived needs at any particular moment.

Mr. Dandar relies on several devices to try to conceal his artifice. The principal one is that
the false testimony he gives and the perjury he suborned flow in symbiotic unison. The record is
replete with concurrent shifts in testimony. There is, for example, Ms. Liebreich s and Mr.
Minton s initial concurrence about at least an informal arrangement for proceeds from any
wrongful death recovery to be given to the LMT followed by their subsequent, concurrent
backtracking at Mr. Dandar s urging. See, Appendix A. Another example is Mr. Dandar s ever-

                              - 80-
shifting saga of the "friends in Europe" and the "Fat Man" to try to conceal his knowledge that
the UBS checks he received from Mr. Minton were payments made indirectly by Mr. Minton. See
Appendix C. There is also Mr. Dandar s and Ms. Liebreich s serial parallel revisions to their
testimony regarding the character (donation vs. loan), intended use (to prosecute this case vs. Mr.
Dandar s personal use), and beneficiary (the Estate or Mr. Dandar) of the money Mr. Minton
lavished on Mr; Dandar in conjunction with this case. See Appendix D. These concurrent shifts of
testimony were orchestrated, not random, and the common denominator in each and every
instance is Mr. Dandar, whether acting on his own, with Ms. Liebreich, with Ms. Liebreich and
Mr. Minton, or in obtaining the contrived "corroboration" of such transparently coached
witnesses as Mr. Prince, Mr. Haney, Mr. Merrett, and Mr. Alexander.

Mr. Dandar s exploitation of this pattern is exemplified in his own testimony on June 6,
2002 in beginning on page 754. Mr. Weinberg asked him if it concerned him that he never
revealed the existence of the $500,000 UBS check to the Second District Court of Appeal in his
certiorari petitions. Mr. Dandar answered with an unequivocal "no." (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 6, p.
754). Mr. Weinberg then got Mr. Dandar to confirm that he never talked to anyone about that
check (Id., p. 755) but then, after answering the question, Mr. Dandar volunteered the following
defense of his testimony: "And I always   I was doing this pursuant to the testimony of Mr.
Minton." (Id., p. 755).

The record is clear that Mr. Dandar has manipulated his former allies with as much vigor
as he has manipulated the truth. Ms. Brooks testified that she and her cohorts were dedicated to
the cause of destroying Scientology and adds that "Mr. Dandar took advantage of that ... and put
Mr. Minton and me in a position where were basically being held hostage to the case." (Ex. 2,

Brooks, May 3, p.170). In this instance, Ms. Brooks is correct. It was, indeed, Mr. Dandar s
ability to practice upon their fanaticism and their willingness to do or say anything to serve their
"cause" that gave Mr. Dandar the opportunity to manipulate them for his own purposes. They lie
to protect their "cause," and he capitalizes on the leverage their lying gives him to pocket Mr.
Minton s money. By persuading Mr. Minton to lie about the "secret agreement" and the UBS
check, Mr. Dandar gave himself the power to blackmail Minton with the threat of perjury and
money laundering charges thus creating a sort of insurance policy against Minton ever turning on
him. Mr. Minton s testimony is that he was terrified over the perjury that Mr. Dandar convinced
him to commit to serve Mr. Dandar s personal greed. (Ex. 17, Minton, April 19, p.158)..

There are other patterns to Mr. Dandar s prevarication as well. Among those is his
habitual "unless you show me something" responses to literally a score or more of questions
where he is testing the waters to see if the defendants can prove he is lying. Two examples will
suffice to prove the point. The first, before Judge Baird, is presented with the response it
provoked from counsel conducting the examination:

     Q.   So let me see if I understand your testimony. You deny that you came aware, in
     or about 1997, that Mr. Minton had made public statements announcing this agreement or
     this stated intention of the Estate to contribute the bulk of the proceeds to the -- from the
     wrongful death case. You deny that, right?
          A.  I deny it unless you can show me something to the contrary....
     BY MR. ROSEN:
     Q. Mr. Dandar, your answer is, if I can prove to you that you re not telling the truth,
     then you ll admit it?

(Ex. 19, Dandar, Tr. of April 30, 2002, p. 140).

The second example, which Mr. Dandar blurted out as counsel upon the conclusion of a
videotape showing Mr. Prince discussing "End of Cycle," and Ms. Brooks chastising Mr. Prince

                              - 82 -
regarding his "interpretation" of the concept, i.e., the very misinterpretation upon which Mr.
Dandar ultimately based his murder allegation in the Fifth Amended Complaint is:

          Judge, for the record, unless they can show me something, I did not represent
          LMT when these tapes were produced.

(Ex. 2, Hearing, May 16, 2002, p. 1583.)~ 

Closely related to his "show me something" ploy, is Mr. Dandar s repeated reliance on not
putting anything in writing that might someday come back to haunt him. This is clearly a pattern
and practice, and is closely related to his oft-incanted mantra that "the record will speak for
itself." The only real significance of his "show me something," "the record speaks for itself," and
"I didn t put it in writing" gambit is that it is, indeed, a gambit. It is Mr. Dandar s modus
operandi. Mr. Dandar saw to it there was nothing in writing with Mr. Minton concerning the
nature or use of Mr. Minton s money; that there was nothing in writing with Dr. Garko
concerning their arrangement; that there was nothing in writing about the use of Mr. Minton s
money with Ms. Liebreich; and that there was nothing in writing to reflect what the State Bar told
him in his alleged telephone call about Mr. Minton s money. It appears that a cornerstone of Mr.
Dandar s scheme involving Mr. Minton s money was Mr. Dandar s reliance on no Swiss bank
checks showing up to overcome his "they didn t come from Minton" excuse for not disclosing
that money to the Court of Appeal. Thus, in response to the motion to disqualii~y filed in front of
Judge Baird, Mr. Lirot and Mr. Dandar asserted that Mr. Minton s statements "are physically

Contrary to his statement, Mr. Dandar certainly did represent LMT at the time that
video was produced in discovery in April 2000, the month after he began to represent LMT
before Judge Penick. As proof, defendants show Mr. Dandar   and the Court   Appendix E.

                              - 83 -
impossible to accept or support." (Ex. 130, Defendant s Response,  7.) When those checks later
were produced by Mr. Minton, who obtained them from his bank, and those payments were
physically supported, Mr. Dandar was reduced to serial dissembling about a Fat Man and some
friends in Europe to try to cover his exposed tracks.

When confronted by the truth, Mr. Dandar has a never-ending supply of excuses,
including his reliance on his assertion that there is something "inartful" about a statement or
concept. In responding to defendants  motion for summary judgment in this case, he attempted to
avoid the fatal flaw in  34 of the Fifth Amended Complaint by claiming it was "inartfully
worded." (Ex. 131, p. 2). Similarly, in the proceeding before Judge Baird, when deposition
testimony of Ms. Liebreich was read, showing that it was her belief that Mr. Minton was donating
money to the Estate (rather than loaning it to Mr. Dandar), he responded by saying:

          BY MR. ROSEN:
            Q.  ... Your own client thought Mr. Minton was not loaning money
to you, was to the Estate; isn t that right?
            A.     She s correct.
            Q.  She s correct; Mr. Minton donated money to the Estate?
            A.  Well, legally, technically, no but,
            Q.  Okay.
          A.   it s the same
            Q.  Well sir, if she s correct that Mr. Minton donated money to the
Estate, sir, then you took that money and deposited it in your
          personal account, didn t you? ~
            A.  Okay, Mr. Rosen.
            Q.  Didn t you?
            A.  She is not aqfully correct, that s right.

(Ex. 132, Dandar, April 19, pp. 279-280).

These patterns of deception in which Mr. Dandar indulged are indelibly etched on the

                              - 84-
record before this Court.56 

          5.   Prince s Patterns of False Testimony

We already have shown in the context of broader discussions, the myriad of ways in which
Jesse Prince has provided false and misleading testimony. Because plaintiff inexplicably continues
to rely on Mr. Prince for a variety of propositions, we emphasize here several additional clear and
dramatic examples of Mr. Prince s false testimony. More than that, Mr. Prince is not merely a
witness who lacks credibility. He is a perjurer, and the Court should so find.

              a.  The PC Folders

During his career as a professional, all-purpose witness, Mr. Prince executed four
essentially identical affidavits or declarations under penalty of perjury in pursuit of the anti-

Scientology strategy of targeting David Miscavige, one of them in this case. In each version, Mr.
Prince offers a self-aggrandizing view of himself as an "expert" based upon ajob he held for 2 '/2 of
his 16 years in the Church, and 5 A years before he left Church employ, when he was removed in
disgrace from that position. (Ex. 34, Prince Depo., Nov. 17, 18, 1999, pp. 657-658.) In each of
his affidavits   all of which were purchased by lawyers funded by Mr. Minton   Mr. Prince

56 There is also a wealth of other evidence of Mr. Dandar s false testimony. He repeatedly denied
that he is motivated by animosity toward Scientology. (Ex. 30, Dandar, July 17, pp. 145-146).
Compare that with Ex. 113, Plaintiffs Hrg. Ex. 76, Mr. Dandar s March 30, 2002 letter to Mr.
Minton in which he states "Dell and her family will never make a deal with the devil." Moreover,
Mr. Dandar testified that he never discussed finances with anyone except for his brother and his
secretary and that they would be the only ones who knew about how much money Minton had
given him. (Ext 1, Dandar, June 6, p. 735). Compare that with Dr. Garko s testimony that he
knew Mr. Minton had given Dandar $1,050,000 (Ex. 28, Dr. Garko, June 11,2002, p. 144)
because Mr. Dandar told him so. (Id. at 152-153). Mr. Dandar also told Mr. Alexander that he
was getting a check from Europe. (Ex. 60, Alexander, June 7,2002, pp. 260-261). And, of course,
he should have, perhaps sometimes did, tell Ms. Liebreich about the money.

                              - 85 -
recounts his story of the destruction of Larry Wollersheim s PC folders, which Mr. Prince claims
was done on orders of David Miscavige, following court-ordered production. He apparently does
so both to try to diminish Mr. Miscavige s credibility and to enhance his own. In so doing, Mr.
Prince has relied on his belief that those folders   which he knows were never destroyed   will
never be produced for inspection by a court, and his fictional attack on Mr. Miscavige is thus
insulated from impeachment. ~'

His now-exposed lie about Mr. Wollersheim s folders was the platform for his entire
career as the witness who went after Mr. Miscavige. His first affidavit of this sort recounted his lie
about Mr. Wollersheim s entire pc file being reduced to pulp upon Mr. Miscavige s order to
bolster his "opinion" that copyright-related documents must have been destroyed at Mr.

Miscavige s command. (Ex. 134  Def. 1kg. Ex. 265, 9f 19-3 1). His second such affidavit
used the pc folder myth to a‰cuse Mr. Miscavige of destroying financial records. (Ex. 135   Def.

Ex. 266, ~J 5-17, 21). His third affidavit premises still other misconduct on the pc folder story.
Finally, here in this case, the story of the destruction of the pc folders is the foundation for
accusing Mr. Miscavige of destroying key parts of Lisa McPherson s, i.e. the orders of Mr.
Miscavige to let her die.

Each affidavit has Mr. Prince s conclusion and exhortation that "It is incumbent upon this
and every court as well as the authorities to realize the amount of deception, chicanery, lying,
manipulation, and outfight criminality that Scientology will employ...." (Ex. 135   Def. 1kg Ex.

~' That Mr. Prince relied on that misassumption was revealed beyond dispute when the pc folder he
claimed to have seen reduced to pulp appeared in this Court. This reaction, upon realizing the
bluff upon which all his lies rely had been called, was to say, "Oh, God no. This is the first time
they have ever tried this trick." (Ex. 133, Prince, July 18, pp. 110-111).

                              - 86-
266,  22; Ex. 134  Def. 1-Irg Ex. 265,913). The truth is that Mr. Prince s accusations apply
not to his former faith, but to himself. Mr. Prince is a professional liar and the proof is, among the
many other things discussedpost, the pc folders that were brought to this Court, all of which he
testified were pulped and destroyed.

On July 18,2002, the original upper level preclear folders of Mr. Wollersheim were
produced in this court by Monique Yingling, making a special appearance on behalf of Church of
Scientology International. As Ms. Yingling told the court:

          These, your Honor, are the upper level auditing files of Lawrence
          Wollersheim. They have existed since the day they were created.
          They were never destroyed. No one in the Church ever ordered Mr.
          Prince to destroy those files.

          They re all labeled with his name. Many of them have his
          handwriting in them....

(Ex. 137, Hearing Transcript, July 18, 2002, pp. 14-15.)

In addition to producing Mr. Wollersheim s folders, Ms. Yingling also produced an
affidavit from Neil Levin, CSI s Custodian of Records. (Ex.l36.) Mr. Levin not only authenticated
the folders produced by Ms. Yingling, but explained what had been ordered by the Wollersheim
court and what the Church had produced:

          Wollersheim s PC folders numbered 1-5 reflected his lower level auditing, up to
          the level known as Power. Folders 1-5 were produced to the Los Angeles
          Superior Court on May 5, 1986 in compliance with an order compelling their
          production in Wollersheim v. ....... The upper level Wollersheim PC folders were
          not ordered to be produced in Wollersheim i . CSC and have remained securely
          stored at all times before and after the production of folders 1-5.

(Id.,91914& 5).

                              - 87-
After Wollersheim s folders were produced in open court, Mr. Dandar attempted to
deflect attention from this clear import. First, he expressed mock "amaze[mentj" that the Church
"has volunteered to have you review someone s preclear folders." (Ex. 137, Dandar, July 18, p.
20). The Court properly pointed out, "They didn t ask   read the motion. They did not request me
to review the content but to look at whatever would help me to know whether or not these are his
files." Id.

Mr. Dandar then suggested that Mr. Prince look at the files, but then acknowledged that
would violate Mr. Wollersheim s privilege. The court offered to make a limited in camera
inspection to determine if "it appeared to be something that belonged to Mr. Wollersheim," id. at
25, but Mr. Dandar objected that the court would not be able to make that determination. Id. at

39. Finally, Mr. Dandar stated that he had spoken to Mr. Wollersheim s counsel, and "he does not
give anyone permission to look at his pc folders." Id. at 127. As the court already had
commented, "I think if Mr. Wollersheim claims a privilege to these 25 or 26 files, it kind of speaks
for itself." Id. at 100.

          b.  Key West

As noted, ante, Mr. Dandar testified that there were meetings at Key West, Florida on

August 9-13, 1999, among Ford Greene, Dan Leipold, Michael Garko, Brian Haney and Jesse

Prince. Mr. Dandar attended, and also stated that he spoke at length with Mr. Prince about

Scientology litigation and the wrongful death case. (Ex. 1, June 6,2002, pp. 84 1-842.) Jesse

Prince lied about the Key West trip. He testified, a mere three months after the Key West trip:

          BY MR. WEINBERG:
          Q.  And who was on the trip? What people were on the trip?
A. You know, I don t really want to discuss that because I was on

                              - 88 -
          a complete pleasure trip, it had nothing do with McPherson, Wollersheim, nothing.
          It had to do with fishing and having a good time, okay,
                               ** *

          Q.     Were you on the trip with Mr. Dandar, or are you embarrassed
          about bringing his name up? Were you on the trip with Mr. Dandar?
          A.  No. Mr. Dandar was not on the trip.
          Q.  Yes or no? Yes or no?
          A.  No. No.

(Ex. 138, Prince, November 17, 1999, pp. 254-255).

At that point. Mr. Prince abruptly requested a break, even though a break had been taken
only ten minutes earlier. On resumption, he testified as follows:

          Q.     Now, I asked you if Mr. Dandar was in Key West with you, and
          you said no, you said no repeatedly. Is that correct?

          A.     I don t   if I did say no, I m very sorry. He was not part of the trip.
          He came and appeared one day, and "Hi," we had dinner and he left.

(Id., p. 256). Mr. Prince s false testimony is diametrically opposed to four other witnesses
(Messrs. Dandar, Haney, Garko, and Minton). Mr. Dandar did nothing to attempt to correct the
deposition perjury of Mr. Prince   yet he represented Mr. Prince in the deposition, was an eye-

witness to the events in question, and himself testified to the contrary in this hearing.

          That s where [Key West] I met Jesse Prince, I believe. And that s where we talked
          and talked and talked. And he flew back with me to my office, and we just started

(Ex. 7, Dandar, Tr. of May 3,2002, p. 90.)

                              * * *

          MR. WEINBERG:
          Q. And   and what percentage of that time   I m talking about the business hours,
          you know, the 9 to 5 hours   was spent with regard to educating you or discussing
          that which had to do with Scientology or the case?

                              - 89-
A.     Every waking moment. (Ex. 1, Dandar, June 6,2002, p. 842.)

               c.   The $500,000 UBS Check

At the hearing, Mr. Prince for the first time testified that Mr. Minton had told him that Mr.

Rinder had already obtained a copy of the May 2000 UBS check for $500,000 as early as March

26, 2002. (Ex. 8, Prince, July 8, pp. 386  88). The point of this false testimony was to

overcome the clear evidence that Mr. Minton had provided the check to the Church in April 2002.

Thus Mr. Prince alleged that the Church had somehow obtained this evidence to blackmail Mr.


The best proof of the lie is that Mr. Prince had neglected to mention this conversation in
his lengthy affidavit of May 1,2002, submitted in support of Mr. Dandar. Mr. Prince could give no
explanation as to how this critical "fact" had not been mentioned. (Ex. 8, July 8, pp. 390-391).
Likewise, Mr. Prince could give no explanation as to why he did not alert Mr. Dandar to Mr.
Minton s startling purported revelation. (Ex. 8, Prince, July 10, pp. 988-990).

The testimony of Monique Yingling and Wally Pope further shows the falsity of Mr.
Prince s testimony. Ms. Yingling emphasized several times that the Church did not have copies of
the checks before Mr. Minton gave them to her and Mr. Rinder on April 17 or April 18, 2002.
(Ex. 112, June 11, 2002, pp. 4344, 56-57; June 12, 2002, pp. 96-97). Mr. Pope likewise
explained that after Mr. Minton had admitted that he had paid Mr. Dandar the $500,000 check, it
took a sustained effort by Mr. Minton to obtain a copy of the check, which was not produced by
the bank until sometime after Mr. Minton disclosed the existence of the check in open court on
April 9. As Mr. Pope made clear, Mr. Rosen and he "learned about that at [Mr. Minton s]

                              - 90 -
testimony on the 9th  And that is when we decided we would try to get copies of [the UBS checks]
by [deposition] subpoena." (Ex. 111, July 17, Pope Testimony, pp.34-3 5.) Mr. Pope cancelled
the deposition when the bank could not produce the check. (Id., at 56.) Subsequently, "we got
these checks a¤er I cancelled the deposition. ... Mr. Minton, I believe, had been able to get his own
bank somehow to get them." (Id. at 55.)

Thus, Mr. Prince s testimony was a pure fabrication, made up at the last minute to try to
support his latest financial benefactor, Mr. Dandar. It has no credibility whatsoever.

               d.   Prince s False Testimony That Mr. Minton Told Him the $500,000 UBS
               Check (dated May 1,2000) Was Given to Mr. Dandar in August 2001

Another aspect of Mr. Prince s misrepresentations concerning the $500,000 UBS check
was contained in his "April 2002" Affidavit and was revealed during his cross examination on July
10,2002. Mr. Prince told an elaborate story in that affidavit, describing the circumstances in which
Mr. Minton told him and Ms. Brooks about the $500,000 payment to Mr. Dandar. According to
Mr. Prince, Mr. Minton took him and Ms. Brooks out of the LMT to a secluded and private
meeting and told them the case was "costing too much" and Dandar "is getting" a $500,000
payment but "that was all he was going to get." This meeting, Prince said, took place in August
200l.~  (Ex. 8, July 10, 2002, pp. 98 1-983) In the Omnibus Hearing, Mr. Prince made it clear
that he was referring in his affidavit to the $500,000 UBS check issued by Mr. Minton to Mr.
Dandar. (Id. at 983-984). When it was pointed out to him that this was impossible, because the

~' Prince s testimony that Minton would have paid another $500,000 in August 2001 is ludicrous
on its face. That was of course the month when Mr. Merrett sent the e-mail to Mr. Dandar, on
behalf of Mr. Minton, telling him "the well is dry" and that Jesse Prince was withdrawing as a
witness because Mr. Ivlinton was unwilling to pay anything further to Mr. Dandar. (Ex. 92,
Merrett e-mail, Plaintiffs Hrg. Ex. 45)

check is dated May 2000, Mr. Prince attempted to brush off his false testimony as a
"typographical error," suggesting he had merely got the date wrong. ("It was not my intention to
    -   ~t pexjury by making a typographical error.... Well, you know, beat me for making a

typographical error." Id. at 984-985)

When it was further pointed out that it was not merely the year that was wrong (2001
instead of 2000), the month that was wrong (August instead of May), but the entire circumstances
of his elaborate story, Mr. Prince merely retorted, "Well, beat me for making a mistake." (Id. at


               e.   Prince s Resignation Letter

On March 3, 1987, when Mr. Prince was removed from his position at RTC, he signed
three letters of resignation   one as a director, one as Treasurer, and one, a cover letter to RTC s
Trustees saying, "I have decided to resign from those positions in order that I may receive
religious instruction and correction on the Rehabilitation Project Force." (Ex. 139, Resignation
Letters) All of these letters were in the same type style, were dated and were all printed on a dot
matrix printer, rather than a typewriter, where a date could later be added. While testif~ring under
oath in RTC v. Yanny on September 11, 1989, Mr. Prince was asked about his resignation from
RTC and confirmed it had been voluntary. ("I wanted to go to the RPF because I needed more
training. I needed -- I just needed more skill than I presently had, and that afforded me an
opportunity to do that.") (Ex. 140, Prince, September 11, 1989, p. 17).

Six years after leaving the Church, deposed in BPI v. FACTNet, Mr. Prince was shown
one of his March 3, 1987 resignation letters. He said this "couldn tbe" his letter because "this
one s dated." (Ex. 141, Prince, August, 20, 1998, p. 842) Mr. Prince said the date "must have

typed on later" (Id., 846) because "My testimony is I signed undated letters." (Id., p. 847) The

- following day, in the continuation of the same deposition, Mr. Prince conceded he had signed
properly dated resignation letters in March 1987:

          BY MR. ROSEN:
               Q.  Did you ever sign a resignation   any resignation?
               A.  Yes, sir, I finally did.
               Q.  When?
               A.  I believe it was at some point the next day.
               Q.  Can you tell me what year this was?
               A.  '92. I m sorry, I m sorry. 1987.
               Q.  So the events you described yesterday and the day you signed a
               resignation, both occurred in 1997?
               A.  1987.
               Q.  '87, sorry, '87. And was it March?
               A.  Sir, I do believe it was sometime in March.

               Q.   What did you resign from?
               A.  I resigned from the   my position on the board of directors of RTC.
               Q.  Did you also resign at the same time as treasurer of RTC?
               A.  That s specifically what I m talking about.

(Id., pp. 882 - 884).

In his August 20, 1999 affidavit in this case, however, Mr. Prince reverted to his false
story that he had been "forcefully removed" from RTC and "It is my belief that my undated
resignation, which I signed when appointed to the Board, was then dated and used to make it
appear that I had resigned, when I had not." (Ex. 36, Affidavit, p. 6.) When the issue was first
raised in the Omnibus Hearing (July 10, 2002), Mr. Prince again said he had been "forcibly
removed" from RTC and had signed an undated resignation letter. (Ex. 8, Prince, July 10, pp.
759-761). The Court directly asked specifically whether he considered the unsigned resignation
was part of his alleged "forcible removal" to which Prince answered "yes." (Ex. 8, Prince, July 10,
pp. 760-76 1).

The next day (July 11), Prince was shown his March 1997 resignation letter and it was

                              - 93 -
pointed out that it was printed on a dot matrix printer and that it would have been impossible to
match a pre-signed document up with a later inserted date. Prince then changed his story again
and admitted that he did in fact sign the resignation letter "on March 3rd 1987" and what he
"executed had a date on it already." (Ex. 8, pp.1028-1030 & 1052-1054 & 1115-1118). The
significance of this testimony is that Prince has repeatedly invented stories concerning his removal,
all of them intended to malign the Church and Mr. Miscavige. The fact is, Prince was removed for
his misconduct. His resignation was voluntary. It was not forced, and it most certainly was not
because of his refusal to engage in misconduct on behalf of Mr. Miscavige.

               f.   Prince s Invented Story of How He Pulled Loaded Guns On Numerous
               Scientology Officials Including David Miscavige

Perhaps nothing more reveals Mr. Prince s propensity to invent colorful but false stories

than his account of how he threatened Mr. Miscavige and numerous other Scientology officials
with loaded guns in 1987. Mr. Prince first told of this story in 1998 in his deposition in the
FACTNet case, the videotape of which the Court observed. Mr. Prince had just been impeached in
the deposition in his false account of the purported unsigned letters of resignation; in apparent
fury and frustration, he made up the story of the guns. (Ex. 141, Prince, Aug. 20, 1998, pp. 854-

The story is so improbable that it is refuted in the mere telling. According to Mr. Prince, he
was surrounded in an office by numerous Church officials, including Mr. Miscavige, who
threatened him and demanded his resignation. (Ex. 8, Prince, July 11, pp. 1042-1043). Mr. Prince
defied them, and was able to break away from all of them by making threatening martial arts
movements, in which he was trained. (Ex. 8, July 9, p. 613). Mr. Prince then left and went to

                              -94 -
his room; despite the threats, not one of the officials followed him to his room to see what he was
doing. (Id., p. 1046). Rather than pack his bags and leave the facilities, however, Mr. Prince
retrieved and loaded an assault rifle and a .45-caliber pistol, and returned to the room of the
confrontation. All of the officials were still in the room, apparently thankful that they had
managed to escape Mr. Prince s martial arts movements. Mr. Prince then entered the room,
pointed the loaded guns at the assembled officials, demanded to know "which one of you want to
f--- with me now," and warned that "bodies are going to start dropping." (Ex. 30, Dandar, July
11, p. 1043). According to Mr. Prince, Mr. Miscavige (apparently with great aplomb) walked up
to Mr. Prince and convinced him to calm down. Mr. Prince then put his guns away and agreed to
speak with Mr. Miscavige.

Mr. Prince then remained at the same facilities for five more years, keeping the loaded
guns m his room. The Church did nothing to take away or disarm the guns, despite Prince s actual
use of them to make threats against Mr. Miscavige and other officials.

If this story were true, that Mr. Prince had aimed loaded guns at Mr. Miscavige while
proclaiming "bodies are going to start dropping," the Church would embrace it as the most
compelling evidence of Prince s bias against Mr. Miscavige. However, no gun confrontation ever
occurred. It is another fabricated scenario. And what it demonstrates is Mr. Prince s ability to
invent the most preposterous story to paint the Church in the worst possible light, reminiscent of
the Branch Davidians at WACO.

To that end, in Mr. Prince s scenario, the facility at Hemet was akin to a "prison camp,"
with a mysterious "ship in the desert" about which Prince ominously said, "God help us if you ve
ever been there." (Ex. 141, Prince FACTNet Depo. p. 858). Yet in fact, as the pictures of the

                              -95 -
facility show, the "ship" is used as a dining facility beside a swimming pool and as Mr. Prince
himself was compelled ultimately to admit, the property where he worked is "beautiful." (Ex. 8,
Prince, July 10, 2002, pp. 941-95 1).

         6.  Mr. Dandar s Harassive Trial Tactics

In a failed attempt to support the false allegation that Bob Minton had been blackmailed
and extorted, Mr. Dandar and his witnesses made a concerted effort to accuse the defendant of -
persistent harassment and unfair tactics: Of course, none of the testimony was relevant in anyway
to the allegation of blackmail of Mr. Minton and, accordingly, should be stricken. See, Appendix
J: No Extortion, Blackmail or Threat. Indeed, if any of this alleged harassment were relevant, the
Church would have presented live evidence of the harassment it has suffered at the hands of Mr.
Minton and the anti-Scientology community. Unlike plaintiff, defendant s testimony would have
been documented with police reports, photographs, e-mails, postings on the Internet, etc. of the
most vile nature. Had defendants done so, the hearing could easily have lasted another 35 days.

Plaintiff alleged the Church and its counsel "extorted" or "blackmailed" Bob Minton, that
they had somehow nefariously traced Mr. Minton s untraceable UBS checks to Mr. Dandar, and
made non-existent threats of criminal RICO prosecution. In forwarding this assault he attempted  
with allegations, but no evidence   to impugn the integrity of prominent members of the District of
Columbia Bar (Monique Yingling), the New York Bar (Samuel Rosen), the Florida Bar (Wally
Pope), and finally any attorney working for the Church, accusing all of them of malfeasance to the
Florida Bar, while also suggesting the Pinellas County Judiciary was corrupt and under the
influence of Mr. Pope s law firm.

To defend against that unfounded "fabricated scenario," the Church was compelled to

                              -96 -
provide attorney work-product notes of these meetings, as well as those of Mr. Minton s
attorney, and was forced to disclose the exorbitant amounts the Church has had to spend in
defending against Mr. Minton s attacks in court and through his anti-Scientology zealotry in the
streets, on the Internet, and with governments abroad.

Mr. Dandar persisted with his allegations of extortion until the Church was left no choice
but to have counsel testify (Ms. Yingling) about the circumstances which led up to Mr. Minton
and Ms. Brooks  disclosure of perjury. Ms. Yingling s testimony confirmed Ms. Brooks  and Mr.
Minton s. It was Mr. Minton who had approached the Church. There was no blackmail or

Undeterred, Mr. Dandar persisted, crafting one fabricated scenario after another until
plaintiff s case dissolved into a stream of irrelevant and unsubstantiated accusations for which
there was not even an attempt at corroboration or proof.

Mr. Dandar s allegations of "fair game" reflect the influence of veteran anti-Scientology
professional witnesses such as Ms. Brooks and Mr. Prince. There is no "fair game" policy in
Scientology. The original "fair game" policy was cancelled by L. Ron Hubbard in 1968. ~' (Ex.
~'  Plaintiff has had all of her "expert" witnesses testify that L. Ron Hubbard s religious
writings are to be followed to the letter. By their own contention, therefore, L. Ron Hubbard s
1968 cancellation of the thoroughly misunderstood policy that referred to fair game means that it
is cancelled and the cancellation must be obeyed. See also Ex. 142, Def Hrg Ex. 207 (1980
Policy re fair game).

          The term is never used inside Scientology because there is no such policy.

          Since 1981 I have heard allegations of fair game at least thousand times, but I had
          never heard the term in my life until I encountered it in civil litigation. To this day,
          I have never heard the term used

143). No policy of any kind has ever existed that even remotely resembles what Mr. Dandar and
his witnesses assert to be "fair game." Jesse Prince himself makes that clear:

          MR.RATHBUN: Thefirstthingis~~thatIwanttoaskyou....i5 that Vicki s [Aznaran]
          alleged that people who attack the Church are suppressive. They re declared
          enemies of the Church. They re then labeled fair game. And then at that point,
          virtually, they are virtually told to go out and do whatever they can against that
          person, regardless of the law, regardless of anything else and destroy them by any
          way they can. What do you have to say about that allegation?

          MR. PRINCE: - It s just the samŠ s just not.... That s utterly not true. In fact,
          it s Church s policy should a person get declared that Scientologists themselves do
          not associate with that person to even get into conflicts or causing damage to that
          person. Fair Game as she describes it here is not what the policy is or not what
          anyone on staff has done in my experience.

          MR. RATHBUN: When was that policy? There was a policy that mentioned Fair
          Game. When was that canceled, to your knowledge?

          MR. PRINCE: Some years ago, that policy was canceled some
         years ago.

          MR. RATHBUN: Before you were in the Church?

          MR. PRINCE: Yes.

          MR. RATHBUN: Okay.

          MR. PRINCE: Because it was just so misinterpreted.

          MR. RATHBUN: Right. It never meant that in the first place.

          MR. PRINCE: It never meant that in the first place.

          MR. RATHBUN: But people said it did.

          inside the Church.

(Def. Ex. 55, Decl. of David Miscavige,  55 (emphasis in the original).

                              -98 -
MR. PRINCE: People have altered it for their own means. (Def. Ex. 144, Def.
Hrg. Ex. 312, Prince video Transcript, pp. 66-67).~ 

Ultimately, Ms. Aznaran herself testified to the "use" of fair game by Church critics:

         7.  The most common and probably the most devastating manifestation
         of this tactic is the use of allegations concerning the so-called "Fair Game" policy
         of the Church. The term "Fair Game" has been misrepresented and repeatedly used
         by the Church s litigation adversaries as a means to create prejudice against the
         Church. To accomplish that end, counsel fashions a declaration in which the
         witness identifies an ugly event   real, imagined, or just plain invented   and then
         alleges that it was a deliberate act which was committed by the Church. The idea-is
         to create the false impression that the Church is committing acts of retribution in
         pursuit of "Fair Game."

         8.  A central element of exploiting the "Fair Game" tactic is to make
         certain that the allegations are crafted so they cannot be objectively disproved. In
         other words, the declarant makes an allegation of a bad or harmful or harassing act
         that cannot be documented in a tangible form and then alleges that it was done by
         the Church pursuant to the Fair Game "policy." By so doing, the declarant has put
         the Church in the impossible position of trying to prove a negative and trying to
         prove it without documentation. It becomes a matter of the declarant s word
         against that of the Church, and by making the act alleged sufficiently despicable,
         the result is prejudice against the Church.

(Def. Ex. 146, Decl. of Vicki Aznaran, ~J 7, 8).

    It is of no small importance that this statement came from the videotape plaintiff s counsel
tried to exclude. This statement of Mr. Prince and many others like it, responding to cookie-cutter
anti-Scientology allegations made by Vicki Aznaran in her lawsuit, paints a vivid picture of the
manner in which the claims of "harassment" tactic is employed against the church. Throughout
this video, Mr. Prince is repeatedly asked about allegations similar to those he makes today. His
answer to those allegations stand in stark contrast to the "interpretations" he has presented to this
Court. Moreover, the tape itself and Mr. Prince s tone and demeanor, evidence the absence of
duress Mr. Prince experienced when leaving the church, and are entirely contrary as to how Mr.
Prince has testified as to those events. (See also Ex. 145, Cooley Affidavit). Mr. Prince had
possession of transcripts filed in court of his interviews with Mr. Rathbun and Mr. Cooley.

                              -99 -
Ms. Brooks corroborates:

          BY MR. LJROT:
          Q.  Well, your testimony was that it was cancelled or disbanded or
          done away with and the critics just kept focusing on it. Is that your testimony?

          A. Well, I   I should say that I   when I was in Scientology, I never seen [sic] this. I
          didn t see it until after I got out. And I began to use that policy. I was very happy
          when-I found it. And I used it beginning in 1993 when I began to do this work in
          litigation. It clearly paints Scientology in an extremely bad light.

(Ex. 2, Brooks, May 7, p. 470).

Brooks further testified that "fair game" not only is not Church policy; it is an anti-

Scientology tactic.

          BY MR. LIROT:
          Q. Ms. Brooks, in your activities I guess as a consultant or expert witness, you
          provided copies of the Fair Game policy to attorneys working for clients that had
          interests adverse to the Church, didn t you not?

          A. Yes. I advised them to bring it up at every opportunity with the Court.

(Id., 462).

And raise it at every opportunity Mr. Dandar did. Through repeated references to "fair
game" either by name or by alleged example, the tactic is an effort not to furnish evidence, but
rather to prejudice the Court with inflammatory, but unsubstantiated allegations. In the end, Mr.
Dandar and his witnesses could point tO nothing anyone from the Church had done to Bob
Minton that was not public. Every point of harassment they accused the Church of using for
purposes of blackmail or extortion, were allegations the Church had repeatedly raised publicly and
brought to the Court s attention, including money laundering, tax evasion and using ill-gotten
money from

Nigeria. Moreover, and notwithstanding testimony to the contrary by Ms. Brooks and Mr.
Minton, the Church stands behind its claims and has repeatedly presented evidence in support of
its allegations. The Court can easily understand why the Church believed LMT and Minton were
involved in money laundering, e.g., Operation Clambake funds funneled through LMT to Mr.

Plaintiffs witnesses made accusations about harassment by the Church, yet the LMT
videos graphically illustrate the Church s policy: avoid confrontation. On the other hand, the LMT
employees were not only not fearful of the Church, they were gleefully laughing as they planned
their pickets, discussing the impact they were hoping to have on the Church.

This is best illustrated by the video where witness Frank Oliver announced, "They re
going to freak" as he arrived for a "midnight picket" at the Fort Harrison. (Ex. 47, Def. Hrg Ex.,
307W. Mr. Oliver, who was in the Church for a very short time and left over a decade ago, has
never been sued, and did not and could not point to one incident aimed at him. By contrast,
during his midnight picket at the Fort Harrison Hotel, he showed neither a compunction nor any
fear about shining his laser light into the eye of a security guard outside the building. Furthermore,
he organized pickets with a group of hired punk rock band members chanting in front of the Fort
Harrison, among other things, "Davey the Dwarf," and said he was "having a good time,"
expressing his First Amendment rights. While this may be true, it demonstrates the double
standard of "harassment" he and his fellow critics apply with respect to the Church.

Hana Whitfield offered her own brand of "fair game" allegations.~1  True to the tactic,

 61/ Church counsel did not receive notice Ms. Whiffield would be called as a witness until
 almost 1:00 a.m. of the morning she testified. This Court was also made aware that Mr. Dandar

                             - 101 -
Hana Whitfleld made unsubstantiated allegations about unauthorized credit checks being run on
her. She offered nothing to link the allegation of credit espionage to the Church as opposed to an
identity thief or even an authorized user of the service. All she did was allege it, and suggest that
it must have been the Church.

Ms. Whitfield, however, is responsible for the involuntary deprograrnniing of
Scientologists, including an effort to alienate one of the defendants, Dr. Houghton, from his faith.
In her direct testimony, she failed to reveal her connection to the now-defunct Cult Awareness
Network, a clearing house for violent deprogranirning, nor did she mention the 1986 billion dollar
class action lawsuit she ffled against various churches of Scientology including FSO and RTC, as
well as David Miscavige personally, to seize all assets of the Church and take control of it. Her
complaint in that case was dismissed as frivolous, and only after failing in her attempt to take over
the Church did she embark on her more invasive anti-Scientology activities. She complains that
Ben Shaw and the Kansas City Church investigated her attempts to deprogram Dr. Houghton as if
a Church had no right to safeguard a member from involuntary attempted conversion from his
chosen religion, including Ms. Whiffield s tactics of clipping the phone wires to the Houghtons 
home and taking their keys.

More egregious were the examples given by Mr. Vaughn Young. Perhaps the most
outrageous was his claim that somehow the Church had "beat" up his dog. Of course, who knows
what happened to the dog (if anything), but certainly it is an allegation the Church has no means

     61/ (...continued)
  had repeatedly offered and then withdrawn Ms. Whitfield as a witness. Judge Moody had issued a
  ruling that Dandar could not use Ms. Whitfleldfor any purpose, without prior court approval. (Ex.
  147). The reason for this is obvious.

of disproving. And yet. Mr. Young utilized this sensational allegation to impugn the Church, even
creating the impression Scientologists don t like animals (Young being well aware how untrue
that is). Yet, as revealed, the harassive activities Mr. Young has engaged in go far beyond the
realm of the non-existent dog-beating story. As shown, Mr. Young was expert in "fabricating
scenarios" most notably the allegation that Mr. Miscavige had somehow been involved in the
murder of his mother-in-law. Amazingly, when confronted with his affidavit, Young equivocated
regarding the plain language of his affidavit, suggesting Mr. Miscavige s involvement was not
really what he meant. Young also was responsible for drafting declarations in this case in support
of Jesse Prince s invented allegations concerning Mr. Miscavige ordering Lisa McPherson to die.
In that regard Young s testimony of harassment is more than sanctimonious. He is motivated by
the anti-Scientology mentality and apparently finds fictitious allegations of murder acceptable,
while any Church response calling him a liar is harassment.

Then there is Peter Alexander, who claimed he was not into picketing like Minton. Yet
when LMT videos were produced, they showed him not only picketing, yelling "let me tell
Miscavige to stick it up his a," carrying picket signs on Cleveland and Fort Harrison calling for
drivers to honk against Scientology, reciting the mantra to "get rid of Miscavige," and a host of
other matters. And as for "fear", Alexander was seen on video counter-picketing union workers
picketing his film set, bragging that "we re going up against the Church of Scientology" and
"We re not afraid of them and we are not afraid of you." (See, Def. 1kg Ex. 307A.)

Finally, there is Jesse Prince who, after blatantly contradicting Mr. Minton s testimony,
through false testimony of his own, was next heard complaining about how his "good friend,"
Bob Minton, was picked on and "harassed" by the Church. Mr. Prince is the last person in the

                             - 103 -
who should complain about harassment of him or Mr. Minton after being paid by Mr. Minton to
level the most serious allegations imaginable, that David Miscavige had ordered Lisa McPherson
killed. When asked what the Church s harassment time line would look like compared to
Minton s, he responded, "minuscule." Beyond that, Prince s stories about Church attempts to
harass and "set him up" included the preposterous allegation that a bag of rock cocaine the size of
a softball, was placed outside his hotel room. He never said how he responded, but considering
the Church s stance against drugs, this story is incredible.

Most egregious, however, were the statements of Mr. Dandar himself. As the hearing
progressed, his claims became more and more outrageous. He alleged his wife had been harassed
because somebody pulled in front of her at a stop sign. He claimed his phone had been used to run
up high phone bills, but failed to bring forth evidence to support such an allegation. Had the
Church been aware of his claim it would have subpoenaed his phone records and been able to
disprove his allegations. It is a virtual certainty, however, that if the Church had served a
subpoena for Mr. Dandar s phone records to examine his allegations, his response would have
been to cry "harassment" and "fair game," and he probably would have accompanied his
protective order motion with a request for sanctions.

Similarly, if the Church had had notice of and sought discovery to disprove the other
allegations of "harassment" leveled for the first time in this hearing   e.g., placing a softball-size
bag of rock cocaine outside Prince s hotel room; credit checks of Whitfield; purported telephone
calls on Mr. Dandar s phone number; beating up Young s dog   Mr. Dandar also would have
cried "harassment" for the very act of trying to obtain information to disprove such fabricated

If "fair game" were really practiced, if it really were a religious duty to destroy people
who attack Scientology, then Frank Oliver would not chuckle and taunt while knowingly being
videotaped by his cohort, Mark Bunker, as Mr. Oliver aims a laser pointer at the eyes of a Fort
Harrison Hotel security guard. If"fair game" were really what OSA practices to do away with
critics by any available means, Peter Alexander would not testify that such "harassment" was
rather amusing. If"fair game" really existed in the form that Mr. Dandar s witnesses would have
this Court believe, those witnesses would not have come forth and testified, and certainly would
not, as Jesse Prince does, attack Scientology for a living.

Perhaps the best evidence of the anti-Scientologist strategy to poison courts by claiming
"fear" and "harassment" involves the events leading to Mr. Minton s recantation. As the Court
will remember, as part of their anti-Scientology activities, Ms. Brooks and Mr. Minton had
directed significant quantities of vitriolic insults towards Mr. Rinder personally, practically
referring to him as "the devil." Thus, the Court expressed surprise that Ms. Brooks and Mr.
Minton would approach Mr. Rinder when they decided to extricate themselves from the anti-

Scientology litigation enterprise. The actual explanation could not be simpler: They had already
done so several times before. They knew Mr. Binder, while no doubt capable of defending the
Church in litigation, would not harm them or subject them to illegal harassment.

In 1998, Mr. Minton and Ms. Brooks met with Messrs. Binder and Rathbun in an effort to
resolve their disputes with the Church. Despite their vociferous, often vicious, verbal assaults on
Scientology and Scientologists, Mr. Binder and Mr. Rathbun invited them into the Church s
Celebrity Centre in Los Angeles. Messrs. Binder and Rathbun opened lines of communication and
attempted to show Mr. Minton, who was never a Scientologist, a Church, what it looks like,

and what parishioners do and see inside.

Following those meetings, where a mutual walk away was offered and rejected, Mr.
Minton and Ms. Brooks resumed their vilification of Mr. Binder and Mr. Rathbun on the Internet
and elsewhere. There was no retaliation from Mr. Binder or Mr. Rathbun.

When Mr. Minton and Ms. Brooks became Directors of FACTNet they faced millions in
potential damages in copyright litigation with the Church. Ms. Brooks and Mr. Minton spoke
directly to Mr. Rinder and Mr. Rathbun, to settle the matter. Ultimately, those discussions were
successful. It is important to note that Mr. Binder and Mr. Rathbun never asked for a penny, but
only insisted the Church s rights be preserved with an injunction against future infringements.

Both Mr. Minton and Ms. Brooks knew when they picked up the phone to contact Mr.
Binder who they reviled as the "devil," he would not only answer, but would respond in good
faith. So, it was no surprise Minton and Brooks expected to walk into a meeting with Mr. Binder,
negotiate a reasonable settlement with the Church, and extract themselves from the litigation.

With FACTNet, Minton not only extricated himself, but ended the FACTNet copyright
abuses. The case went away. Considering Minton s central role in the wrongful death case, which
had become the centerpiece of the anti-Scientology crusade worldwide ("David Miscavige orders
Scientologists killed"), based on allegations made by Minton s imported employees (most
particularly Jesse Prince), the Church expected Minton to stop the abuse.

Not surprisingly, both Minton and Brooks felt that very result was within their power.
After all, they knew of the financial shenanigans, they knew LMT s actual role as adjunct to
Dandar & Dandar as well as recipient of the bulk of any judgment, they knew how the Jesse
Prince "end of cycle" scenario had been concocted, and they knew of the LMT discovery that had


hidden or destroyed.

In essence, Minton and Brooks knew the case was a sham and more importantly, they
knew their involvement and misconduct might soon be exposed in upcoming hearings and
sentencing for contempt of both Brooks and Minton. Even more significantly, they expected that
Mr. Dandar, also aware of all the facts and the trouble Minton and Brooks were facing, would
support their efforts to extricate themselves from litigation (and criminal charges), especially in
light of the huge sums of money Minton had provided Dandar.

Minton and Brooks never suspected that Dandar would turn on them, using his knowledge
of their perjury as blackmail to hold them hostage. The final straw came when Minton requested a
return of $250,000 he had given Dandar yet days before. Dandar refused, alleging it had already
been "used up". Minton realized   so had he.

The Court has wondered what would cause someone like Minton to testify as he has, even
when it results in self-incrimination. The answer may best be summed up in the words of John W.
Dean describing his reasons for abandoning the White House in the wake of Watergate:

         "In the end, of course, I found that I didn t have the stomach for a life of
         crime. When I decided to end the cover-up by going to the prosecutors and
         explaining what was really going on, it was a difficult and unpleasant decision, but
         I had reached a point where I was ready to destroy myself to do the right thing. I
         wasn t 'flipped  to become a government witness. Rather I went looking for the

John W. Dean. Unmasking Deep Throat

The false evidence of harassment was offered as a ruse to claim that Minton had been

blackmailed and extorted and that his testimony therefore was false. It is clear from the above that
harassment had nothing to do with Mr. Minton s sudden turnabout in providing truthful


In a perverse turn of events, both Minton and Brooks have now been subjected to the
same type of harassment the Church has suffered at the hands of the anti-Scientology community
  which Minton once led   for years. The witnesses he paid now call him and Ms. Brooks liars, and
have attempted to tell the Court nothing they say can be believed.

As both Mr. Minton and Ms. Brooks agree, it was Bob Minton and the LMT who
subjected the Church, its staff and its parishioners, to harassment unprecedented in nature. He
financed a campaign to accuse the ecclesiastical leader of the religion of murder, and to spread
this venom on the Internet and pickets worldwide. Unlike Minton and his LMT cronies, the
Church staff members were not giggling about midnight pickets. They did not find it entertaining.
They retreated. When Minton and LMT came to the doors to harass parishioners, they purchased
vans to escort them. When the pickets went right up to the windows of the vans, they decorated
the windows with Christmas ornaments. When LMT obstructed front entrances, the Church
created side ones. When the Church s refusal to respond resulted in even more strident assaults,
the Church followed the city s suggestions and hired off-duty CW police to keep the peace. It was
not enjoyable. It was not fun. But it did cost   millions.

The harassment in and resulting from this case is set forth in detail, and supported by
evidence, on the defendants  Time Line of Harassment. (Def. Hrg. Ex. 309). The Church has
endured years of vulgar picketing, provocative taunting, and claims that their religion is a fraud
and its leadership is criminal. Churches and church staff members have been shot at, fire bombed,
physically assaulted. While anti-Scientologists have been amused, Church staff in Clearwater and
around the world have been threatened with bomb scares and postal anthrax hoaxes; they have


been the targets of gunmen and bombers and swastika graffiti.

It s clear the harassment in this case has nothing to do with the blackmail or extortion of
Bob Minton. It is Mr. Minton who undertook a worldwide crusade of harassment against
Scientology, Scientology churches, and Mr. Miscavige. It was Mr. Minton who spent over ten
million dollars of his own money to try to destroy Scientology through litigation, charging the
leader of the Church with murder, creation of LMT, development of the movie "The Profit," and
other projects. It was Mr. Minton who provided employment for the handful of apostate
Scientologists who, as typical former believers of a religion, will engage in almost any act and say
almost anything to hurt that religion. It was Mr. Minton who sponsored and engaged in picketing,
violent acts, vile internet postings, and other Threats against Scientologists. When confronted by
this heavily funded assault from Mr. Minton, the Church has responded by lawful means, in the
courts of law.

As we have shown here, the only reason Mr. Minton recanted was that his misconduct in
this case and the case before Judge Baird put him in a position where he either had to recant or
risk very serious civil and criminal penalties. Thus, all the testimony presented by plaintiff of a
purported policy of "fair game," of a purported practice of harassment against critics or
opponents of Scientology, completely unrelated to Mr. Minton or Ms. Brooks, is irrelevant. It is
almost entirely inadmissible hearsay, unreliable, and false. Moreover, absolutely no credible
evidence of extortion or blackmail was presented because it did not occur. The Court should not
give it any weight; it should not consider it; in fact, it should strike it from the record.

          7.   The Sham Murder Allegation

The sham nature of the intentional murder allegations upon which the wrongful death

claim exclusively rests is addressed in "Defendant s Final Brief on Issue of Sham Pleading...",
which we fully incorporate here. As we show, there is not and never has been an objective
competent evidentiary basis to support that allegation, which Mr. Dandar s own "expert" witness,
Bill Franks, labeled as "bizarre" and which Mr. Prince admitted was his own sheer conjecture and
speculation. As we further show in the aforementioned brief, it was a fundamental violation of
Florida law for Mr. Dandar and plaintiff to bring and continue to litigate such contrived pretense
of an allegation.



     A trial court has the inherent power to impose sanctions on a party who destroys evidence

or perpetrates a fraud on the court. Figgie Int l, Inc. v. Alderman, 698 So. 2d 563, 567 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1997); Tramel v. Bass, 672 So. 2d 78, 84 (Fla. 1~t DCA 1996), rev, den., 680 So.2d 426
(Fla. 1996).

     It is Well-settled law "that a party who has been guilty of fraud or misconduct in the

prosecution or defense of a civil proceeding should not be permitted to continue to employ the-.

very institution it has subverted to achieve her ends." Hanono v. Murphy, 723 So.2d 892, 895

(Fla. 3d DCA 1998). Where a party perpetrates fraud on the court which permeates the entire

proceedings, dismissal of the entire case is proper. Desimone v. Old Dominion Insurance Co.,

740 So.2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Babe Elias Builders, Inc. i . Pernick, 765 So.2d 119,

120-2 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Savino v. Florida Drive In Theatre Management, Inc., 697 So.2d

1011 (Fla. 4il~ DCA 1997); Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4~ DCA 1992).

Indeed, a trial court has the right and obligation to deter fraudulent claims from proceeding in
court. Savino, 697 So.2d at 1012 (emphasis added); Tn Star Investments, Inc. v. Miele, 407
So.2d 292, 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Tramel, 672 So.2d at 83.

In examining whether fraud "permeates the entire proceedings," Desimone, 740 So.2d at
1234, courts have noted a number of factors that warrant dismissal. They include the following:

1.     the egregiousness of the misconduct, Metropolitan Dade County v. Martinsen,
736 So.2d 794 (Fla. 3rdDCA 1999).

2.     whether the party personally participated in the fraudulent activity, Cox v.
Burke, 706 So.2d 43 (Fla. 5t~~ DCA 1998).

3.     whether the fraud bore "directly on the issue of damages," Desimone, 740
So.2d. at 1234.

4.     whether the aggrieved party can be "restore[d] ... to the position they would have
occupied," Babe Elias Builders, Inc., 765 So.2d at 121.

5.     whether counsel engaging in the fraudulent activity previously had been
sanctioned for similar acts. Kozel v. Ostendorf 629 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1993).

While any one of these factors can militate, even conclusively, in favor of dismissal, all of
them are present here.

As we have seen, the misconduct at issue here goes far beyond the acts of plaintiff s
counsel in suboming the perjury of Minton on such issues as the amount of funding Minton
supplied to counsel, and plaintiff s counsel s own perjury in the breach of contract case covering
up the perjury and subornation of perjury. It extends as well to, and yet still goes far beyond, the
acts of perjury and intentional misstatement, including the perjury and misstatements of plaintiff

herself, concerning the agreement that the plaintiff would donate the "bulk" of any recovery in this
case to an anti-Scientology group of Minton s choosing, lies intended to conceal the improper
purpose and ultimately the sham nature of the plaintiffs allegations in this case.

Rather, the misconduct, goes to the very heart of the case. Plaint jff  and, by the
testimony of both Ms. Liebreich and Mr. Dandar, it was plaintiff herself, and not merely her
counsel or her financier or her consultants and witnesses   chose to convert this case into a
broadside attack on the Church and the Scientology religion, for collateral and improper
purposes. That attack was fueled by a wholly contrived and sham factual allegation of intentional
murder, purportedly ordered by the religion s highest officials. Those invented allegations came
not from any facts, but rather from the imaginations of Stacy Brooks and Jesse Prince, fueled by
the money of Robert Minton. Those sham allegations were approved by the plaintiff herself, and
relentlessly pursued by Mr. Dandar, in the face not only of uncontroverted evidence to the
contrary, but even the testimony of his own principal expert witnesses. Those allegations were not
even l¤nited to the wrongful death claim. Similar allegations of intentional misconduct and murder
are contained in the general allegations, particularly paragraphs 26 and 29, and are realleged in
every count of the complaint. And the specific examples of perjury, subornation of perjury, and
false statements now revealed were undertaken for no other reason than to further the sham
allegations and collateral purpose of the lawsuit, or to conceal that purpose.

For those reasons, even apart from the sham murder allegation itself, much of the
misconduct of plaintiff established in this proceeding and set forth herein is relevant and material
to the underlying case. In particular, the misconduct was relevant and material to the Church s
possible defenses to the Fifth Amended Complaint, especially its allegations of murder and its

attacks upon the Scientology religion. Much of the perjury, false statement and discovery abuse
engaged in by Mr. Dandar, Mr. Minton, Ms. Brooks and LMT was undertaken to conceal the fact
that the case was being litigated at least in substantial part to destroy the Scientology religion and
to benefit an anti-Scientology group. The scandalous allegations were invented for the purpose of
benefitting and increasing the return for that group, its principals, its board members, and its
employees, many of whom also served as Mr. Dandar s "witnesses." Certainly, the Church would
be entitled to defend against the invented "murder" charges and attacks on the religion by
showing the motive, financial interest and connection between LMT, its employees, its owners
and operators, and the estate and its counsel and their common obsession to denigrate and destroy
the reputation and ecclesiastical standing of David Miscavige. Likewise, the Church would be
entitled to show that plaintiffs witnesses, as employees and participants in LMT, stood to gain
from any financial benefit LMT might obtain from a judgment or settlement in this case. In fact,
their future employment and economic well-being depended to a large extent on LMT being, in
Mr. Minton s word, "endowed" by a portion of the judgment in this case. By "backtracking" from
prior statements that LMT would reap substantial financial gains from a large verdict or
settlement in the case, by hiding the degree to which Mr. Minton and LMT were involved in and
interfered with the conduct of that case, and by hiding or destroying evidence, Mr. Dandar and his
associates interfered with the Church s potential defenses and with their ability to impeach the
testimony of witnesses, including Mr. Prince.

The factors relating to fraud on the court are examined individually below.

          A.   Damage to Aggrieved Party

     In Babe Elias Builders, Inc. v. Pernick, 765 So.2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), the trial

                             - 113 -
entered a default against defendants who created false evidence in the form of invoices, receipts
and other documents. The appellate court affirmed, noting that defendant "cannot restore the
Plaintiffs to the position they would have occupied in the absence of [Defendant s] willful and
fraudulent discovery violations." Id. at 121. Similarly, in Kozel v. Ostendorf 629 So. 2d 817, 818
(Fla. 1993), one of the factors in deciding whether a dismissal is appropriate is whether the
misconduct "prejudiced the opposing party through undue expense, loss of evidence, or in some
other fashion."

Here, defendants have suffered incalculable damages   more than $10 million in fees and
costs, including very substantial fees and expenses on this Motion alone, incalculable wasted time
and effort, and the most highly publicized case of the decade in the local community as well as
world-wide derogatory coverage of the sham allegations  from plaintiffs misconduct, sham
pleading, perjury, and subornation of perjury. Defendants have spent more than four years
defending the false intentional murder and survival tort claims that were added in December 1999

  indeed, the bulk of the litigation since that point has concerned those claims. No reasonable
comparison can be made between the damages to which the plaintiff could ever be entitled and the
harm already visited upon the Church. Additionally, whatever damages defendants can recover on
their counterclaim, or as sanctions, or on their breach of contract claim before Judge Baird, can
never be compensated by the Estate, whose only asset, according to Mr. Dandar, is the wrongful
death claim itself.

Indeed, the Estate is already substantially in debt, and is about to become much more so.
On March 4,2002, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas entered a
judgment for $309,000 against the Estate   on behalf of the Religious Technology Center (RTC)

because of the Estate s beach of contract in seeking to add RTC s Chairman, Mr. Miscavige, as a
defendant in this case. A second judgment for attorneys  fees, in the amount of almost $300,000
has also been entered, which also assesses over $98,Q00 of that amount against Mr. Dandar, his
brother Thomas, and Dandar & Dandar, for vexatious litigation of claims having no merit in fact
or law. (Ex. 149). ~-~' In the Florida breach of contract case, Judge Baird already has entered
summary judgment on liability on behalf of FSO. Resolution of damages and attorneys  fees, and
sanctions for the misconduct of Mr. Dandar and the plaintiff has yet to be determined. Moreover,
at the least, defendants are entitled to a default judgment on the counterclaim in this case, based
on the clearly documented false testimony and misconduct which occurred on matters related
directly to the counterclaim. Thus, the Estate is likely to be in debt to FSO and other Scientology
entities for millions of dollars, which it can never pay. Certainly, it would be highly inequitable to
permit the Estate to pursue a wrongful death claim, in any form, which cannot legitimately
approach in value the amount the Estate itself will owe to FSO and RTC. And to require FSO to
continue to litigate and defend the wrongful death action, when it can never hope to recover its
damages in this and the breach of contract cases, would merely add insult to injury.

          B.   Party Personally Involved in Fraud

This case involves false statements and misconduct not only by counsel and Mr. Minton,

62/ Amazingly, Dandar & Dandar moved for reconsideration to have that judgment amended
to apply only to Thomas Dandar, thereby relieving Kennan Dandar of legal or financial
responsibility for his misconduct. In light of Mr. Dandar s testimony in this case, it becomes
obvious why his firm would seek to only amend fees against Tom Dandar: If all monies received
from Minton were personal to Ken an award against Tom would once again find RTC unable to
collect due to another '~judgment proof" individual. That motion was denied with the Texas
court reiterating the frivolous nature of counsel s conduct and granting the award against Ken
Dandar, Tom Dandar and Dandar & Dandar, leaving no room to avoid its payment. (Def. Hrg.
Ex. 284).

but by the plaintiff herself. (See April 20,2002 deposition testimony of Dell Liebreich.) Ms.
Liebreich: 1) was involved in developing the litigation strategy, and even claimed to be "in
control" of the course of litigation (Ex. 120, Liebreich Depo, Jan. 10, 2001, pp. 224-225), and 2)
testified that she herself suggested adding in the false intentional murder claim against David
Miscavige (Ex. 121, Depo of April 20, 2002, pp. 362-363), and 3) testified falsely and
misleadingly herself on the issue of the secret agreement with Mr. Minton, which is not a matter
collateral to the litigation as it was this agreement that transformed the entire nature of the
proceeding. (See Appendix A). As such, Ms. Liebrich was an active and essential participant in
the fraud upon the court.

A number of courts have dismissed actions in their entirety when a plaintiff has been
personally involved in a fraud upon the court. Similarly, courts have entered orders of default
against defendants who perpetrate fraud   here, the Estate is a defendant with regard to the
Church s counterclaim.

In Cox v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 5t~~ DCA 1998), the trial court dismissed a personal
injury action after the plaintiff provided false information about her personal history. Even though
the falsity did not gO to her underlying claim of legal malpractice, the Fifth District Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal, finding that the falsity did relate to damages and was not
collateral, stating that:

          where a party lies about matters pertinent to his own claim, or a portion of it, and
          perpetrates a fraud that permeates the entire proceeding, dismissal of the whole
          case is proper.

Id. at 47. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in Figgie Intern. Inc. v. Alderman, 698 So. 2d 563, 567
(Fla. 3d DCA 1997), the court affirmed a trial court order striking the defendant manufacturer s

pleadings and entering a default judgment against it after its product safety manager repeatedly
presented false testimony and destroyed false documents. In Tramel v. Bass, 672 So.2d 78 (Fla.
1st DCA 1996), the trial court entered a default against defendant sheriff s department after its
employees wilfully omitted key portions of a videotape of the incident in question.

Moreover, Ms. Liebreich cannot escape responsibility for this vast record of misconduct,
sham pleading and perjury by claiming to be an innocent victim of the misconduct of Mr. Dandar,
Mr. Minton and others. As already noted, she and the Estate agreed to donate the bulk of the
proceeds to an anti-Scientology organization chosen by Mr. Minton, ultimately LMT. As further
noted, she too testified in a false and misleading manner, at Mr. Dandar s instructions, for the
very purpose of concealing that and related facts. Ms. Liebreich testified extensively that she
played an active part in the litigation of the case, reviewed all pleadings, made decisions, and
evaluated tactics and strategy. Most notably, Ms. Liebreich claims not only that it was her idea to
expand the -case to add Mr. Miscavige as a defendant based entirely on the incompetent
speculations of Jesse Prince, but that she "ins fructed" Mr. Dandar to do so. (Ex. 121,
Deposition of April 20, 2002, p. 362-363) ~'

In the FSO v. Liebreich case, Ms. Liebreich testified to complete responsibility for adding
Mr. Miscavige and that it was her decision alone:

          Q. You moved to amend to add Mr. Miscavige as a defendant in
          September of 1999 not because you found out about him or his Supreme control
          over Scientology, but for a different reason, didn t you?

          A. Well, I wanted him to be responsible for what he did to Lisa.

63/ If Ms. Liebreich is taken at her word, she is responsible. If she is not, she is a perjurer.


          Q. And you decided in 1997 to agree not to hold him responsible in
          exchange for that agreement, Confidential
          Agreement, right?

          A. I guess I changed my mind.

          Q. No. Actually, what happened in September of 1999 is that somebody
          else wanted to add Mr. Miscavige as a defendant and prevailed upon you to do
          that; isn t that right?

          A. That is not right. That is not right.

          Q. So you were the one who initiated the idea of, let s go add Mr.
          Miscavige as a defendant in 1999; isn t that right?

          A. I m sure I did.

(Ex. 120, Liebreich Depo. January 10, 2001, pp. 224-225). Indeed, this testimony was precisely
the ground upon which summary judgment was granted against the Estate in both the Texas and
Florida breach of contract actions.

Unbelievably, Ms. Liebreich also testified that she discussed adding Mr. Miscavige into
the lawsuit with Lisa s mother Fannie McPherson, prior to the suit ever being filed, who said she
"wanted him filed against." (Id. at 223-224). Mr. Dandar gave similar testimony to this Court in
explaining that it was "no big deal" to him to add David Miscavige as a defendant, but he merely
was following the wishes of Fannie McPherson:

          THE COURT: I have a question. If it wasn t such a big deal, why in the world did
          you do it? - I mean, I m having a lot of harangue and a lot of stuff and a lot of stuff
          going on about this addition. If it wasn t a big deal, why in the world did you do

          THE WITNESS: I did it because I was, believe it or not, following the dictates of
          my client, Fannie McPherson. She said, "I want you to sue everybody that had
          anything to do with this."

(Ex. 1, Tr. of June 4, 2002, 158:17-159:1). That statement, and Ms. Liebreich s similar

-   are incredible; Mr. Dandar and Ms. Liebreich apparently ignored these wishes of Fannie
McPherson for 3 '/~ years. When asked by Judge Moody why they waited for over three years to
seek to add Mr. Miscavige, Mr. Dandar stated, falsely, that he only recently had obtained
information about him:

           Mr. Dandar: ... My client agreed not to add on RTC, CSI [in November 1997- 11
           months after the suit was filed.] At the time we had no evidence. We actually
           believed Flag that those corporations and David Miscavige didn t have anything
           to do with running the Church at Flag; Flag was separate and independent.

(Ex. 39, Hearing of October 8, 1999, p. 8) Yet, on the same day he signed the contract, on behalf
of the Estate, Mr. Dandar also filed the First Amended Complaint, which extensively alleged Mr.
Miscavige was the "head" of Scientology and would have received reports about Lisa McPherson.

See First Amended Complaint, ~f 12, 16, 18. The point is that Ms. Liebreich freely joined with
Mr. Dandar in making obviously false statements on the record concerning how and why efforts
were made to add Mr. Miscavige to the litigation.

Ms. Liebreich s testimony that she initiated adding Mr. Miscavige into the lawsuit is not
credible in light of the recent testimony of Mr. Minton, Ms Brooks and Mr. Garko who attended
the meeting with Dandar and debated adding Mr. Miscavige as a defendant. If Ms. Liebreich, as
the representative of the Estate had already decided to do so, what was the necessity of debating -
the matter?

 The most likely ‡xplanation for Ms. Liebreich s testimony, as unbelievable as it was, is
 that it was necessary to defend Mr. Dandar and Mr. Minton against the exposure of the actual
 relationship between Mr. Dandar, Mr. Minton, and the LMT. Additionally, if Liebreich had not
 testified that she controlled the case and that it was her decision to add parties, she would have


exposed Mr. Dandar to potential liability and damages in both breach cases. With her testimony as
she gave it, she only exposed the Estate, which had "no assets", and thus was judgmentproof)" 

Thus, Ms. Liebreich herself was personally involved in the fraud. Moreover, her fraudulent
acts were central, not collateral, to the litigation, as they resulted in the addition of the central
extant claims in this litigation, and concerned specific acts of conduct by the defendant that were
unsupported. Thus, the misconduct here was even more central to the litigation than in Cox,
where plaintiffs lies concerned her own personal history, rather than the actions of defendant.

          C.   Fraud Bears on Issue of Damages

If the fraud relates to damages, that militates in favor of dismissal. For example, in Savino
v. Florida Drive In Theatre Management, Inc., 697 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 4tb DCA 1997), the plaintiff
in a personal injury action lied about his level of education and intelligence prior to the accident,
claiming among other things that he had a master s degree in engineering from N.Y.U,

"' Ms. Liebreich testified in her deposition on April 20, 2002 that she did not know who would pay
the Texas judgment:
                    Q.   Would you expect Mr. Dandar to pay that judgment? MR.
                    DANDAR: Objection; speculative and
                    JUDGE BEACH: Sustained.
                    Q.  Well, who would you expect to pay that judgment? MR.
                    DANDAR: Objection; speculative and
                    JUDGE BEACH: I think he can ask her that.
          A. Idon t know.
(Ex. 121, Liebreich Depo., pp. 404:14-25).

thus exaggerating the effect of the injury on his brain.~  Dismissing the entire action, the court

     Appellant lied about matters which went to the heart of his claim on damages. These
     repeated fabrications undermined the integrity of his entire action. We believe that the trial
     court has the right and obligation to deter fraudulent claims from proceeding in court. See
     id.; Tn Star Invs., Inc. v. Miele, 407 So.2d 292, 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Tramel v. Bass,
     672 So.2d 78, 83 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev, denied, 680 So.2d 426 (Fla.1996). Appellant s
     conduct amounted to a scheme calculated to interfere with the court s ability to impartially
     adjudicate his claim. Thus, we do not find that the trial court clearly abused its discretion
     in dismissing the case with prejudice.

Id. at 1012. (emphasis added).

     Similarly, in Desimone v. Old Dominion Ins., 740 So.2d 1233 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), a

pedestrian sued a bar after being allegedly struck by a vehicle in a parking lot. The trial court
found that plaintiff made "deliberate misrepresentations and gave false information regarding his
prior involvement in personal injury litigation, prior similar injuries, past medical treatment,
criminal history, employment status and income." Id at 1234, and dismissed the entire action. The
appellate court affirmed, stating that the fraud "permeate[dj the entire proceedings" and "bore
directly on the issue of damages." Id.

Here, the misconduct bears "directly on the issue of damages," in several ways. The
inclusion of the false intentional murder claim heightened plaintiffs potential recovery by allowing
for a claim of punitive damages. Indeed, the purpose of the inclusion of the intentional tort claims
was to increase the amount of the damages, so that they would be sufficient not just for the
plaintiff, but additionally to fulfill the needs of a separate anti-Scientology movement.

65/ Plaintiff also took the initiative of manufacturing a false diploma and presenting it to
the court.

                             - 121 -
Additionally, the fraud here permeates the litigation even more thoroughly than in
Desimone and Savino as it relates not only to damages, but also to allegations concerning the
conduct of the defendants   in other words, the very heart of the case.

          D.   Seriousness of the Misconduct

Serious misconduct also favors dismissal. In Metropolitan Dade County v. Martinsen, 736
So.2d 794 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1999), plaintiff alleged injuries from being rear-ended by a city bus
traveling at 4-5 miles per hour, and did not disclose a fairly lengthy history of pre-existing
conditions. The appellate court found that it was an abuse of discretion not to dismiss the case in
its entirety, stating that the record clearly established that plaintiff engaged "in serious
misconduct," the court concluded she "forfeited her right to proceed." Id., at 795.

Here, as the plaintiffs expansion of this lawsuit to include intentional murder claims that
had no basis, and that have required five years of this court s time, amounts to "serious
misconduct," it would be an abuse of discretion not to dismiss. Plaintiff and her counsel have
simply made up factual allegations of the most scandalous and prejudicial nature possible, which
they must have known had no evidentiary basis. Defendants have been impelled to litigate, at
immense expense, to address and disprove these outrageous and false allegations. Even if plaintiff
herself were not so intimately involved in the misconduct as we have shown she is here,
terminating sanctions would still be appropriate and necessary. In the unique and extreme
circumstances of this case, even if "But for the actions of counsel, appellants would still have a
cause of action[,] Appellants  only recourse now [would be] an action against their counsel."
Johnson v. Landmark First Nat ! Bank, 415 So.2d 161 (Fla. 4tI~ DCA 1982).

                             - 122 -
         E.  Prior Sanctions

Mr. Dandar has twice been sanctioned for filing and litigating claims that had no basis in

fact or law. The first was several years ago in a litigation in federal court before Judge

Kovachevich; the sanction was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit. (Ex. 148, Def. Hrg. Ex. p. 193).

The second was the recent order in the Texas breach of contract case. (Ex. 149, Def. Hrg. Ex.


The prior sanctions did not have their intended effect of deterring similar conduct. More
severe sanctions therefore are necessitated. Kozol, supra.


In no event and under no circumstances should the Court permit Mr. Dandar or his firm to

remain in this case. The activities of Mr. Dandar set forth above constitute, among other things,
violations of the following:

(a)  Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.3(4) (A lawyer shall not
knowingly permit any witness ... to offer testimony or other evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false. ... If a lawyer has offered material evidence and thereafter comes to know of its falsity, the
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.) In Florida Bar v. Lopez, 406 So.2d 1100, 1102
(Fla. 1981), the Florida Supreme Court applied this provision as prohibiting a lawyer from
eliciting testimony from a favorable witness that the lawyer "knew or should have known" was
false. Here, the record is overwhelming that Mr. Dandar, at the least, permitted his witnesses,
including Mr. Minton, Mr. Prince, and the plaintiff herself, to testify falsely, without taking
remedial measures.

                             - 123 -
(b)  Rule 4-8.4(a) (A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of

(c)  Rule 4-8.4(b) (A lawyer shall not commit a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyers s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.)

(d)  Rule 4-8.4 (A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). Here, Mr. Dandar himself engaged in false testimony and
subornation of false testimony, and made repeated false statements to the court.

(e)  Rule 4-8.4(d) (A lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection with the
practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice  )

(f)  Rule 4-1-8(0(2) (Providing that it is improper for an attorney to permit a
third-party who pays that attorney for representing a client to "interfer[e] with the lawyer s
independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship.") It is not necessary
that the third-party s conduct rise to the level of "control" of the litigation; mere interference
renders the attorney s action misconduct.

     The difference is significant. The definition of the word "control" is:

          To exercise restraining or directing influence over. To regulate; restrain; dominate;
          curb; to hold from action; overpower; counteract; govern.

Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 329 (6k" Edition, 1995).

          In contrast, the definition of the word "interfere" is:

          To check; hamper; binder; infringe; encroach; trespass; disturb; intervene;
          intermeddle; interpose. To enter into, or to take part in, the concerns of others.

Id., p. 814 (emphasis added).

In this case, as discussed above, the evidence, at the least, shows that Mr. Minton
continually interfered   i.e., entered into and took part in the concerns of the Estate with respect to
the wrongful death case   both personally as well as through his paid agents, Ms. Brooks and Mr.
Prince, through meetings, phone calls, internet postings, etc. concerning how the case ought to be
conducted, including, inter alia, the making of the "murder" allegations, the challenge to the
religious status of the Church, the inclusion of allegations generally attacking the Scientology
religion, the use of Stacy Brooks as the "eyes and ears" of Minton, the provision of and payments
to Jesse Prince as a "consultant" and witness, and other acts.

Moreover, where the amount of compensation reached the level it did in this case   over
$2 million   the mere payment combined with the continuing communications between Mr. Dandar
and Mr. Minton gives rise to a clear inference of interference, i.e., a clear appearance of
impropriety. For example, it is inconceivable that Mr. Dandar could or would have converted the
wrongful death case into a general attack on Scientology, would have sought to add the murder
allegations, or would have moved to name Mr. Miscavige as a party without assurances of
massive funding from Mr. Minton. It was only after Mr. Minton agreed to step up his funding in
Philadelphia in August 1999, and gave Mr. Dandar a new check for $250,000, that Mr. Dandar
actually brought his motion to add Mr. Miscavige to the case. And, within nine months of the
Philadelphia meeting, Mr. Minton gave Mr. Dandar $950,000!

               (g)  The attorney s oath of admission to the Florida Bar provides, in part, that:

               I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the
               causes confided to me such means only as are

                             - 125 -
              consistent with truth and honor,

               (h)  Sixth Circuit Standards of Professional Courtesy, Standard A-4:

               We will not knowingly misstate, misrepresent, distort, or exaggerate any
               fact, opinion, or legal
               authority to anyone. We will not mislead by inaction or silence. Further, if
               it occurs unintentionally and is later discovered, we will disclose or

     In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. KA. W, 575 So.2d 630, 633-634

(Fla. 1991) the Florida Supreme Court held that although the Rules of Professional Conduct
effective January 1, 1987, no longer contain a specific admonition "to avoid the appearance of
impropriety," the standard in a disqualification motion still remains "the appearance of
impropriety." In the present motion, plaintiff alleges not merely the appearance of impropriety,
but actual impropriety. The Florida Supreme Court adopted from Rotante v. Lawrence Hospital,
46 A.D. 2d 199,200, 361 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (1974) the proposition that disqualification is
warranted in any situation that is "rife with the possibility of discredit to the bar and the
administration ofjustice." State Farm v. KA. W., supra, at 634.

In Henriquez v. Temple, 668 So.2d 638 (3rd DCA Fla. 1996), the appellate court refused to
disturb a trial court order disqualifying a law firm which surreptitiously obtained documents that
the trial court, after an in camera inspection, previously ordered were not to be produced. The
Third District, citing State Farm v. KA. W , supra, found the facts to be "'a situation rife with the
possibility of discredit to the bar an&the administration ofjustice." 

The Henriquez court also relied upon Judge Kovachevich s opinion in Rentclub, Inc. v.
Transamerica Rental Finance Corp., 811 F.Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla. 1992), aff d., 43 F.3d 1439 (1
1~" Cir. 1995). The federal court noted that while the Rules of Professional Conduct do not
contain an

express provision prohibiting the appearance of impropriety, Florida law retains that requirement
in disqualification motions. Relying upon Norton v. Tallahassee Memorial Hospital, 689 F.2d
938,941 (1 1d~ Cir. 1982), the Rentclub court adopted the following, two-pronged test for

          First, although no proof of actual wrongdoing is required, there must exist a
          reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety in fact
          occurred. Second, the likelihood of public suspicion must outweigh the social
          interests that will be served by counsel s continued participation.

Rentclub, 811 F.Supp. at 654. The Court accordingly should disqualify counsel based upon the
foregoing facts and law.

          A.   The Egregious Nature of Mr. Dandar s Misconduct Is Not Mitigated or Excused
          by its Purported Lack of Materiality
     to the Underlying Proceeding

We have shown that not only the sham murder allegation, but also the overall

misconduct engaged in was relevant and material to the underlying action, in particular to the
Church s possible defenses and to the credibility of plaintiff s witnesses. Whether or not particular
aspects of Mr. Dandar s misconduct are considered ~relevant or material, however, they still are
deemed to be improper and grounds for sanctions.

Not surprisingly, under the appearance of impropriety standard, Florida law unequivocally
prohibits making false statements to the Court, eliciting or presenting false testimony, paying fact
witnesses for their testimony, disobeying court orders, or  withholding evidence, without
limitation and without any requirement that the testimony or statements relate to the underlying
merits of the case. Thus, Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.3(a), provides that a lawyer
shall not knowingly "(4) permit any witness, including a criminal defendant, to offer testimony or
other evidence that the

lawyer knows to be false," and does not limit this prohibition to material false evidence. Likewise,
without regard to materiality, Rule 4-3.4 provides that a lawyer shall not "(b) fabricate evidence,
[or] counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely" and prohibits payments to witnesses other than
reasonable expenses and reasonable lost compensation. Similarly, Rules 4-8.4(c), (d) prohibit a
lawyer from "engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation~~ or
"engag[ing] in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice," without any reference to materiality.~ 

The Supreme Court in The Florida Bar v. Agar, 394 So.2d 405 (Fla. 1980), explicitly
held that attorney misconduct need not be relevant to the merits of the case to constitute serious
misconduct under the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct. In Agar, an uncontested divorce
proceeding, the attorney for the husband arranged for the wife to testify to the husband s
residency. Just prior to the hearing, the attorney informed the wife that the practice of the
presiding judge prohibited the wife from giving such testimony, and he therefore suggested to her
that she conceal her identity, testify under a false name, and state that she knew the husband
because she had done bookkeeping for him, which she did, while testifying truthfully on the
material fact of residency. Based on these facts, the Court disbarred the attorney, rejecting his
argument that the finding of misconduct was

Several of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly contain a materiality
requirement. See, e.g., Rule 4-3.3(a)(l) (prohibiting-knowingly making a false statement of
material fact or law to a tribunal); Rule 4-4.1 (a) (prohibiting making a false statement of material
fact to a third person). The inclusion in certain of the Rules, and its exclusion in others, establishes
that materiality is not a requirement for those Rules which do not contain an explicit requirement.
See, e.g. State v. Espinosa, 686 So.2d 1345, 1347 (Fla. 1996).

inappropriate because the dishonesty was irrelevant to the ultimate outcome of the proceeding:

          It matters not, despite respondent s arguments to the contrary, whether the
          testimony is capable, in and of itself, of affecting the outcome of the case in
          question. What is relevant is that respondent, by his own admission, allowed his
          client to perpetrate a fraud upon the court and, according to the testimony of his
          client and the false witness, was the one who suggested the fraud in the first

Id at 406 (emphasis added).

Moreover, the law is clear that, even as to those Rules with an explicit materiality
requirement, the issue of materiality focuses not on the merits of the underlying case, but rather
on the specific proceeding in which the alleged misconduct occurred.~2  Thus, in The Florida Bar
v. Lathe, 774 So.2d 675 (Fla. 2000), for example, the Florida Supreme Court suspended an
attorney who made false statements of facts which were material to the court s specific inquiry,
even though that inquiry was immaterial to the underlying merits of the case. The attorney falsely
stated to the court that he could not attend a deposition because another judge had ordered him to
attend a pretrial conference. Although this false statement was irrelevant to the merits of the
underlying case, the Florida Supreme Court found that the attorney s statement constituted a
violation of Rule 4-3.3(a)(l), which provides that a lawyer shall not make a false statement of
material fact or law to a tribunal. 774 So.2d at 677. See also The Florida Bar v. Hmielewski, 702
So.2d 218, 220-21 (Fla. 1997) (suspending attorney for "deliberate misrepresentations of

Mr. Dandar continued his pattern of misconduct in the underlying case, by repeatedly
perjuring himself in the presence of this Court at the hearings upon the Church s Omnibus


material fact" regarding existence of documents).

          B.   Florida Law Authorizes Attorney Disqualification for Serious Misconduct in the
          Case, Whether or Not the
          Conduct Is Related to the Merits of the Case

Florida courts have long possessed the inherent power to remove an attorney from

a case based on the attorney s serious misconduct in that action. See Burns v. Huffstetler, 433
So.2d 964, 966 (Fla. 1983) (affirming, under court s inherent powers, "removing petitioner as
counsel" in the underlying case); Carnival Corp. v. Beverly, 744 So.2d 489, 493-95 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1999); Henriquez v. Temple, 668 So.2d 638, 638-39 (Fla. 3rd DCA

1996) (affirming disqualification where the attorney s ethical improprieties "clearly involved a
situation rife with the possibility of discredit to the bar and the administration of justice") (internal
quotations omitted). As the court in Carnival Corp. explained, the court s inherent powers
necessarily include the "power to sanction an attorney by the removal of that attorney as counsel
in the case in which the conduct occurred." 744 So.2d at 495. Likewise, the court has the explicit
power to find a party in contempt for failure to comply with discovery orders, which, based on the
above inherent authority, would include the power to disqualify counsel in particularly egregious
cases. See Fla. R. Civ. P.

1 .380(b)(2)(D).

This judicial power to disqualify an attorney for serious misconduct is not limited to
situations in which future proceedings may be tainted, or of conflicts of interest or improper
acquisition of confidential information. Rather, again based on the appearance of impropriety
standard, disqualification is appropriate based solely on acts of serious ethical improprieties in the
subject case, whether or not related to the merits of the case.

   In Burns, for example, defense counsel attempted to delay a criminal trial by requesting
   continuances upon false grounds and by improperly having the criminal defendant admitted
   into a psychiatric hospital. 433 So.2d at 964. The trial court removed him from the case and
   suspended him from the practice of law. On a petition for a writ of prohibition, the Florida
   Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked the power to suspend or disbar attorneys, but
   that it did have the "inherent power.., to impose contempt sanctions on attorneys for lesser
   infractions." Id. at 965. In particular, the court held that there was "no basis in this record to
   vacate the order removing petitioner as counsel" in the case. Id. at 966.

   Several state and federal decisions within the Eleventh Circuit likewise establish that
   disqualification is an appropriate sanction for serious attorney misconduct, unrelated to
   conflicts of interest, access to confidential information, or future taint. In the leading case,
   Kleiner v. First Nat. Bank ofAtlanta, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985), the court upheld both
   a $50,000 fine against the attorney and the disqualification of defendant s lead trial counsel
   where counsel advised his client to contact plaintiff class members to encourage them to opt
   out of the plaintiff class. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court had the power to
   impose any appropriate sanction short of disbarment under the court s "inherent power to
   discipline counsel for misconduct ... without resort to the powers of civil or criminal
   contempt." Id. at 1209 (citing Flaksa v. Little River Cons fruction Co., 389 F.2d 885, 888
   (5th Cir. 1968)). Kleiner did not require the attorney

     - misconduct to concern a matter directly relevant to the underlying proceedings or to have
   tainted future proceedings. Rather, Kleiner explicitly held that "a court can order

                                  -                      131 -

     disqualification based -solely on past improprieties without regard for future taint affecting
     the outcome of the proceeding." Id. at 1210.

    Following Kleiner, the court in Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Finance
    Corp., 811 F.Supp. 651 (M.D. Fl. 1992), affid , 43 F.3d 1439(11th Cir. 1995), applied
    both Florida and federal law in disqualifying a law firm for two acts of serious misconduct,
    each of which supported the disqualification order. Particularly relevant here, the
    plaintiff s law firm paid defendant s former employee   Canales -~ to be a "trial

         consultant," but after payment Canales executed a factual affidavit attacking the

     defendant.~  The court found that "there is the appearance that Canales is being paid for

         his factual testimony as opposed to his work as a 'trial consultant."  Id. at 65-4 (emphasis
     added). The court further found disqualification appropriate because "the likelihood of
     public suspicion outweighing the social interest that will be--served by counsel s
     continued representation, is self-evident." Id. at 656.

     In Cbs v. Pugia,.420 S.E.2d 774 (Ga. App. 1992), the Georgia state court, also
     applying Kleiner, upheld the disqualification of an attorney who improperly communicated
     with an opposing represented party outside the presence of that party s counsel, in
     violation of the applicable Georgia rules of professional conduct. The court held the
     disqualification proper even in the absence of any suggestion of future taint and despite
     the trial court s finding that the ethical violation was not willful. The sanction of
     disqualification was nonetheless necessary because "the appearance of improprie~...

          68/  The court also found that there was an appearance of impropriety that plaintiff s
          law firm

     had induced the former employee to disclose confidential information by its payments to
     him as a "trial consultant."

-   outweighed [the parties ] interest in being represented by their counsel of choice." Cbs, 420
S.E.2d at 775 (citing Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1210); see also Knox v. Hayes, 933 F.Supp.

1573, 1585-86 (S.D. Ga. 1995), affld., 108 F.3d 343 (11th Cir. 1997) (disqualifying counsel and
law firm and imposing an award of attorneys  fees where counsel prepared and used knowingly
false witness affidavit); Essex County Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger, 18 F.Supp.2d 418 (D.N.J.
1998) (disqualifying plaintiffs  counsel for providing her clients, inmates in Essex County jails,
with a memorandum describing staffing deficiencies in the jails, thereby creating a security risk).

          C.   Florida Law Permits an Award of Attorneys  Fees for Serious Misconduct

The Florida Supreme Court recently resolved a conflict among the Circuit Courts

and held that a trial court possesses the inherent authority to impose attorneys  fees against an
attorney for bad faith misconduct. Moakley v. Smallwood, 2002 WL 276466,27 Fla.L. Weekly
5175 (Fla. Feb. 28, 2002); see also Bitterman v. Bitterman, 714 So.2d 356, 365 (Fla. 1998)
(recognizing inherent authority of a trial court to award attorneys  fees and costs for bad faith
conduct against a party). Under Moakley, a court may assess attorneys  fees under its inherent
powers, as long as it makes "an express finding of bad faith conduct ... supported by detailed factual
findings describing the specific acts of bad faith conduct that resulted in the unnecessary
incurrence of attorneys  fees." Moakley, 2002 WL 276466 at *4  The award of fees should
include the costs and expenses incurred as a result of the misconduct, including those occurred
during the hearing at which the serious misconduct is established, and is in addition to the remedy
of disqualification. See Knox, 933 F.Supp.

                             - 133 -
at 1586 (disqualifying counsel and awarding attorneys  fees as a result of counsel s -discovery
abuses, including fees incurred with respect to court s hearing on counsel s misconduct); see also
Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1210 (ordering disqualification and award of attorneys  fees).

The award of attorneys  fees as a sanction for misconduct does not turn on whether the
misconduct is related or material to the merits of the underlying proceeding. In Lathe v. Florida
Select Citrus, Inc., 721 So.2d 1247 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), for example, the court upheld the
imposition of attorneys  fees against an attorney who lied to the trial court after he failed to
appear for a deposition. The Fifth District rejected the attorney s argument that the trial court
could not impose attorneys  fees without first finding him in contempt and held that a "trial court
has inherent authority to order an attorney, who is an officer of the court, to pay opposing
counsel s reasonable attorney s fees incurred as a result of his or her actions taken in bad faith."
Id. at 1247; see also Patsy v. Patsy, 666 So.2d 1045, 1046-47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (affirming
trial court s inherent authority to award attorneys  fees and costs against attorney for a bad faith
motion to disqualify counsel, filed without a factual basis and solely to delay the proceedings);
David S. Nunes, P.A. v. Ferguson Enterprises, Inc., 703 So.2d 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
(assessing attorneys  fees against counsel who did not attend a mediation and advised his clients
that they also did not have to attend).

A court "shall" also award attorneys  fees, in specified circumstances, under Rule
1.380(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, for dIsobeying a discovery order. Unlike the
imposition of attorneys  fees under the court s inherent powers, a fees award under Rule


  1.380(d) does not require a finding of bad faith. Rather, the court "shall require the party. to pay
  the reasonable expenses caused... , which may include attorneys  fees" unless

the party can show that the failure to obey the order was substantially '~justified." As with an
attorneys  fees award for bad faith conduct, the amount of the attorneys  fees award is determined
by the expenses incurred as a result of the party s disobedience. See, e.g., Tutor Time Merger
Corp. i . MeCabe, 763 So.2d 505 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Interamerican Car Rental, Inc. v. Icaro,
559 So.2d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Ortega, 508 So.2d 493
(Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

Here, the appropriate measure of attorneys  fees is very substantial. It includes at the
least the recently concluded proceedings on this motion. It includes almost the entirety of the
litigation over the last four years, with the possible exception of the medical testimony and the
motions to exclude medical evidence. And even that might not have been necessary if plaintiff had
filed and proceeded on a proper complaint with proper allegations and without an improper goal
and purpose. Under those circumstances, it is likely that the case would have settled long ago,
without the Church having had to incur any of the huge legal fees that it has.

Whatever sanctions and attorneys  fees are awarded, the Court should require that they
be paid in full before any consideration be given to proceeding on any claims, if any

- claims remain. As we have argued, the sanctions granted should take into account whether the
aggri&ved party can ever be restored to the position it would have held in the absence of the
misconduct. In this case, that is impossible. For that reason, the monetary sanctions

  which could never be fully satisfied   should supplement the only appropriate sanctions:

                             - 135 -

termination of the plaintiff s lawsuit and disqualification of Mr. Dandar.


For all the reasons stated above, as well as in our moving papers and in our "Final Brief on
Issue of Sham Pleading, and Final Reply on Motion for Summary Judgment on Wrongful Death
Count," the Court should issue an order striking the plaintiff s pleadings, dismissing plaintiffs
complaint, entering default against the plaintiff on the counterclaim, disqualifying Mr. Dandar and
his firm as counsel, awarding defendants monetary sanctions (including attorneys  fees) against
plaintiff and plaintiffs counsel in an amount to be determined, and holding Mr. Dandar in
contempt of court.
DATED: August 9,2002     Respectfully submitted,
                        Eric Lieberman      U

                        Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard,
                                   Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C.
                                   740 Broadway, 5th Floor
                                   New York, NY 10003-95 18
                         Telephone: (212) 254-1111
                         Facsimile: (212) 674-4614
Douglas J. Titus
Florida Bar Number 213756
George & Titus, P.A.
Suite 1290
100 South Ashley Drive
Tampa,FL 33601-3240
        Telephone:    (813) 273-0355
        Facsimile:    (813) 276-1515

Ronald P. Hanes
Florida Bar Number 375624
Trombley & Hanes
707 N. Franldin Street, 10th Floor
Tampa, FL 33602
        Telephone:    (813) 229-7918
        Facsimile:    (813) 839-2025

Helena K. Kobrin
                                   Lee Fugate
                                   Florida Bar Number 0170928
                                   Morris Weinberg, Jr.
                                  Florida Bar Number 0486401
                                   ZUCKERMAN, SPAEDER, LLP
                                   101 East Kennedy Blvd., Suite 1200
                                   Tampa,FL 33602
                                           Telephone:    (813) 221-1010
                                           Facsimile:    (813) 223-7961

                                   Kendrick L. Moxon
Florida Bar No. 0259713
1100 Cleveland Street
Suite 900
Clearwater, Florida 33755
        Telephone:    (727) 443-5620
        Facsimile:    (727) 443-5640
1100 Cleveland Street, Suite 900
Clearwater, FL 33755
Telephone: (727) ~3-5620
Facsimile: (727) ~3-5640

Michael Lee Hertzberg
740 Broadway, 5di Floor
New York, NY 10003
Telephone: (212) 982-9870
Facsimile: (212) 674-3614

                      CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have caused the foregoing DEFENDANTS  CLOSING
SANCTIONS AND OTHER RELIEF to be served to counsel on the below service list, on this
August 12, 2002, as indicated below.

                          SERVICE LIS "(
Kennan 0. Dandar, Esq. VIA HAND    Douglas J. Titus, Esq. VIA U.S.
Dandar & Dandar, P.A. DELIVERY     George & Titus MAIL
1715 N. Westshore Blvd., Post Office Box 3240
Suite 750                Tampa, FL 33601-3240
Tampa,FL 33607           Attorney for Main Kartuzinski
Attorney for Plaintiff
                         Anthony S. Battaglia VIA HAND
Luke Lirot, Esq. VIA HAND          Battaglia Ross Discus & Wein DELIVERY
112 East Street DELIVERY 980 Tyrone Blvd.
Suite B (W/O EXIIIBITS)  St. Petersburg, Florida 33743
Tampa, FL 33602
Attorney for Plaintiff   Bruce 0. Howie VIA HAND
                         Ludin, Howie and Werner DELIVERY
Ronald P. Hanes, Esq. VIA U.S.     5720 Central Avenue (W/O EXHIBITS)
Trombley & Hanes, MAIL   St. Petersburg, Florida 33707
707 N. Franklin Street
10th Floor               Attorneys for Robert Minton
Tampa, FL 33602
Attorney for Janis Johnson
                       INDEX OF APPENDICES

     A.  Testimony Corroborating Robert Minton s Second Affidavit

     B.  Statements of Minton, Dandar, Liebreich & Family Regarding
     "Agreement" to Distribute the Bulk of the Proceeds of a Potential
     Judgement to LMT or Another Anti-cult Group Associated with Minton

     C.  Dandar s Statements Regarding Minton Money

     D.  Liebreich Statements Regarding Minton Money

     E.  Representation of LMT and its Principals and Obstruction of Discovery
     by Ken Dandar

     F.  Testimony about the Trip to Key West

     G.  Jesse Prince s Testimony Regarding His Lack of Opinions on this Case

     H.  Vaughn Young Was Not Involved in Drafting the First Amended

     I.  Vaughn Young "Literal" Testimony

     J.  No Extortion, Blackmail, or Threat

     K.  Graphic Representation of Selected Events in the Wrongful Death Case